Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

364. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, September 26, 1964—11:29 p.m.

736. Personal for the Ambassador from the Secretary. We have been following closely the excellent reporting from your Mission which boiled down to the conclusion in your 938² that the deterioration of governmental processes is proceeding faster than we anticipated. I have asked my colleagues here to scratch their heads and think of more ways of pulling the body politic together.

One thought that has occurred is the possibility of drafting a declaration of national unity to be signed by all prominent Vietnamese civil and military leaders. The purpose would be to get unanimous written agreement to a list of political objectives toward which all could pledge themselves to work. Something like this was done, I think, in the Philippines and Korea and I am asking our people here to send you the precedents.

In a separate cable we are also raising the question whether Vu Van Mau’s return from London would be helpful.³ In this connection, I wonder whether you have been able to identify any civilian or group of civilians who might provide civilian political leadership, a sort of individual or collective Pompidou.

I am also concerned about the contingency that Khanh may fall away completely. Is there any other leader or group of leaders that you can identify?

Finally, I wonder if you could spare Bill Sullivan for a two-day trip to Washington to give us a better feel for this extremely fluid situation. (I suggest Sullivan because he could probably come in and out of Washington without creating a public fuss.) I don’t want to press this on you if his presence is more urgently required in Saigon. Bob McNamara has said he will arrange the most rapid air transport for Sullivan if you could spare him.

We are very much aware of the extraordinary demands the situation is making upon you and your colleagues, and I need hardly tell you again that the President and the Executive Branch are concerned primarily about finding additional ways in which we can help.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared with William Bundy.
2. Document 359.
3. This telegram has not been identified.