Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

489. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 23, 1963, 5–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting between the President and the Prime Minister of Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Mr. A.B. Duke, Chief of Protocol
• Mr. Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Alex G. Toumayan, Interpreter
• H.H. Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
• H.R.H. Tiao Khampan, Ambassador to the United States
• H.E. Ngon Sananikone, Minister of Public Works and Transport

The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to the President for the assistance Laos is receiving from the United States. He stated he would continue to do all he could, as he had in the past, but that he would need a great deal of help to ensure the application of the Geneva Agreements. Many difficulties were placed in his way. In reply to the President’s query on the source of these difficulties the Prime Minister replied they arose from both sides—left and right. Unless the mistrust and lack of confidence which existed could be eliminated, he said the difficulties would continue. The Prime Minister thought that if North Vietnam would no longer interfere in Lao affairs the mistrust would vanish. So long, however, as this is not the case General Phoumi will be suspicious and wary of Pathet Lao intentions. On the other hand the PL distrusts Phoumi. The Prime Minister said that he has indicated before and continues to believe the solution of the Lao problem depends on a settlement in Vietnam. North Vietnam does not want Laos to regain peace because it does not want the RLG to extend its authority over the entire country since this would prevent North Vietnam from using Laos to penetrate South Vietnam. Although the North Vietnamese would withdraw their support from the Pathet Lao in the event of a Vietnamese settlement, the Prime Minister thought the Vietnamese would still remain interested in Laos.

Prince Souvanna believes that over ninety percent of the Lao people support the policy of neutrality and if the Pathet Lao would relax its control the people would rally to the government. The Pathet Lao knows this and therefore is unwilling to open its area or permit freedom of movement. In reply to the President’s question whether Prince Souphanouvong was the real leader of the Pathet Lao the Prime Minister replied he was merely a “paravent” (screen). The real leaders are Nouhak and Kaysone, while the Neo Lao Hak Xat, the party of the Pathet Lao, is subservient to the North Vietnamese. Souphanouvong is not free to enter into agreements and in fact has frequently made a commitment only to withdraw it after consultation with his peers. On the other hand both the Prime Minister and General Phoumi give their word and abide by the commitments they make.

The President asked about the prospects for military activity in the fall and winter after the rains end. Prince Souvanna said he would seek to restore calm by working through the joint committees for administrative and military integration. However, it would largely depend on the North Vietnamese. If they are willing to help, a settlement can be reached. He had spoken quite bluntly to the DRV Ambassador on several occasions pointing out to him that if the DRV and the PL wanted to prove there were no North Vietnamese troops in Laos they should allow the International Control Commission freedom to investigate the charges.

The Prime Minister said he felt, in fact he was convinced, the Soviet Ambassador was doing what he could to help ensure observance of the Geneva Agreements but he did not seem to have direct influence on the Polish Commissioner of the International Control Commission. Marek Thee, the Polish Commissioner, always sided with the PL and to be effective the ICC must be impartial and operate under a consensus. When the President suggested it might be helpful to have a change in the Polish Commissioner the Prime Minister agreed this was a good idea. He said he would mention this to Chairman Khrushchev when he visits Moscow.

The President then raised the question of the survivors of the Air America C–46 which was shot down by the PL on September 5. Prime Minister Souvanna said he would do what was necessary. (During an earlier meeting with Governor Harriman and Assistant Secretary Hilsman the Prime Minister had agreed to send a telegram to the NLHX requesting information about the survivors and their immediate release.)

In reply to the President’s question as to what additional measures the United States could take to help him the Prime Minister replied the USIP had been very useful and he appreciated this assistance. However, it was too early to assess the impact of the program since goods were only now beginning to arrive in large quantities. The President then informed the Prime Minister the United States would contribute up to $4 million to the Lao stabilization program and was pleased that the United Kingdom and France had also decided to contribute. Prince Souvanna mentioned that he had learned in Paris that the United Kingdom and France would each contribute $1.7 million to the $8 million fund under the program.

The President told the Prime Minister that the United States would consider the neutrality of Vietnam if conditions indicated this would be successful. However, the necessary ingredients seemed to be lacking, such as a personality who could lead a united Vietnamese people. Moreover, North Vietnam would dominate South Vietnam which would collapse and as a consequence the pressures on Laos and Cambodia would be intensified. General De Gaulle’s proposals on Vietnam were fine, but for the future. The President did not see how they could be realized for the present. The Prime Minister repeated his view that a solution of the Lao problem depended on a settlement in Vietnam. He had talked only about the reunification of Vietnam and in terms of the future, after South Vietnam had made economic and social progress. He had not commented on neutralization of Vietnam and he agreed that genuine neutrality could only be achieved if both North and South were neutralized. However, before South Vietnam could make progress a popular regime was needed and this was lacking under President Diem. North Vietnam, like Laos, fears China and must take into account China’s proximity and size. The pro-Peiping group in Hanoi seemed to him to be in the ascendancy over the pro-Moscow group and this limited Moscow’s influence on the North Vietnamese.

The President asked what kept the North Vietnamese from overrunning Laos and whether they feared United States intervention if they threatened the Mekong valley. The Prime Minister replied this was the case. The North Vietnamese feared war, especially in view of their population and economic problems, and would therefore refrain from coming too close to the Mekong. He cited the halt of the PL advance toward Ban Houei Sai in May 1962 as supporting this view. The President emphasized that we would never accept communist control of Laos and are determined to support the Prime Minister’s government. We want the PL and the other communists to continue to know this. The Prime Minister’s efforts were essential to the preservation of the Geneva settlement and we would continue to do what we could to help him. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation and said he counts on United States support. He is still hopeful the situation will be remedied since he does not believe the PL wants a complete breakdown of the coalition framework. This was demonstrated on September 9 when Phoumu Vongvichit remained in Vientiane although he had earlier threatened to leave. In conclusion the President said a visit to Moscow, which the Prime Minister said he planned before returning to Laos, should be fruitful. The Soviets had a continuing responsibility to see that the Geneva Agreements work and the Prime Minister should make this clear to Chairman Khrushchev.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/63–11/63. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan. The meeting was held at the White House. The time of the meeting is taken from Kennedy’s appointment book. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)