Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

371. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 6, 1964—9:30 a.m.

1035. Deptel 731² Reftel raises the cogent question of how to get a maximum of pacification effort in South Viet-Nam with a minimum contribution from the central government in Saigon. This cable acknowledges the existence of this problem, comments on the proposals of reftel, and indicates the actions which the U.S. Mission considers feasible and desirable to implement at this time.

It is true that the pacification activities in the provinces have thus far shown a surprising degree of independence of the political turmoil in Saigon. This independence has been in large measure because of the already decentralized nature of the pacification program and of the leadership occasionally displayed by certain military and provincial officials. The question raised by reftel is whether we should increase this decentralization and encourage greater initiative on part of local commanders to press forward in clearing and holding action to bring at least temporary security to broader areas.

With regard to increased decentralization, as indicated above there is already a high degree of decentralization particularly in most aspects of the PL-480 and psyops programs. With respect to the training of regional forces, this matter is progressing satisfactorily under present arrangements and hence no change seems required. It is doubtful that much further decentralization is feasible except by way of improved supervision at regional level which is discussed below.

[1 paragraph (3–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

We do not necessarily agree that, in principle, it is desirable to encourage uncontrolled initiative wherever found throughout the provinces. The shotgun application of resources in the past has been one of the defects of the pacification program. In instituting the Hop Tac plan, we resolved to concentrate our resources in the Saigon area and accept relatively little progress elsewhere for the time being. This establishment of priority does not, of course, rule out exploiting to the maximum the resources available elsewhere. However, we do think it essential to meet Hop Tac requirements fully and accept shortages as necessary in other parts of the country.

Monthly provincial reporting is now giving us a better feel of the progress of pacification throughout the provinces. For the month of August, our observers considered that pacification was not going satisfactorily in fourteen provinces in comparison to seven in July. This retrogression may be due to a number of reasons such as (a) political events in Saigon (b) refined reporting methods and (c) the concentration of effort being given the Hop Tac provinces. We are now about to propose to Khanh that he strengthen the regional level (currently coextensive with Corps) by providing each with Ministerial representatives who can be used for troubleshooting in the provinces where pacification is lagging.

Another observation is that in the long run Saigon must play an important role in the country-wide pacification. The overall problem is to establish justified requirements for Ministerial resources at the provincial level and then see that the Ministries meet these requirements on time. The Ministerial pipelines must be stocked and made to flow at a proper rate in order to meet pacification needs. This machinery is working very poorly now but it must be our objective to improve it, and get it to perform if we are to be successful in the end. During this caretaker government of Prime Minister Khanh, we should do nothing to retard the subsequent development of the governmental machinery in Saigon, after the installation of the follow-on government. Thus we do not favor the suggestion of providing U.S. aid directly to the provinces beyond present procedures.

In conclusion, the U.S. Mission is unanimous in recommending the following program:

a) Give full support to Hop Tac plan, assuring it the necessary priorities to give it every chance to succeed.

b) Continue to refine U.S. provincial reporting in order to determine areas requiring remedial attention. When Hop Tac priorities permit, concentrate on selected weak areas.

c) Take up with Khanh the need to provide Ministerial representation at regional level capable of forming troubleshooting inspection visits to lagging provinces.

d) Continue at the National Security Council level to develop simplified pacification budgeting procedures without involving regional (Corps) headquarters.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy files: Lot 68 F 8)
2. Document 362.