Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 22, 1963, 8:32 p.m.

1143. Exploratory Talks with Sov Del re UN Financing.

We are continuing our appraisal of strategy we should follow in exploring with Soviets possibility of reaching understanding on UN financing. Points raised by USUN in very thoughtful papers we had from you earlier this month and in comments to Cleveland in last week’s discussion of draft three-point package have raised number of questions on which further deliberation required before we are ready to wrap up strategy paper. We are, in particular, reassessing way in which we could reach understanding with Soviets and others on how larger contributors could be given larger voice in future peacekeeping operations without impairing potential of UN to act in face of Soviet obstruction. Under circumstances it would be premature for you to engage in discussion with Soviets on points of substance even in preliminary manner.

Dept would therefore want you to use occasion of Thursday lunch to set framework for later discussions and to probe Soviet readiness to discuss regular scale in broader context of regularizing arrangements for UN financing, including satisfactory settlement of arrears. Using arguments familiar to you, following would appear to be reasonable and useful line to take:

1. Question of holding line on regular scale cannot be treated in isolated manner. Given U.S. and USSR responsibilities as big powers, such question must be considered in context of two related aspects of UN financing, settlement of arrears and financing of future peacekeeping.

2. We believe that such three-fold framework for exploratory discussion has a chance of proving fruitful since problems interrelated. We have common interest in (a) achieving equitable and stable scale for regular budget; (b) clearing away underbrush of old debts through satisfactory Soviet settlement of its arrears so as to avoid confrontation on Article 19, and (c) harmonizing our views on the handling and financing of future peacekeeping operations so that larger contributors have voice commensurate with their responsibilities. FYI. In this connection, we must assure that any understanding on future arrangements does not impair our capacity to get UN to act if USSR unwilling to do so. We could not agree to any arrangement which would give USSR this kind of veto. End FYI.

3. We do not have fixed views or position on these but believe they offer promising framework for future discussions. We would welcome Soviet views on whether this appears to them reasonable and useful way to approach discussions. We are open to suggestions, but want to make it clear from outset that we would not regard separate and isolated discussion on freezing regular scale as holding hopeful prospect. In particular, settlement of arrears is sine qua non of any accommodation on holding regular scale to more or less present level.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, UN 10–4. Confidential. Drafted by Nathan A. Pelcovits on October 22; cleared by Sisco, John C. Guthrie, Richard N. Gardner, Louis E. Frechtling, and Richard H. Davis; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Moscow.