Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

443. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, February 20, 1963.

Laos

Recent intelligence reports have indicated that Kong Le’s military position in the Plaines des Jarres may become critical in the coming weeks. Both Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces are said to have taken up positions around the Plaines and the Embassy in Vientiane has speculated that the PL may intend to crush Kong Le quickly in the event he cannot be disposed of by defecting his forces.

Kong Le is, as you know, Souvanna Phouma’s only domestic military support. We have been informed that Kong Le may only be able to hold out for a few days in the event the PL decide on a full scale attack. We feel it would be in our interests to put him in a position to hold out somewhat longer in order to give the West a chance to take the diplomatic offensive under the Geneva Accords. Later we might want to do more, depending upon the circumstances.

There are two courses Governor Harriman proposes. First, orders should go to the Embassy, JUSMAG Bangkok, and CINCPAC directing them to expedite the flow of supplies to Kong Le through channels which are approved by Souvanna Phouma. They should also be directed to determine what types of arms and ammunition should be provided to Kong Le in order to permit him to hold out for a reasonable period of time against the Pathet Lao assault.

Second, CINCPAC, JUSMAG Thailand, and the CIA should be directed to cooperate with the Embassy in Vientiane in preparing means to deliver materiel (including arms and ammunition) on an emergency basis to the Plaines des Jarres in the event fighting breaks out suddenly. These means might involve direct flights from Thailand to Plaines des Jarres if the situation got out of hand.¹

No action other than preparation would be taken under the second proposal without your express authorization; but it does seem prudent to ensure that we be in a position to act if the necessity arises.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/63–2/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text by Forrestal reads: “Mac: The President has said O.K but he wants to know what our capabilities are to help?” A note in an unknown hand reads: “MF is finding the answers to the President’s question.”
1. In telegram 834 to Vientiane, sent also to Bangkok for the DEPCHJUSMAG and to CINCPAC, the Department asked the Embassy in Vientiane to prepare estimates of the quantity and types of equipment that would be needed by the neutralists and forward the estimate to CINCPAC. Concurrently, the Embassy, DEPCHJUSMAG, and CINCPAC should develop plans to rapidly deliver this material on an emergency basis. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-Laos)