Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

461. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2465⁰

Washington, April 20, 1963.

U.S. Policy Toward Laos

a. The Council discussed the deteriorating situation of the neutralist military forces in the Plaine des Jarres and its effect on the Geneva Accords.

b. The President approved the following political actions:

(1) Ambassador Unger will discuss with Souvanna military measures which the United States is prepared to take in support of him and the neutralist forces, including airdropping arms and supplies prepositioned in Thailand and action by Meo guerrillas.

(2) A strong diplomatic approach will be made to the French Foreign Minister reminding the French of their commitment to support Souvanna and urging them to back him now by encouraging him to take a firm stand against the Pathet Lao military attacks, urging the King to use his prestige in the present situation, strengthening the French military mission’s approach, and making appropriate use of the French mission in Hanoi.

(3) Ambassador Kohler will raise the subject of Laos with Khrushchev during his April 24 interview on another matter, subject to other arrangements which may be made in connection with the Harriman visit.

(4) Governor Harriman will leave at once for London and later Paris to discuss Laos with the British Government as co-chairman of the ICC and with the French Government. Depending on the reply to the current British approach to the Russians, Governor Harriman will proceed to Moscow to discuss the situation with the Soviet Government as the other ICC co-chairman.

(5) Secretary Rusk will call in today the Ambassadors of the ICC member states to discuss the current situation.

c. The President approved the following military measures:

(1) A carrier task group and Marine battalion afloat will be ordered to sail tomorrow from Subic Bay into waters off South Vietnam, remaining south of the 17th Parallel. The task force departure is not to be announced, but it is intended that it will become known indirectly to the Russians and the North Vietnamese. The task force will sail earlier if the Russian response to the British demarche in Moscow is unsatisfactory.

(2) Admiral Felt will visit Bangkok, confer with the military representatives of SEATO, and, as the situation develops, may extend his tour to Vientiane.

(3) The SEATO maneuvers scheduled for late May will be used to cover the earlier movement of U.S. forces into the area.

(4) The Thais will be consulted about plans to move U.S. air units into Thailand, only after Khrushchev’s current views on Laos are known.

(5) Plans for possible military action against North Vietnam are to be prepared for the President’s consideration next week.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 512, April 20, 1963. Secret.