Office of the Historian

178. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs1

Washington, August 15, 1961.

Outer Mongolia and the Votes of African States in the United Nations General Assembly

If Outer Mongolia is not admitted to the United Nations the African states could mobilize at least eleven votes (French African or Brazzaville group) or possibly as many as twenty votes (Monrovia group) against the Chinese Nationalists and, depending on the circumstances, against the United States. This group of votes could prove decisive on the Chinese representation issue and others of major importance to us.

The key issue for the French African states is whether Mauritania is admitted to the United Nations. African states generally, and the French African states in particular, have made it quite clear that their voting on Chinese representation and other issues would be affected by what happens to the application of Mauritania. Since the Soviet Union has declared that it will veto the application of Mauritania if Outer Mongolia is not admitted, the issue depends, in the eyes of the French Africans, on what happens in the case of Outer Mongolia. Their reaction will be almost equally adverse, so far as the GRC is concerned, whether Outer Mongolia’s admission to the United Nations is blocked by a veto or by abstentions.

The evidence for this analysis, based on reports from many sources over several months is quite impressive. The more important reports are summarized below.

(1)
In May, our Embassy at Dakar reported that the twelve states of the African-Malagasy union had taken advantage of the Monrovia conference to discuss the admission of Mauritania to the UN. These states reportedly agreed that if Mauritania’s admission is blocked, whether by veto or abstentions, they would “retaliate by breaking relations with the Chinese Nationalists. In addition, the eleven states members of the UN would at the next regular session vote for expulsion of Nationalist China and the admission of Red China.” These states expressed the [Page 379] hope that the United States would convince the Chinese Nationalists to abstain instead of using the veto (Dakar tel 783, May 24).2
(2)
In June, Liberia, on behalf of the participants in the Monrovia Conference, circulated a letter to UN members stating that the group “looks with concern” on any attempt to prohibit the membership of Mauritania in the UN by exercise of the veto or by linking its admittance to other issues. The letter called on the Security Council, in the name of twenty independent African states, to approve the membership of Mauritania. (USUN tel 3324, June 14)3
(3)
In July, USUN reported its belief that the French Africans will in fact carry out their threat to take reprisals against both the US and the GRC on issues important to us in the next GA and that they will do so “whether Soviet veto of Mauritania is engendered by GRC veto of Outer Mongolia or by defeat latter through abstentions organized by US. We therefore risk losing substantial bloc of votes not only on Chirep but on series of other issues of great importance to US if we do not proceed as planned with endorsement Outer Mongolia.” (USUN tel 214 July 25)4
(4)
On August 4, USUN reported that the Mauritanian representative (Lokman) said that Soviet representatives in New York are telling the French Africans they will veto all new membership applications if China goes through with its threat to veto Outer Mongolia. The Mauritanian representative said the French Africans had decided to retaliate at the 16th General Assembly by voting against China on the representation issue. (USUN tel 346, August 4)5
(5)
President Senghor of Senegal told Attorney General Kennedy on August 6 that the Brazzaville states would work for the admission of Communist China to the UN if Nationalist China blocked the admission of Mauritania by vetoing the admission of Outer Mongolia. (Embassy Abidjan tel 95, August 8)6
(6)
Our Embassy at Paris reported on August 14 a French official said that if the Chinese Nationalists use the veto and Mauritania was thereby excluded, the Chinese Nationalists “would of course be finished in Africa and at the UN so far as African support on the Chinese Communist issue is concerned.” (Paris tel 805, August 14)7

In the last session of the General Assembly a key group of African states, including several French African states, demonstrated they are [Page 380] disposed, when they consider their interests are thwarted, to react sharply and negatively on matters of grave importance to the United States. A good example was the group’s reaction to the US abstention on the Northern Cameroon plebiscite issue and our negative reaction to the concept of target dates for independence for colonial areas. When we did not take their side, these African states had no hesitation in voting against the US, or abstaining, at one vital point in consideration of the Cuban issue. (Defeat on April 21, 1961 of operative para I of draft resolution submitted by seven Latin American states at US request.)

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 303/8–1561. Confidential. Drafted by Alfred E. Wellons and Virginia F. Hartley, and cleared by LaRue R. Lutkins (FE), William B. Buffum (UNP), Jesse MacKnight and Donald Dumont (AF), and Woodruff Wallner (IO). A covering memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, also dated August 15, signed by William H. Brubeck for Lucius D. Battle, noted that Bundy’s office had requested the study by telephone the night before.↩
  2. Not printed. (Ibid., 303/5–2461)↩
  3. Not printed. (Ibid., 303/6–1461)↩
  4. Not printed. (Ibid., 303/7–2561)↩
  5. Not printed. (Ibid., 303/8–461)↩
  6. Not printed. (Ibid., 303/8–961)↩
  7. Not printed. (Ibid., 303/8–1461)↩