Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

114. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12, 1964¹

Manila, April 12, 1964, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Bundy
• Foreign Minister Quat, South Viet-Nam

Following the conclusion of Dr. Quat’s discussion of his plans at the Conference,² he asked to stay on alone with the Secretary and myself.

Dr. Quat said he wanted to describe the real situation in Saigon, which he had talked about with Ambassador Lodge recently.

He said that the essential problem was that all groups should pull together to assure victory. In particular, he was deeply concerned that there was not full military-civilian cooperation. He said that Khanh knows the situation uniquely among the generals, but that some of his advisors were not so wise. He said there was presently a tendency for Khanh to draw in on himself, and likened this to an accordion which had been fully extended but was now sharply contracted.

He made clear that what he meant was that there was a tendency toward increasing military domination and military powers. This he thought might increase effectiveness in the military sense, but that the result would be ephemeral without better political understanding.

Dr. Quat said that the resignation of Interior Minister Ky³ was an “eclatement” of feeling between the military and the civilians; the implication was that he was friendly to Ky’s position.

Dr. Quat said that he himself was playing the part of an unofficial intermediary between the military and the civilians, and that in his talks with the military leaders, one or two of them had expressed what Dr. Quat regarded as dangerous ideas. Specifically, it was being suggested that if the press did not behave in a disciplined fashion, it should be suppressed. Secondly, it was being suggested that there should be anti-intellectual demonstrations, apparently by military forces (“sorties dans la rue”).

Dr. Quat thought there were two possible solutions. One would be a “real marriage” between the two groups, so that not only would there be a plan (which he conceded there was at present) but it would be carried out in unison on both the military and civilian sides.

Alternatively, Dr. Quat thought there might be a sharing of responsibilities. For example, the MRC might be taken out of political life and lay down the basic guidelines of action for the so-called “points” of the plan, and there might be a civilian government set up under the MRC in order to carry out the plan. If the civilian government then did not do its job, it might be changed.

Comment: Throughout the conversation, Dr. Quat spoke in a low, intense manner, apparently reflecting deep feeling. He was obviously trying to get across the picture that all was not well with Khanh’s handling of the civilian side, and that he himself, despite his asserted position of intermediary, was among those who were sharply unhappy with the way things were going. He did not refer specifically, except in the one instance, to the position of the intellectuals, but I should judge that this, too, is very much on his mind. (I note Khanh’s attack on the intellectuals as useless in his statement yesterday.)

I am not sure how seriously to take Quat’s expression. He himself has always been something of an intellectual, and recollection is that he expressed similar misgivings early in the Khanh regime. Nonetheless, his description does tally sufficiently with other evidences of military-civilian friction so that we should take it as not wholly unfounded.

William P. Bundy⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WFB Chron. Secret. Drafted by Bundy on April 13.
2. At 3:30 p.m. on April 12, Quat, accompanied by Nguyen Duy Lien, the Vietnamese Observer at the SEATO Council Meeting, and Do Lenh Tuan, the Vietnamese Charge in Manila, met with Rusk, William Bundy, and Max V. Krebs, Political Counselor at the Embassy in Manila. Rusk stressed to Quat that he should use the Council meeting to talk with each of the SEATO foreign ministers and describe the situation in Vietnam, the threat from the North, and how South Vietnam was countering it. Rusk thought it important that Quat give the impression that South Vietnam was confident of its ability to cope successfully with the situation. Quat stated that such was his intention, and the two foreign ministers discussed the best means of doing so. (Memorandum of conversation, April 12, US/MC/1; ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
3. Ha Thuc Ky.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.