Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

365. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 28, 1964—7 p.m.

972. For the Secretary. Ref: Embtel 938 and Deptel 736.² This is a US Mission message.

In continuation of the discussion contained in reftels and to furnish additional basis for your talks with Bill Sullivan, this cable resumes consideration of our basic problem, how to assure adequate political leadership (a) in this interim period to about November 1 and (b) in provisional govt thereafter while maintaining throughout an effective military posture toward VC.

Fundamental to this consideration is how we are to view Khanh who, up to now, has enjoyed our confidence and has received our unqualified public and private support. In recent times we have bailed him out at least twice: first, in late August when, except from our repeated assertion of US support, his Generals were apparently ready to oust him because of his concessions to the Buddhists; second, at the time of the September 13 abortive coup when word of encouragement from us to the coup leaders would have tipped scales. The question now is whether he is worth saving again either for the long or short

Before answering the question, it is probably worthwhile to review Khanh’s assets and liabilities as the pressures of recent events have allowed us to see them more clearly. He continues to demonstrate alert intelligence, quickness to see point and agility in moving (sometimes too quickly) to a conclusion. His native cockiness has been reduced to manageable proportions by the tribulations of the past month which have been sobering and edifying experience. He continues to display diligence, working endless hours often to his physical detriment.

Khanh has chosen to identify himself politically with loose coalition, represented on one flank by Tri Quang, and the Buddhist support which he can command, and on the other flank by the clearly anti-Communist, “Young Turk” officers who saved his skin [in] the September 13 affair. These two disparate elements supported Khanh at the time of the September 13 coup and continue to support him temporarily, but for motives which are essentially unrelated except for their common opposition to the Can Lao-Dai Viet-Diemist remnant groups.

To gain the support of these two elements, particularly Tri Quang, Khanh has paid considerable price—how great is presently difficult to determine—in alienating important groups of Vietnamese Army officers. But whatever this loss, he still has the apparent support of majority of officer corps for at least two reasons, (1) evidence of his continued support by US and (2) the absence of strong rival.

So much for Khanh’s assets. He has formidable list of offsetting liabilities. First and foremost, in the last two months he has given most discouraging demonstration of lack of fundamental qualities of leadership. He has yielded to pressure groups and, in particular, has lost precious face in giving way publicly to the Buddhists. His extended absences from Saigon suggest fear for his personal safety.

After his ill-considered and hasty effort to impose the Vung Tau Charter of August 16, he has demonstrated lack of decisive force in dealing with the genie which he released from bottle on that occasion. In particular he seems to have had no sense of clear direction after authoritarian lines of Vung Tau Charter were effectively repudiated.

He is pathologically suspicious of his oldest associates whom he thereby repels and alienates. His suspicions are now turned in uncomfortable measure against Americans who are his last refuge. We have pretty clear indications that he is surreptitiously condoning “leaks” to the press alleging that US was behind the Sept 13 coup, the general strike of the CTV³ and the Montagnard revolt.

If he has won some political support, it has been at the expense of incurring the hostility of the Dai Viets, the Can Lao and of some part of the Catholics which [while?] losing the esteem of an important element of the officer corps. These are his tangible losses—more important is the overall loss of confidence in him of much of the thinking Vietnamese public, of important elements of the armed forces and of Khanh in himself. He is alone, unhappy, afflicted by suspicions and anxious to find some way out of his job.

Mission also has tended to lose confidence in Khanh’s ability to handle the current situation and his ability to prevail in the long run. It now seems doubtful that he can pull through until the inauguration of the provisional govt.

What then should be our course of action in this interim period? I would recommend that we try to stay with Khanh. But if he seems clearly to be going down (and we doubt that he can survive another coup attempt), we should do what we can to maintain an organization with which we can work, preferably with Minh in charge. Minh has been behaving quite well of late and is personally identified with the formation of the High National Council. He is no world-beater as we all know but we need time to see what will come out of the deliberations of the Council.

It would seem that three things might happen in this interim period. First, the Council may succeed in discharging its mission, even if later than the present schedule, and an undistinguished but acceptable civilian govt may emerge which can get on with the war, cooperative adequately with us and justify our giving renewed consideration to military pressures against the North. In this case, we should be filled with pious gratitude and render the govt full support.

Next, the Council may bog down amid bickerings, political maneuvers and renewed pressures from minorities. We should do everything in our power to avoid or restore [resolve?] such situation which could dissolve into anarchy. Alternatively, it could result in backlash which would lead to complete military takeover by armed forces who will hardly stand aside long before such spectacle and in reversion to a dictatorship fully as grim as that of Diem.

In course of such events, the radicals of Hue, the Montagnards in the highland and the VC everywhere all offer potentialities for further troubles but, by the working of the law of averages, they are not all likely to realize their total possibilities.

I am afraid that the foregoing, like most recent cables from Saigon, does not present pleasant outlook. Yet we on the ground are far from ready to concede defeat. As previously reported (Embtel 938) we must hang on, keep up the war and play for political breaks. If we can get reasonably good provisional govt before the end of the year we are back in business. I suspect Khanh will not survive as head of govt but if he can be retained as MinDef and Commander-in-Chief, he may be able give effective military leadership to pacification effort. There remains the ever present problem of finding civilian head of govt. Vien, the new MinInterior, Quat or Vu Van Mau might turn the trick but we will never know until we try them. To permit experimenting, there would be some advantage if the Council comes up with PriMin rather than President as head of govt.

In summary, we recommend for the present:

a. Continuing to press for satisfactory governmental solution by way of the Council.

b. Being prepared to drop Khanh if he gets into irreparable trouble.

c. Viewing Minh as a short term substitute for Khanh.

d. Continuing to fight the war and play for the breaks.

e. Continuing to prepare to take the offensive against North Vietnam in accordance with the time schedule outlined in Embtel 465.⁴

I would appreciate your making this cable available to the President in partial discharge of my obligation under Deptel 707⁵ to provide him each week with a personal evaluation of the situation.⁶

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)
2. Document 359 and Document 364.
3. See footnote 3, Document 359.
4. Document 319.
5. See footnote 2, Document 359.

6. On September 28, the Central Intelligence Agency completed a paper entitled “Deterioration in South Vietnam,” which concluded:

   “The deluge of adversity being reported out of South Vietnam raises the question whether we may be on the verge of some sudden calamity. We believe that certain of this reporting is overly despairing and does not take sufficient heed of offsetting considerations. Nevertheless, the signs of deterioration are so many and so clear, in our view, that the odds now favor a continuing decay of South Vietnamese will and effectiveness in coming weeks, sufficient to imperil the political base for present US policy and objectives in South Vietnam.”

   A copy of the paper was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy on September 28. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XV111, Memos. This paper served as the basis for SNIE 53–2–64, Document 368.