Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 13, 1963, 4:43 p.m.

1402. Ref: Deptel 1143, USUN 1665.² Talks With Sov Del re UN Financing.

In further assessment draft strategy paper you discussed with Cleveland in mid-October, we conclude it would be premature and unprofitable to attempt at this time to reach harmonization of views with Sovs on handling and financing future peacekeeping operations in context your current talks. We believe workable device for giving bigger voice to larger contributors—such as GA financial screening out or opting out provision—is not simply technical matter but is intertwined with (a) policy decision on politically acceptable US share of costlier peacekeeping operations, which necessarily involves Congressional support and (b) safeguards to ensure we do not impair UN capacity to act in face of Soviet opposition. This complex issue must be separated out for intensive planning between us over next few months so that we can take sound and approved position into Working Group discussions. Meanwhile we see no objection (and some merit as suggested below) to your indicating to Sovs on informal basis that we are giving attention to long-range problem of financing and management of future peacekeeping operations in preparation for deliberations of Working Group, taking into account special problems of large contributors.

Under circumstances we would plan to do separate longer-range paper geared to key policy decision on financing and managing future peacekeeping, and limit what follows to strategy in more immediate context of current talks. In place of three-fold framework outlined in Deptel 1143 you should be guided by following considerations in pursuing talks, adapting tactics as necessary.

1. New turn reported in USUN 1930 and 1943³ (re proposal for short resolution on 1964 scale of assessments which would list only changes and not publish entire scale) suggests that Sovs may be backing away from freeze idea for time being. We are inclined to doubt that Sovs have dropped idea entirely, and we propose following strategy on assumption they will want to continue talks before end of GA or early next year.

2. You should therefore continue to be receptive to Sov desire resume talks. Our main objective is to achieve satisfactory solution of arrears so as to avoid or at least delay beyond 1964 threatened hassle on Article 19. Despite negative attitude of SovDel reported urtel 1665 (which to be expected at this early stage) we must insist on tie-in between arrears settlement and our receptivity to discuss freeze on regular scale. Without indication of Soviet readiness to clear up arrears issue, we would see no prospect of mutually acceptable outcome on regular scale freeze. This linkage is not to be regarded by Sovs as capricious or artificial on our part, nor is it simply advanced by us as bargaining counter. Sovs should be aware of following considerations: a) we would find difficulty justifying to American people and Congress standstill on regular scale (instead of expected reduction in our share and sizeable increase in Sov share) while Sovs and others continue resist obligation to pay for previously-assessed fair shares for UN operations; b) in same vein we could not argue convincingly for new, higher peacekeeping scale while arrears for past peacekeeping operations remain unsettled; c) other members whose proportionate share of regular budget will be higher if regular scale is frozen can be more readily persuaded to acquiesce in freeze if it is combined with settlement of arrears.

3. At same time you should indicate to Sovs that with solution of problem of old debts we would be in better position to turn our attention to long-range problem of financing and management of future peacekeeping operations, taking into account special problems of larger contributors. On this point too early to discuss particulars but Dept giving close study this problem in developing US position on questions that will come before Working Group next spring. (Unofficially, as illustration one possibility, you might speculate that in event special scale adopted for costly peacekeeping operations, arrangements might be established so that bigger contributors would have larger voice in determining when such special scale would be applied.)

4. In addition to holding out carrot of favorable attitude on our part to their freeze proposal, we believe that despite Sov intransigence you should adopt following course: (a) reiterate that overwhelming GA acceptance of ICJ ruling on peacekeeping assessments removes any doubt as to legal and political validation of their obligation to pay UNEF and UNOC assessments; (b) reiterate, using familiar arguments, that terms of Article 19 make it clear that loss of vote is automatic; (c) continue to assert as you did in last go-round that US position on application Article 19 remains unchanged; and (d) enlist support appropriate third countries in pressing Sovs to clear up arrears problem.

5. Dept believes politically-important third countries could play useful role in urging Sovs to settle arrearage problem. We would like your views on embarking on such corridor talking campaign with third countries in such way as to ensure its getting back to Sovs. Countries such as India, UAR, Nigeria, Brazil occur to us but you are in better position to judge. Our arguments would be: arrears must be settled if UN to go forward in orderly and businesslike manner; underbrush of old debts must be cleared away if we are to make progress on future peacekeeping formula in Working Group next spring; settlement of arrears is not US–USSR issue but involves delinquent behavior on part certain members with which entire UN membership must be concerned.

6. Initial sessions should thus concentrate so far as possible on question of arrears to probe area of give on this matter. You should of course make it clear that we will not make issue of means by which debts are paid, nor do we insist on open confession of sins. We would assume that Sovs could work out acceptable formula with UN Secretariat which would allow them to pay up without appearing to compromise on principle. For example, they could make minimum payment on UNOC, perhaps initially for period in 1960 when UNOC operated under SC reses they endorsed authorizing SYG provide GOC with military assistance and, in addition, for later period when Thant became SYG, and in expectation that operation would wind up by mid-1964. They could advertise payment as act of grace to help out UN in financial difficulties, thus avoiding endorsement Congo operation. They could pay UNEF arrears ($14 million) as “voluntary” act while continuing deny that assessment obligatory. Of course you should not leave impression that any partial payments could be regarded as full discharge of their legal assessments.

7. If Sovs give satisfactory indication that they are moving to resolve arrears issue, you could move on to discussion of substance their proposal for freeze on regular scale. We assume that meanwhile your preliminary “technical” talks would have gone long way in exposing spuriousness of their statistics and arguments re fairness of scale. In substantive discussion of regular scale you should complete refutation their arguments so that whatever accommodation we may reach does not in any way imply acceptance of Sov premise re fairness of scale. Whatever validity there is to Sov plea for more favored treatment has already been cranked into criteria used by Contributions Cmte in determining capacity to pay, and there is no justification for favoring Sovs at expense of rest of membership.

8. We would in any case consider freeze for ten years as unrealistic and unjustifiable in terms of balance of interests of all members. If we were to entertain concept of freeze it would be for next three-year round and would be on two grounds: (1) that arrears had been settled; (b) that stabilization of assessments for this period would be in general interest of UN. It would provide time for Organization to digest effects of recent budget and program increases; take account of effect on UN program and operations of rapid influx of poor members whose demands on organization not offset by contributions; and give UN time to wrestle with problem of achieving viable formula for financing future costly peacekeeping operations. In addition, we would want assurance that any freeze formula would provide some net reduction for US share by taking account of receipts from any new members who will pay their share of regular budget within 100 percent scale. Applying this principle to eight new members now outside scale, our proportionate payment comes out at about 31.90.

9. FYI. You are aware that freezing scale would not be without advantage to us quite apart from arrears settlement. Ceiling principle has become increasingly contentious. While we have been inching our way to GA-approved 30% ceiling, we would not want risk reopening debate on ceiling principle, and it may eventually become desirable for us to acquiesce in maintaining roughly our present share during next 3 year assessment period. On balance, however, we would not find freeze of all shares on regular scale, including Sov share, to our net advantage and it becomes politically palatable only if combined with solution on arrears. End FYI.

10. Dept assumes above strategy would be effective if Sov desire for freeze is important objective. If not, it is unlikely in our estimation that Sovs would back down on arrears this early, if at all. Dept would appreciate early assessment from USUN and Embassy Moscow on how strongly Soviets desire freeze. We would also be interested in probing Sov intentions re future peacekeeping operations. What importance do you attach to Solodovnikov’s repeated remark that USSR cannot be expected pay arrears if it not have single technician in Congo operation or in Civops Congo? Is this search for face-saver or does it presage Soviet desire to get directly involved in future peacekeeping acts? If latter, what in your estimation are implications for US policy?

11. Dept believes that whether or not you make headway in achieving kind of deal we have in mind, process of exploration with Sovs will be beneficial to us in preparing our policy on financing and management of future peacekeeping operations. It is thus very timely apart from hopefully successful outcome of immediate issue.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, UN 10–4. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits on November 7; cleared by Sisco, Burdett, Captain Freeman, Leonard C. Meeker, Virginia C. Westfall, Richard N. Gardner, Ernest L. Kerley, John C. Guthrie, and William B. Buffum; and approved by Assistant Secretary Cleveland. Also pouched to Moscow, Geneva, and Paris.
2. Telegram 1143 is Document 275. Telegram 1665 from USUN, October 28, described a luncheon meeting on October 24 between four members of the U.S. Delegation and four members of the Soviet Delegation. During the luncheon, the Soviets insisted that their country’s assessment scale should be frozen or reduced because it had not recovered from the devastation of World War II and because of its difficulty in obtaining foreign currency. At a later reception, Roshchin said that the Soviet Union would agree to a freeze on regular assessments and to removal of “operational programs” from the budget. Payment of any arrears for ONUC or UNEF was “absolutely excluded.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, UN 10–4)
3. Neither printed. (Both ibid.)