276. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- The Upcoming Talks with the Russians on UN Financing
A memorandum from the Secretary to the President on the U.S. strategy on the over-all problem of financing, including bilateral talks with the USSR, is being prepared, but it is long overdue. I am, therefore, passing along the following as a means of keeping you abreast of the Soviet side of the problem since we must soon be clear as to what our position is before the bilateral talks with the Soviet Union begin (as yet unscheduled).
The Soviet position has not greatly changed since they first suggested in an unofficial memorandum on September 28 that bilateral talks should begin between the U.S. and the USSR on the matter of freezing the existing scale of assessments for ten years. The U.S. is quite amenable to such discussions, but we also have insisted on discussing the matter of settling arrearages in order to avoid confrontation with the USSR on the application [of] Article 19 in the 19th GA. We also would [Page 607] like to discuss the matter of future peace-keeping operations (the U.S., and certainly the Soviet Union, would like to protect the political interests of the big powers against the possibility that the small powers would—because of their numerical superiority—be in a position to direct future peace-keeping operations).
On all three aspects of the problem—regular assessments, payment of arrearages and future peace-keeping operations-our own interests, to some degree, are shared by the USSR. They are the three topics the Department now plans, with the President’s approval, to instruct Stevenson to explore with the Russians.
The most worrisome aspect of the problem is how to find a way to avoid a confrontation with the Russians on the application of Article 19. As you probably know, Soviet spokesmen in New York and elsewhere have stated categorically they will confine themselves to discussion only of freezing the present scale of assessments and that they will not discuss their arrearages in peace-keeping operations (we would, of course, have to discuss arrearages before we could properly discuss future peace-keeping operations).
There is no question that we potentially face a most serious problem in the 19th GA if the Russians remain adamant about payment of their arrearages. There has developed a large body of opinion in the UN which will not go along with the ICJ interpretation of Article 19 if it means denying the USSR its GA vote. This opinion is especially apparent among the Afro-Asians and the Latin American states, although it is too early to predict how much of this opinion would be translated into voting strength. The best one can say is that we are not sure we can muster a two-thirds vote on this Important Question. Some countries believe the precedent of denying a GA vote to a member state might one day be used against them; others insist that denial of the USSR’s vote would “destroy” the UN.
The Russians thus far have been very cavalier about the matter. They do not appear to believe the GA will throw them out and, even if it did, one member of the Soviet delegation has noted that at least the Soviet Union will continue to have a vote in the Security Council. The Russians base their present approach on their long-standing argument that peace-keeping operations fall under the Security Council as provided by Chapter VII of the Charter which provides that, “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 [also in Chapter VII]2 to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
[Page 608]As you know, the matter of peace-keeping operations came under the GA by the passage in 1950 of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution which authorizes the GA to act when the SC is paralyzed by the veto. The U.S., which then had a dependable, solid majority in the GA, pushed this resolution through, and it has been used as an umbrella for Korea, UNEF, and UNOC. The Russians have consistently insisted (along with the French) that the GA acted illegally in giving itself powers which the Charter had delegated to another UN body.
Despite the foregoing, there is good reason to believe the Russians are more concerned about their posture on financing than they have been in the past. It would appear that, as a minimum, they are seeking a clarification of their position and, in order to do so, they apparently consider themselves in a position to enter into hard bargaining.
It may be that the Russians would find a way to make the minimum payment necessary to get past Article 19 in exchange for U.S. agreement to freeze the present scale of assessments—a formula not wholly unpalatable to the U.S. or the USSR. Another course the Russians might choose would be to make a minimum payment on UNOC (there is a SC resolution empowering the UN to act in the Congo) under protest, based on an understanding that the operation will terminate on June 30, 1964, and as a gesture to help the UN out of its financial difficulties. Another alternative would be the payment of their arrears of $14 million for the UNEF operation as a voluntary-not an obligatory-gesture; thereby not compromising in principle. Any one of these three approaches might be satisfactory; especially as the day of reckoning draws nearer. Actually, in order for the USSR to avoid an impasse on Article 19 in a totally regular way, a relatively small sum is involved-about $6 million on either UNEF or UNOC plus their assessment on the regular budget (which they always pay).3
The Department will recommend—and I think rightly so—that we should allow the Russians to have no illusions about our seriousness to see Article 19 applied, but we should also make it abundantly clear that we have no desire to deprive them of their GA vote. We should strongly impress upon them the value we attach to having all members—especially great powers—retain their votes in the GA.
The next step in the exercise is to take the Secretary’s proposals for over-all strategy on UN financing to the President-hopefully by the end of the week. After that, as USUN explores the problem with the Russians, we will be in a better position to judge the size of the problem we face and what kind of compromises, if any, we may have to make.