Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

89. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 14, 1961, 7 p.m.

Secto 118.¹ Eyes Only for President and Acting Secretary.

Secto 116 contains text statement which two co-chairmen propose to make with possible amendment of time for opening meeting. Gromyko has been absolutely adamant in not yielding one jot or tittle in his original demand that all three Laotian groups be seated at the conference table, except to agree that they should be representatives from (not of) Laos. He expressly refused to agree that they should have the status of observers.

Decision before us is whether we attend conference, with some such statement as contained in Secto 117,² refuse to attend, seek postponement or adopt some other position.

A. Relevant to our decision are following factors here:

1. We have no support among delegations in Geneva, with exception of RLG, to hold out on what non-Communist delegations consider to be a trivial point of procedure. The fact that point is considered important by Gromyko seems to impress no one. Possibility of influence of seating arrangements here upon relative prestige of parties in political discussions in Laos regarding coalition government is heavily discounted.

2. It is unfortunate that we have not had strong delegations from RLG, Thailand, and South Vietnam who might be helpful on a point of possible symbolic value in Southeast Asia.

3. It seems quite probable that British went considerably further in their talks in Moscow about arrangements for 14-power conference than we were told; I am not suggesting that this was deliberate since seating of Pathet Lao seems to have appeared to them as an inconsequential detail.

4. Canadians, Indians, Burmese have been ready to take Gromyko’s formula from beginning. French and British have at least cooperated in trying on a variety of formulae but without success.

5. Gromyko is obviously enjoying himself and considers that he is in the driver’s seat at least on this point.

6. Although US and Southeast Asia opinion may be quite different, it seems fairly obvious here that this particular issue is not a good one on which to break up the conference insofar as world opinion is concerned.

B. Other factors which are undoubtedly relevant are:

1. Reaction among countries near Laos, especially Thailand, Vietnam, and Philippines. Timing of this procedural issue in Geneva may make Vice President’s mission Bangkok more difficult. Seating Pathet Lao could be decisive regarding Thai willingness send delegation at all.

2. US policy and public opinion which, though divided, might well be negative.

3. Reaction upon Soviets if we concede without slightest move on their part.

4. To be taken into account is importance of gaining time for stabilization cease-fire in Laos making it cumulatively more difficult for other side to renew fighting in absence political agreement to their liking. A conference-in-being is some insurance against resumption of fighting and is good background if such fighting requires reference to UN and SEATO.

5. Repeated reports out of Laos of meetings among “the three sides” which are used as arguments against us, as well possibility that political issues may be settled among Phoumi, Souvanna Phouma and Souvanna vong thus making strong stand by us on seating look somewhat ridiculous.

6. My impression is that although we are isolated regarding seating there is considerable strength among Western and neutral group for effective international machinery to supervise and control military aspects of cease-fire and neutral Laos. We won’t get all we want but we might get a good deal more by battling out such issues in this conference than by breaking it up.

7. If cease-fire holds, possibility of tolerable solution should be fully explored in conference rather than abandon effort this stage and choose between high risk of fighting and deliberate withdrawal US interest in Laos.

On balance, I recommend that we attend conference with statement contained Secto 117 and take every opportunity to make clear that we consider RLG the only government that country. Other Western delegates have indicated they are prepared to do the same. In other words, insofar as we are concerned, there is only one Laotian representative at the conference; we ignore any “strangers” present but get on with the conference in the interest of international agreement on a neutral independent Laos.

I believe this recommendation, coolly considered, is in our long-range interest although my personal reaction to situation in Geneva could be expressed in more lurid terms.

Since time is of essence, please telephone President’s reaction.

If more detailed confidential instructions are to be sent, telephone approximate time we can expect.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1461. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Vientiane eyes only for Ambassador Brown. Passed to the White House for the President at 7:30 p.m. On another copy of this telegram, there was a note that indicated that the President and Bowles discussed this cable. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/14/61–5/31/61)
1. Dated May 14, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1461)
2. In Secto 117, May 14, the Delegation at Geneva suggested issuing a statement indicating that while the United States considered the Royal Lao Government the only legal government, it would be prepared to hear other Lao factions at Geneva so long as it was accepted that the United States could not agree that their presence conferred any status which those Lao might individually claim. (Ibid.)