Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

93. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 17, 1961, 11 p.m.

Secto 164. Greatly appreciate Tosec 120¹ and Vientiane’s 36² commenting on my Secto 125. Believe Department and Brown should review whether events are not moving much faster than we now think with respect to a coalition government which we will not like.

Believe you should take into account fact that Commies at Geneva are full of confidence and appear to be utterly relaxed about achieving their goals in Laos. Their speeches have been short and moderate, their demeanor friendly and they are purring like cats. I find it difficult to believe that this is because they want a neutral Laos as we see it. They expect a coalition government and a coalition delegation almost momentarily. Of course they could be wrong but so could we. For exactly reasons Commies have in mind, of course, it might be impossible for the King to form a government based upon RLG and Souvanna Phouma group since latter might be wholly unwilling to take the gamble.

My Secto 125 was not intended as an action instruction but to raise the question whether this or some other prompt action could be taken to head off what seemed predictable from Geneva environment. I have supposed that RLG may now be sufficiently intimidated by Pathet Lao or sufficiently discouraged about possibility of SEATO action that their pol position could collapse without warning to US.

Purpose this message is to inform Department and Vientiane that it looks from here as if time is running out fast in Laos, and that what is happening at Geneva is conditioned more by events there than here.

Would appreciate your comments soonest.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1761. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Also sent niact to Vientiane as telegram 39.
1. In Tosec 120, May 15, the Department suggested to Rusk that if the Geneva Conference were to break down, it should be on an issue that clearly demonstrated the Communist side’s unwillingess to accept a truly neutral Laos. The issue of seating the three Lao factions was not such an example. Rather than using a coalition government under the King, which Rusk had suggested in Secto 125 (also sent to Vientiane as telegram 20, May 15) to head off a dangerous coalition under Souvanna Phouma, the Department suggested concentrating at Geneva on effective supervision, multilateral aid, or disarmament which were all issues central to the principle of a neutral Laos. (Both ibid., 751J.00/5–1561)
2. In telegram 36, from Vientiane to Geneva, repeated to Washington as telegram 2087, May 16, Brown stated that it would be a mistake for King Savang to try to form a coalition government. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–1661)