Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

58. Memorandum of Meeting⁰

Washington, April 19, 1961.

Summary Report of Meeting of the Task Force on Laos, April 19, 1961

The meeting was called to discuss a preliminary report of the talks between the British Ambassador at Moscow and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on April 19 and a British recommendation, received just prior to the meeting, that they accept the Soviet proposal as “explained” by Gromyko.¹

In the British view Gromyko would be heavily committed to produce if the British agreed to accept his explanation of the Soviet position. They, therefore, proposed that as a test of the Soviet Union’s intentions we agree to their accepting the proposal with the understanding that it would not be binding on the United States and that the West would not attend a conference unless there were a cease-fire by May 5.

Mr. Steeves suggested we tell the British that this would be acceptable to us as a test of Soviet sincerity on the condition that we were left free to take any action we deemed necessary if the situation deteriorated. After considerable discussion it was agreed that we should emphasize to the British again and perhaps consider making public that an effective cease-fire must precede the conference and that it was the function of the ICC to verify the cease-fire.

The group also agreed we should inform the British that we acceded to their proposal with the understanding that we would be outsiders, not bound by the agreement but observing its results. If the cease-fire were not effective, we would reserve the right to take appropriate military action and would expect the British to join us. We would regard any significant forward movement by the Pathet Lao as a violation of the cease-fire. We would also suggest to the British the possibility that after the Co-Chairmen’s appeal had become public, we might make public a statement of our position.

Mr. Steeves concluded the meeting by suggesting that the group leave for later consideration the specifics of the type of military action we might take and the kind of action on the part of the Pathet Lao which would require us to act.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/17/61–4/21/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Dungan, April 21.
1. In circular telegram 1631, April 19, the Department included an account of Roberts’ talk with Gromyko on April 19; a copy of an instruction from the British Foreign Office to its Ambassador in Washington recommending acceptance of the Soviet proposals; and a message from Rusk to Home in which Rusk agreed to accept the proposals, but asked that the British realize that the United States would feel free to act vigorously until the cease-fire was effective, would want immediate consultations if it was violated, and would not accept verification of the cease-fire by the Co-Chairmen themselves should for some reason the ICC fail to verify the cease-fire. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1961)