54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0
4874. Eyes Only for Ambassador. The following letter was handed by the Secretary to Sir Harold Caccia this morning for transmission to Lord Home:
“I very much appreciate your prompt reactions on Laos which Harold Caccia has just let me have.1
I think there is some difference in our assessment of the present situation on the ground in Laos. I am thinking both of the precarious military situation in which we find ourselves and the equally disturbing political decay which is taking place.
On the military side, our Laotian friends are not among the stoutest of heart, at best. The long delay which has ensued with much talk of cease-fire is making them even less effective militarily than usual. Rather than ensuring no deterioration before a possible cease-fire, they are completely relaxed and appear ready to accept whatever disadvantages are built up by the other side.
[Page 133]Politically, the decay is even more serious. Our constant reminders of our need to rearrange their government, of course, carry the obvious meaning that we are not as happy as we might be with the RLG itself. They sense that change is in the air and it does not give them the united determination which should characterize their position in the face of national danger.
What they need on both of these fronts is something which will lift their morale to encourage their will to resist. We feel very strongly that the rather minor steps we are taking will provide them with at least some stiffening.
As to the immediate military situation itself, our Watch Committee report of yesterday was most disturbing. It is true that there are no major battles being waged, but in at least three rather critical areas the Communist buildup continues and we could be faced overnight with a virtual collapse. The Pathet Lao have deployed a force of 1,000 troops supported by 105 howitzers and mortars approximately five miles northeast of Nhommarath, to the rear of Thakhek. They are in a position to do real damage there. In a message received today, Phoumi characterized the situation as ‘serious.’2 On the Tha Thom Paksane road the situation continues to be ominous, and a breakthrough there could sever Laos at the narrow waist. Further to the north, there is the very unsatisfactory situation around Muong Kassy. The abortive attempt of the paratroopers there did not help the situation any. What concerns us the most here is that we could rapidly find ourselves in a position where Luang Prabang is seriously threatened or, indeed, overrun. We do not find evidence of disengagement by the Pathet Lao or the return of Viet Minh to their own country.
There is the matter of the Russian airlift. Although the President and I have been careful to discount publicly the increase in supply, it is a fact that in the recent few days a significant increase has been observed. While we did not want to show public alarm by emphasizing this fact, it would of course cast a very serious cloud over the entire scene if the present trends are sustained.
With respect to the Russian response, we find little encouragement leading us to believe that they have an intention of giving an early satisfactory reply. While delaying their answer, they make off-hand remarks about the cease-fire being held off until the conference convenes. They also comment that the conference must of course be at the foreign minister level from beginning to end. This to me is clear evidence that they are being evasive. It should be remembered that, when we agreed to the formula [Page 134] of the cease-fire and conference to begin with, we placed great emphasis on an immediate cease-fire. Weeks have gone by since we put forward this minimum requirement, and it has been largely ignored while they pursue their activities in Laos.
Perhaps it would be helpful for me to be a little more precise about the actual steps we are discussing. The Americans are those who are already there, and known to be there by the other side. To put them into uniform means, actually, little more than pinning on their insignia. What we want them to do is to get down to battalion level with the troops in the field where we think they can stiffen units which are now inclined simply to melt away when the enemy fires a few rounds. We would not think this would ‘torpedo’ the conference, if there is the slightest interest in a neutral Laos. We do not believe that this step can be provocative since it is wholly within the methods of operation on the other side. Russian air personnel are in northern Laos as are considerable numbers of Viet Minh personnel. If this action on our side is taken as provocative, it will merely be because they wish to make it so.
Another reason for putting our own personnel in uniform is to make it possible to move a very limited number of small Thai units (we now have in mind two artillery batteries) before there might have to be any formal SEATO intervention. Sarit quite naturally does not wish to find himself alone and his attitude could be met by Americans officially present in uniform and in airlift operations. We of course will not take this action until we have the appropriate request from RLG in hand.
The transfer of Americans into ‘uniform’ is probably not a technical compliance with the Geneva accords, but the other side has been treating these accords with the utmost contempt. It remains open for all sides to return to the Geneva accords, although I am under no illusions that the Communists are willing to do so.
By the time this reaches you, of course, we may have had a reply from Moscow. I can well appreciate your concern, for it coincides with our own. We are not spoiling for a fight, as I am sure you know, but we do believe that the security of Southeast Asia requires that Laos not be overrun by the other side and that we must take minimum steps against the sudden collapse of our position. It will probably take two days or so to discuss the matter with the RLG and to ensure Phoumi’s cooperation. If, meanwhile, we have a satisfactory Russian reply, we would be very pleased.”
For Paris: The substance of the above letter was reviewed for the French ambassador and the letter is therefore repeated for your information.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1561. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Steeves.↩
- Reference is to a letter from Home to Rusk, a draft of which is contained in telegram 4189 from London, April 14. In the letter, Home stated that he was worried that the military action described in Document 53 would encourage world opinion to believe that the United States had “torpedoed the chances of a settlement just when they looked promising.” Home stated that British information indicated that there was very little fighting going on in Laos and the Pathet Lao seemed to be as inactive as the Royal Lao Army. Home wondered if the cease-fire was not already on its way to be realized. Home acknowledged the legitimacy of U.S. paramilitary action, but asked for a delay in implementing the decision for a few more days. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1461)↩
- The statement as reported in telegram 1864 from Vientiane, April 14, reads “Phoumi acknowledged situation ‘serious’ but believed he had it under control.” (Ibid.)↩