Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

484. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/7

Pitsunda, Soviet Union, August 9, 1963.

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Kohler
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Richard Davis, EUR
  • Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR
• USSR
  • Mr. Khrushchev
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Mr. Vinogradov

SUBJECT

• Part IV—Laos

After discussion of trade, the Secretary raised the subject of Laos.

The Secretary said the President wanted him to say a few words on this subject because we were concerned about developments in Laos. The President believed he and Mr. Khrushchev should work together to support the Geneva accords, which had been rendered possible only as a result of the personal agreement reached between him and Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961. The Secretary continued the US had accepted with some reluctance the general terms of the Geneva accords and had agreed to the establishment of a coalition government under Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister. The US had loyally supported the accords and the ICC in Laos in every way. Now we were very much concerned because Souvanna had so much difficulty with the Pathet Lao and there was a danger that the accords might wither away or collapse. We believed this problem was important to peace in that part of the world and to relations between our two countries. The Soviet Ambassador in Laos had been saying he had no contact with the Pathet Lao and no influence there. However, the Secretary said, this was not the point he was making because Mr. Khrushchev would remember that we ourselves had had certain difficulties with some elements in Laos. But we hope that the Soviet and the US Ambassadors could cooperate with the UK Ambassador as the other co-chairman. If there was any point of disagreement, we must try to solve it, but if the US, the USSR, the UK and the other signatories to the Geneva accords could continue to give full public support to the Geneva agreements, that would be a very encouraging development. Also, we hoped the USSR could influence the Polish representative on the ICC so that he would be more positive and constructive. But the main point was that we hoped the USSR would make it clear publicly that it supported the Geneva accords providing for a neutral and independent Laos, because sometimes one gained the impression that the accords were being eroded and that not all elements were loyally supporting them.

Khrushchev said he wanted to tell the Secretary that the USSR had cooperated with the US and with other states with great benefit to the Laotian people and the goal set in Vienna by the President and himself had been reached. A government under Souvanna Phouma had been formed and it had said it would pursue a policy of neutrality. But now the Laotians were set on fighting again. What should the Soviet Union do? Should it send its troops? It was the US that had experience in such matters, because it had sent troops to help Diem keep his pants on, and Americans were dying in Viet Nam. But the Soviet Union could do nothing if Laotians wanted to fight. Moreover, the USSR was not being asked to do anything; if the USSR attempted to intervene, the Laotians would ask who are you. Thus the USSR was not going to do anything and what’s more it was not being asked to do anything. He wondered why he should do anything about Laos, for he had enough of his own responsibilities and problems. The Soviet Union had no troops in Laos; it only had its ambassador there, just as it had ambassadors in other countries of the world. The Soviet Ambassador listened to the Laotian Government and transmitted its view to his government. In any event, Khrushchev said, he believed the Laotian situation had now entered a new stage, because the Laotians now wanted to fight. He then said he believed the Laotian question was the last dish the Secretary wanted to serve in these talks. Of course, usually hostesses serve dessert at the end of a meal but he, the Secretary, had offered a bitter dish. He suggested that the group adjourn and go to lunch where he was sure something sweet would be served for dessert. Discussion could continue there.

The Secretary wondered whether he could make just a few additional comments on this pickle.

Khrushchev said Laos was not a pickle because he liked pickles. The Secretary said he had used this simile only because Khrushchev had referred to something sour.

The Secretary continued that Mr. Khrushchev apparently believed the Geneva accords had been fulfilled and the matter was finished. However, we were disturbed that if the great powers remained silent or seemed unconcerned about the implementation of the Geneva accords, this might give the impression to some elements in Laos that they had the backing of one or another of the powers. He did not know how the Laotians would fight; perhaps they would fight for ten days or so, then go together to a water festival and then fight again. But we were concerned that unless the USSR, the US, the UK, France, and others expressed full support for the accords and their desire that the accords be implemented a difficult situation could ensue. We believe that this was an important matter not only because of its significance in Southeast Asia but also because it was the most productive cooperation between our two countries in recent years.

At this point the meeting was adjourned and the group moved to another building where lunch was served.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Secret; Eyes Only. The drafting information on the source text is illegible, but it was approved in S on August 28. The meeting took place in Khrushchev’s dacha. Rusk was in the Soviet Union for discussions and the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Documentation on Rusk’s visit to Moscow is in volume V.
1. On September 3, Harriman met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and informed him that the discussions on Laos in Moscow were left in an unacceptable manner. Harriman complained about the North Vietnamese failure to live up to the agreement, the Soviet Union’s lack of support for the Souvanna government, the obstructionist role of the Polish ICC representative, and the Soviet Union’s unwillingness to assume a constructive role as Geneva co-chairman. Dobrynin went over familiar ground, pleading ignorance or stating that the Soviet Union was adhering to the 1962 Geneva Accords. Throughout the conversation, Dobrynin gave the impression to Harriman that the Soviet Union was either unwilling or unable to influence events in Laos or the policies of Hanoi or Beijing. (Memorandum of conversation, September 3; ibid., POL 27 Laos)