Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, April 29, 1961, 6:44 p.m.

1191. Eyes Only for Ambassadors Harriman and Brown.

1. You may explain our following views to King Savang, Prime Minister Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan. You may also wish draw upon Depcirtels 1659¹ and 1674.² President has taken unusual step of sending special Ambassador to confer with King. Will appreciate receiving King’s suggestions and guidance on our endeavors to help. Ambassador Brown has kept President informed of difficulties which King has faced over recent trying period. President thus knows of King’s personal fortitude and determination to maintain Laos as part of Free World against Communist aggression. President supports King in concept of neutral Laos. King’s territory and people must not be embroiled in major conflict. FYI Most important you should stop short of assuring King or Phoumi of US or SEATO intervention in their support unless otherwise informed. End FYI.

2. Principal objective your visit to Laos is to convey to RLG our support at this juncture when bloc is stalling on cease-fire while maintaining military, psychological and diplomatic pressure. We are watching situation closely. We wish to encourage Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government to maintain a firm position from which to negotiate in an international conference, or, if necessary, to provide a basis for further military action.

3. Specifically if conference is held we want to keep the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government intact until it is clear whether or not a properly safeguarded Laos can emerge from the conference. Meanwhile, we want to prevent the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government from compromising itself by a deal with Souvanna Phouma and/or others less determined to prevent a Communist takeover. In particular, we feel the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government should enter Geneva Conference intact, without any change in present anti-Communist coloration.

4. We want to guard against Communist efforts to draw RLG into discussions of political matters, or even of substantive military matters, during cease-fire talks. In these talks the RLG should confine itself exclusively to technical aspects of the cease-fire.

5. RLG will undoubtedly raise issue resumption political discussions with Souvanna. We believe any such talks should take place only after cease-fire has become effective and should be carefully limited following two purposes: First, to put RLG in posture earnestly seeking reasonable solution; second, to keep door open if at any point Souvanna should be persuaded move away from present close affiliation with Communists. Under no circumstances should discussions be permitted lead to any type coalition government since RLG position at any Conference would be irrevocably weakened thereby.

6. We are supporting negotiations for a genuine cease-fire in hope that international agreement might be reached to assure integrity of Laos. We are also exploring possible action in UN Security Council to bring about cessation of hostilities.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2961. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Young, cleared in substance with McConaughy, and approved by Rusk. Also sent niact to Bangkok and Saigon and repeated niact to New Delhi.
1. In this telegram, April 22, the Department informed relevant posts that it no longer favored an enlarged Lao Government including Souvanna Phouma and had decided to “stand four square behind” the Boun Oum government. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–2261)
2. In this telegram, April 25, the Department presented preliminary thinking on what it hoped to achieve at a conference on Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–2561)
3. A record of Harriman’s and Brown’s discussion with Phoumi and Boum Oum in Luang Prabang on April 30 is in a memorandum of conversation of that same date. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–3061)