113. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy Chancery,1
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The Secretary of State
- William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
- Carl F. Salans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs
- France
- Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Jacques de Beaumarchais, Director of the Minister’s Cabinet
- Robert Gillet, Assistant Director of Political Affairs
SUBJECT
- Viet-Nam
The Secretary asked Couve what his thoughts were about South Viet-Nam.
Couve said he hadn’t changed his mind since his last discussions with the Secretary in the autumn.2 The problem in Viet-Nam, as he saw it, was not military but rather a complete political vacuum in Saigon. The Vietnamese people do not want to fight. Couve stated that French reports are that apart from the cities Vietnamese territory is out of the control of the Vietnamese government. The Diem government, although unpopular, was at least a government. Now there is nothing at all.
The Secretary asked what France meant by “neutrality” for Viet-Nam.
Couve replied, “Quite simply, the Geneva Agreements of 1954.” Those accords, he said, provided for the division of Viet-Nam with a commitment by both sides not to accept military aid from outside (sic)3 and not to enter into military alliances—which is really neutrality. The Accords provided for independence, nonalignment and reunification. But, Couve admitted, reunification would not be possible with a Communist regime in the North which is not independent.
[Page 235]Couve said, if you tell me military victory, I will say that is fine. But if the war is not extended to the North and if U.S. forces do not participate, there is not likely to be military victory in Viet-Nam. The South Vietnamese people are out of the game. All you have is a professional army supported from outside. Couve stated that the situation is exactly the same as the French experienced in Viet-Nam in 1954 and again in Algeria. In 1962 in Algeria, when the French gave Algeria its independence, the French had complete physical control of the country, “but in spite of that we lost the battle. You can’t win without the people.”
The Secretary asked whether there were large numbers of Vietnamese and Algerians fighting with the French in those situations. Couve said yes—200,000 Vietnamese and large numbers of Algerians.
Couve continued. There is the game in Viet-Nam, he said, and the game in the international field, with China. North Viet-Nam depends greatly on China. China is an expansionist, imperialist country, and Southeast Asia has always been a target of China’s expansionism. All Southeast Asian countries are terrified at the thought of Chinese expansion. Is there any possibility of China’s considering it in its own interests to reach an accommodation with the West, i.e., the United States? He thought there was, that in order to concentrate on internal development and to reduce the threat to it, China would renounce its expansionist drive in Southeast Asia on the understanding that Southeast Asia would not be hostile. The Hanoi government would have to follow suit.
The Secretary asked, would North Viet-Nam agree to be nonaligned? Couve admitted it would be difficult to conceive of that at the present time. But, he said, it would be enough if North Viet-Nam would agree to let South Viet-Nam alone. National cohesion in VietNam, Couve added, depends on the Vietnamese alone. The Vietnamese don’t like the Chinese and it is not in their interest to be aligned with China.
The Secretary questioned whether the formula described by Couve would appeal to the Chinese any more than in the past. Couve said, “you omit the fact that you are there.” The Chinese are terrified by that. The Secretary said, we were not there in force in 1957. That’s not fair, Couve rejoined. Since 1954 the United States supported the Diem government. The Chinese felt that South Viet-Nam was an American sphere of influence. The Secretary pointed out that our increased presence in Viet-Nam came only after 1959 when Hanoi announced that it was after the South. Mr. Bundy indicated that before that, our presence in Viet-Nam was within the scope of the 1954 Geneva Accords. For example, we had no more than 500–600 military [Page 236] personnel, the number the French had in 1954. Couve replied that for China 500 French military personnel in South Viet-Nam is one thing, but 500 American personnel is another.
Couve said France was trying to find the best means calculated to keep South Viet-Nam from falling to the Communists. The Secretary asked, “Is it the heart of French policy not to have a Communist regime in South Viet-Nam?” Couve answered, “Of course. I have said it many times.” The Secretary asked, then wouldn’t it help for France to throw its support behind those who are trying to stop a Communist takeover? No, said Couve, because we don’t think you can win. The South Vietnamese think that French policy is to get the United States out of Viet-Nam and to have the Communists take over, the Secretary added.
The Secretary said we thought there was a chance for a settlement in Laos, but we haven’t seen it. Couve attributed this fact to the deterioration of the Vietnamese affair. In any case, Couve said, Laos is no longer a “crisis” and Laos is not finally divided. There is still a possibility of unification under some kind of government.
The Secretary said that when Couve speaks of the Laos agreement not having worked because of Viet-Nam, it meant to the Secretary that the Viet Minh want to continue to use Laos to push people into South Viet-Nam. That is one reason, Couve admitted. Another is that the Pathet Lao and Phoumi had no intention of implementing the Geneva Agreements. Both thought there was still something to gain. Phoumi hoped to be master of South Laos-to have a divided country.
Couve asked the Secretary how he saw things for the SEATO Conference. The Secretary said he thought there would be full discussion in the private meetings of Laos, Viet-Nam and Malaysia. He thought it important for SEATO to express interest in there being no further expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam, after all, was one of the SEATO Protocol States. The Secretary did not think SEATO would be called upon to get into the Malaysia question.
The Secretary said he hoped he and Couve would have a further talk. Couve said perhaps something could be arranged on Wednesday afternoon.4
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Salans and approved by Rusk on April 16. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” Rusk and Couve de Murville were in Manila as the heads of their respective delegations to the Ninth Ministerial Council Meeting of SEATO, April 13–15.↩
- Couve de Murville and Rusk discussed Southeast Asia and Vietnam in October 1963. (Ibid.)↩
- As on the source text.↩
- April 15. No record of a conversation has been found.↩