Office of the Historian

45. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of Defense McNamara0

Washington, March 31, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • State-JCS Meeting 1130, 31 March
1.
The following points were made during the discussion on Laos:
a.
Mr. Parsons stated
(1)
Mr. Rusk considered the SEATO Conference to have been more successful than was anticipated but that it represented only a beginning in our effort to hold SEATO together.
(2)
In an interview with a Polish journalist Prince Sovannovong [Souphanouvong] (The Red Prince) explicitly admitted, for the first time, that he is a Communist.
(3)
State Department is studying the proposal by former Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone that the King assume the premiership and form a more broadly based government.
(4)
The lack of Soviet response to the British proposal may be due to pressure from Communist China.
b.
Admiral Burke inquired as to the U.S. position re the composition of a new government. Mr. Parsons replied that we would oppose a tripartite government or conference based on a Souvanna-Pathet Lao-Phoumi basis because this would be a two out of three basis for the leftists; however, he indicated that we would probably be willing to include one or two Communist members in minor Cabinet posts in a Lao Government.
c.
General Lemnitzer pointed out that we must avoid an International Control Commission like the one in Viet Nam which will not even look into the Russian airlift, and that we must not cease our support to the RLG because the Laos border with North Viet Nam probably cannot be effectively policed. Mr. Bowles agreed that we must be tough on this. General Lemnitzer indicated his belief that the Communists would press their attacks between now and the convening of a conference.
d.
Mr. Rostow asked if the use of the B–26’s would be our best reply to Communist pressure. General Lemnitzer answered affirmatively and said eight were ready now and that 16 would be ready by 6 April.
e.
General Lemnitzer asked if we were doing all we could for Major Bailey.1 Mr. Parsons replied that efforts were being made through the British, the French and the International Red Cross. He said he was willing to receive any suggestions for additional actions.
f.
It was agreed that there were no strings on the use of the helicopters at Udorn.
2.
The following points were covered during the discussion of Iran:

[Here follows an account of State-JCS discussion on Iran.]

Haydn Williams2
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Laos, No. 1. Secret.↩
  2. On March 23, a U.S. Air Attache plane overflying the Plaine des Jarres en route from Vientiane to Saigon was shot down by anti-aircraft fire of Pathet Lao troops. The plane crashed and burst into flames. Two men were seen to have parachuted from the aircraft, one of whom, Major L.B. Bailey, Assistant U.S. Army Attache, Laos, was taken alive by the Pathet Lao. Bailey held a diplomatic passport and was accredited to the Royal Lao Government. According to a memorandum to McNamara from Lemnitzer, March 25 (CM–156–61), the plane was engaged in a reconnaissance mission with the permission of the Royal Lao Government, a procedure which appeared to be fully “legal” under international law. Lemnitzer recommended a protest to Moscow, and perhaps also Hanoi and Beijing. (Ibid., OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, 381 Laos (Sensitive), Jan.–Mar 61)↩
  3. Signed for Williams by Colonel W.S. McCrea.↩