Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

474. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy³

Washington, June 4, 1963.

LAOS

I attach INR Research Memorandum RFE–45,⁴ which analyzes possible courses of U.S. action in Laos and Communist responses thereto.

At present we are confining ourselves to supplying Kong Le on the Plain of Jars indirectly through legal channels. The consensus is that these supplies are adequate to maintain him assuming the current level of military activity. If there should be a massive attack, however, it would be necessary to supply Kong Le directly and in much greater quantity. Such supply would be in open violation of the Geneva Accords, but we have taken the necessary steps to do it quickly if necessary.

I think the tougher and more likely problem will result from a grinding away of Kong Le’s will to resist by continuous artillery pounding and encroachments on the small bit of territory he has left in the Plain of Jars. Our planning is still inadequate for coping either with this eventuality or the possibility that Kong Le might be knocked out suddenly despite our supplies. The JCS have been asked to look at as many military options as possible to meet the contingencies described above and in the attached memorandum. We have been keeping the pressure on the military planners to come up with some options but so far progress has been slow.

3. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/63–6/15/63. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.
4. Not printed. The May 31 memorandum was entitled, “If the Pathet Lao Attacks: United States Courses of Action and Communist Response.” INR outlined five courses of action: 1) essentially what the United States was already doing in conjunction with sending U.S. troops to Thailand as part of a forthcoming SEATO exercise; 2) a “Lebanon type” operation to secure conservative-held areas; 3) a “Lebanon type” operation to secure conservative-and neutralist-held areas; 4) air strikes on Pathet Lao supply routes from North Vietnam but within Laos; and 5) actions which directly threatened North Vietnam from air reconnaissance to air strikes.