179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1
117. You should seek appointment with President Chiang soonest and personally deliver following message from President Kennedy. You should point out Security Council consideration of Outer Mongolia and Mauritanian applications will probably take place during week of August 21.
“Dear Mr. President:
Now that Vice President Chen has returned to Taiwan I want to express my keen appreciation for your having sent so distinguished, able and trusted a representative to consult with me.2 My associates and I profited greatly from his clear presentation of the views of your Government on matter of common concern.
As I am sure the Vice President has reported to you, our talks were marked by cordiality and frankness. While agreement was not reached on all points, the talks showed our agreement on fundamental objectives and demonstrated the vital importance both our countries attach to maintaining and strengthening our traditional friendship. In this regard I was particularly heartened by Vice President Chen’s assurances [Page 381] that the GRC would never create any difficulties for the U.S. in its effort to meet the Communist challenge and that the overriding consideration motivating your Government in its relationship with the U.S. is its desire not to add to U.S. difficulties or see U.S. prestige suffer.
The joint communique issued by Vice President Chen and me following our discussions pointed out our mutual awareness of the world-wide nature of the Communist threat and of the belligerency and hostility displayed by the Communists in areas such as Berlin, Laos, Korea and Viet-Nam.3 I am sure you will agree with me that the increasingly grave nature of the Communist challenge makes it imperative for all of us in the free world to maintain our solidarity and not allow the forces of Communism to divide and thereby undermine our joint strength.
In the international struggle between the free world and Communism, the United Nations is also a major battlefield. Whatever our appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the UN, we must recognize that it is a powerful force on a wide range of issues. The United States fully shares the strong views expressed by Vice President Chen on the importance to the GRC of not turning the UN battlefield over to the Communists. Moreover, as I explained to the Vice President, the prestige of the United States is deeply committed to preserving the GRC’s membership in the UN and keeping the Peiping regime out. For ten successive years the United States has led the fight to prevent the entry of the Chinese Communists against increasingly serious opposition. Now, at what may well be a critical moment in this fight, we more than ever need to concert our efforts in this common cause.
In our discussion of the difficult problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations, Secretary Rusk and I outlined to the Vice President our proposed tactics to realize our common objective of preserving the GRC’s position in the UN and keeping the Peiping regime out. I am gratified that the general outline of our proposed approach is acceptable to your Government. It remains, in the weeks before the opening of the next session of the General Assembly, for our staffs in Washington and Taipei and our Missions in New York to work together on a close basis to translate this general approach into detailed tactical plans to meet a wide range of possible parliamentary situations.
Our present tactical plan is, I am confident, the most promising that can be devised in the circumstances. I would not be frank with you, however, if I did not emphasize that there is a very grave danger we would not be able to muster majority support for it if your Government should invoke the veto to block Outer Mongolia’s admission to the UN. Our most [Page 382] careful study of the situation clearly indicates that, if Mauritania is denied entry to the UN as a result of such action, most if not all of the French African states will, however illogically and unjustly, retaliate by voting against the GRC on the Chinese representation issue. In this eventuality we fear that despite our best efforts the GRC would be unseated and subsequently replaced by the Chinese Communists.
Vice President Chen’s treatment of this subject and, more explicitly, your observations to Ambassador Drumright on July 14 indicate that you are aware of these possible consequences of a veto of Outer Mongolia and are prepared to accept them rather than alter your position. The record on this issue, both in 1955 and in recent months, makes clear that you consider fundamental GRC interests to be involved.
I fully appreciate the importance of this matter to the GRC. I must stress, however, that the problem is not one that affects only the GRC. It involves no less deeply and inescapably the position and prestige of the U.S., especially at a time when the mounting Berlin crisis poses a mortal threat to the free world. The GRC may consider that in certain circumstances it would prefer to leave the UN rather than to yield on a point of major importance to it. But before taking an action that could lead to such a situation, I urge you, Mr. President, to consider carefully not only the GRC’s interests but also those of the U.S. As I emphasized to Vice President Chen, it would be extremely inimical to U.S. interests if the Chinese Communists should gain admission to the UN. We would remain in the UN with a continuing heavy responsibility for leadership of its free world members. But our capabilities for exercising this leadership would be seriously impaired by defeat on the Chinese representation issue. My advisers warn, moreover, of the likelihood that French African wrath over a veto of Outer Mongolia will be felt during the next General Assembly session not only on the Chinese representation question but on various other issues important to the U.S. In this regard it is pertinent that the French Africans, and indeed many other states, will wrongly hold the U.S. responsible for such GRC action in view of the close relationship between our two countries.
In explaining, both publicly and in private talks with the U.S., why it feels obliged to prevent Outer Mongolia’s admission to the UN, the GRC has advanced several cogent arguments which I would like now to consider. It has stated that, in the first place, this is a matter of basic principle, that you and we should not for the sake of expediency submit to Soviet blackmail tactics and acquiesce in what amounts to a violation of the UN [Page 383] Charter. The U.S. fully shares the GRC’s repugnance for any action that allows the Soviets to get away with bare-faced blackmail. It also recognizes that there is a real question whether the Outer Mongolian regime possesses the qualifications for UN membership as provided in the Charter. Nonetheless, the cold, hard fact is that the French African states have accepted the Soviet linking of the Mauritanian and Outer Mongolian applications as a matter of practical power politics and have made the GRC and U.S. vote on the Outer Mongolian application the touchstone of their subsequent vote on Chinese representation. Our two countries are thus confronted with a situation in which we must choose the lesser of two evils. We must recognize that in order to attain our overriding objective of preventing admission of Communist China to the UN we will have to exercise tactical flexibility on the lesser consideration of Outer Mongolia’s admission.
It has also been argued that admission of Outer Mongolia would seriously impair the UN’s integrity and effectiveness and greatly enhance Communist prestige. No doubt admission would represent a tactical victory for the Soviets. But it seems to me inescapable that the adverse effects would be nothing compared to those that would flow from the GRC’s departure from the UN and its replacement by the Chinese Communists, if GRC veto of Outer Mongolia should cause us to lose our voting majority on this larger issue. Moreover, once the GRC lost its seat, Outer Mongolia’s admission could be expected to follow shortly in any case.
Finally, Vice President Chen and others have emphasized how difficult politically it would be for your Government to justify to the Chinese people and your representative bodies a reversal of your announced position on this issue. I am aware of the views expressed by the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang, by the five Yuans, and by your press and, as a practical politician, appreciate the problem that you face. Knowing, however, your long record as a statesman and the Chinese people’s deep and abiding faith in your leadership, I am confident of your ability to explain to them the need for flexible tactics on the lesser issue of Outer Mongolia’s admission to the UN in order to safeguard the GRC’s international position and thereby to fulfill your national mission of thwarting the designs of the mainland Communist regime.
I also feel it necessary to emphasize the potential significance of the GRC’s action on this issue in terms of its own security interests. GRC loss of its UN seat would impair the ability of the U.S. to muster support in the free world for military action in defense of the GRC should such action ever be required. U.S. support of the security of the GRC should not, moreover, be conceived of in purely military terms. Political, diplomatic and economic measures are also essential. Free world support for such measures may be extremely difficult to obtain in [Page 384] a situation in which the sympathies of a large part of the free world would probably have been lost, and the GRC’s own juridical position undercut, by its attitude toward the UN. Its departure from the UN would inevitably lead to increasing isolation of the GRC as one country after another switched its recognition to Communist China. The problem of maintaining solid support for the GRC in the face of Chinese Communist pressures would become increasingly difficult. There would be a real danger of the U.S. itself becoming more and more isolated on this question. The GRC must not ignore the serious damage to its own security or that to U.S. interests which could result from its refusal, regardless of the cost, to maintain its UN position.
In your meeting with Ambassador Drumright on July 1 you stated that you would regard U.S. action to establish relations with Outer Mongolia and to support its admission to the UN as “incompatible with the consideration due a close ally.” In this regard, you will recognize, I am sure, that our interests as well as yours are at stake. In the present instance the U.S., as I made clear to Vice President Chen, has deferred to the GRC’s view and suspended our negotiations with Outer Mongolia for recognition. We are prepared to defer them indefinitely if the GRC will refrain from vetoing Outer Mongolia’s application for UN membership.
Because the success of our efforts on the crucial Chinese representation issue is likely to be jeopardized if the Outer Mongolian application for UN membership fails, the U.S. considers it of the greatest importance that the GRC right of veto not be exercised. Assuming that the GRC agrees not to veto, the U.S. will abstain on the vote. While we cannot undertake to organize other abstentions, and recognize that Outer Mongolia will probably be admitted to the UN, we regard this as the minimum concession we both must make because of the larger issues involved.
For more than a decade the concerted action of the GRC and the U.S. has thwarted Communist divisive tactics on the Chinese representation issue. In the UN the position of the GRC has been maintained and the Chinese Communists have been excluded. At this crucial time for our two countries, and for the entire free world, in the struggle against the forces of international communism, it would be an unprecedented tragedy if we were now to find ourselves in disarray—and Communist stratagems to divide us were at last to succeed. We must, therefore, stand together—as we have in so many past dangers-so that victory may again be ours.
With great respect,
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 303/8–1561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Lutkins; cleared by Robert W. Rinden (CA), Wallner, William O. Anderson (EUR/SOV), Jesse MacKnight (AF), McGeorge Bundy, and William H. Brubeck (S/S); and approved by Assistant Secretary McConaughy (FE).↩
- Vice President Chen Cheng of the Republic of China visited Washington July 31–August 3. For accounts of his meeting with President Kennedy and senior U.S. officials, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXII, Documents 45–47.↩
- For text of the joint communique, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 545–546.↩
- Regarding the meeting between President Chiang and Ambassador Drumright, in which the President said that the Republic of China would withdraw from the United Nations rather than accept a “two Chinas” arrangement, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXII, Document 39.↩