Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

440. Paper Prepared by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff⁰

Washington, undated.

REPORT ON LAOS

The situation in Laos today can best be summarized as an unstable equilibrium. Domestic support for Prince Souvanna Phouma has deteriorated in recent months. This is largely due to his failure energetically to attract independent domestic political support and to the recent defections from Kong Le’s forces.

The Prime Minister has also been made the subject of increasing attacks from the Pathet Lao, who have been linking him more and more with General Phoumi.

General Phoumi, as usual, alternates between the mountains of over-confidence and valleys of despondency. His grip on FAR officials, while still strong, has been shaken largely because of uncertainties for personal futures. Also demobilization is not being effectively implemented. There is as yet no single plan which has been accepted by the Army. Part of the trouble may be real in that there has been great practical difficulty in returning men to villages which are under Pathet Lao influence. Primarily the problem is that most of the FAR commanders are unwilling to cut the basis of their power. Only one commander, General Pasouk in the south, has so far actually demobilized any troops (about 1500 at the time we visited him in Pakse). If the mobilization is to be made effective, it will have to be given more drive and planning from the American side.

As mentioned above, Souvanna Phouma’s position domestically has deteriorated with the result that he has become more and more solely the creature of the Geneva Accords; that is to say, his position depends upon the fact that there is no other leader who can obtain the support of the great powers. His domestic basis of support needs to be strengthened. At the moment the best chance for doing this seems to be in the Plaine des Jarres where Kong Le still maintains a precarious hold. Kong Le is important for two reasons: not only does he represent an independent source of political support for Souvanna Phouma, but his military control of the Plaine des Jarres could, in the event of a division of the country, represent an important asset. U.S. policy, therefore, should be to support him fairly vigorously economically and politically and maintain at least his present military capabilities.¹

On January 9, Forrestal cabled Bundy asking the President’s reaction to the possibility of a Souphanouvong visit to Washington, which Unger and he favored, but not as a matter of urgency. Bundy responded on January 11 that the visit was approved in principle. (Ibid.)

Kong Le claims to have de facto control of the Plaine des Jarres with about 3500 troops. Although he has a rather large amount of military equipment there, he probably over-estimates his strength. The Pathet Lao are definitely in evidence, although Kong Le claims they do not hold strong points. It seems likely, however, that if heavily attacked by the Pathet Lao, Kong Le could call upon Souvanna Phouma for help. His principal problem, of course, is that of defections. Since November 27th of last year, Kong Le has cut his last remaining ties with the Pathet Lao and they are now openly antagonistic. This has cost him some of his men, although it is difficult to say precisely how many. The French currently estimate that he has about 6,000 troops, about half of whom are scattered in isolated points outside the Plaine des Jarres.

In order to reduce the defections and consolidate Kong Le’s position, it will be necessary to bolster both the security and the economy of the Plaine des Jarres. One is impressed with the building activity which is going on, particularly in Khang Khay, where Souvanna is trying to establish a summer capital as part of his plan to gain physical independence from both extreme tendencies. It would seem to be in our best interests to foster the development of this region by insuring that it becomes an attraction, not only for the inhabitants for Xiengkhouang Province, but also a power center for other neutral nationalists. To do this we should provide Kong Le through Souvanna Phouma with material support by giving him the necessities of life for his troops and perhaps extending into some small scale AID operations. We need to have one or two AID people in the area just as soon as security can be provided. On the purely military side we should try to insure that Kong Le has on hand enough military supplies to resist an overt attack by the Pathet Lao for at least long enough to enable the cumbersome Geneva machinery to operate and conceivably to enable Souvanna to call upon FAR or Meo help. We have inadequate information on Kong Le’s real needs in this respect and, consequently, the Military Attache (who is well known to Kong Le) should get up to the Plaine des Jarres more often.

Air Supply and the Meo

The Meo remain one of the most difficult residual problems we face in Laos. Even if we could assure support for them in the future, the question would remain whether such support is worth their value as a source of intelligence or their value as a military asset in the event of a breakdown of the Geneva Accords. It is becoming evident that our capability to supply the Meo is being increasingly jeopardized.

At present, the Meo are being supplied by USAID through the facilities of Air America. The fact of the matter is that this arrangement simply will not stand up under intense political pressure. Despite the fact that our official position is to the contrary, we do not have a firm agreement with Souvanna on supply flights to the Meo; and under increasing Pathet Lao pressure, he is rapidly backing away from the tacit acceptance he has given them. Added to this is the problem with Air America itself. Morale among its pilots has dropped to a point where they cannot be expected to continue flights over enemy-held territory where they are subject to being shot down. While it is true that the danger has not increased significantly over what it was during the time of the fighting, it is a human fact that these pilots no longer feel that they are engaged in a war and consequently are no longer willing to accept the risks of their activities. In addition to this, Air America has become politically about the most unpopular institution in Laos. Its past associations are public knowledge, and indeed Souphanouvong has said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] almost any other form of American air activity would be an improvement. Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi both dislike it because its personnel have grown so accustomed to behaving as if Laos were not a sovereign country, that they have behaved on occasion in an arrogant way even toward right-wing officials in Vientiane.

Under these circumstances some new arrangement must be worked out if we are to continue supplying the Meos during the next year. Souvanna Phouma has made a suggestion which Ambassador Unger is trying to follow up. Souvanna Phouma has asked that some U.S. aircraft be given to the RLG to be piloted by American crews. His point is that Lao Government aircraft can theoretically fly to any part of the country. In practice such aircraft would be divided up among the three tendencies and used by them during the period prior to integration to supply their own needs. There is, of course, no assurance that such aircraft could be used to supply the Meo entirely, or even in some of the more sensitive Pathet Lao-held areas. Souvanna Phouma implies that eventually they could, but the impression from Souphanouvong is that the troika veto over such operations would be attempted. Nevertheless, things in Laos being what they are, much can be obtained by consistent pressure and taking advantage of opportunities to establish a practice. Consequently Unger should be supported in his attempt gradually to convert the Air America operation into one which is partially performed by RLG aircraft.

Another attack should also be made on the problem of Meo supply. It is essential that we establish as rapidly as possible a sound international political basis for the continued supply of food to the Meo, either by the RLG, or if they cannot, by our own civilian air services. To do this, Unger is preparing a White Paper on Air America relief operations since October 7, 1962 in an attempt to establish that these activities are not only permitted by the Geneva Accords, but are morally and humanely required as part of the process of bringing peace to Laos. The next step should be to convert Air America into a U.S.-operated air transport service for the Lao Government—its planes marked with Lao insignia and operating under the authority of Souvanna Phouma. The goal should eventually be that the subject of air supply to the Meo becomes a fitting subject for discussion under the Geneva Accords.

Despite all these measures, the possibility that during the next year resupply of the Meo might become impossible must be considered. Unger and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have started to tackle in detail the possibilities of self-sufficiency and resettlement. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and USAID have a high degree of expert talent available in this field, and some preparatory steps are already being taken. Nevertheless they will need guidance from Washington on long range policy. Some of the questions that have to be answered are: should an attempt be made to maintain a stay-behind intelligence ability, and if so in what areas; what is the extent of our moral obligation to these people, is it enough simply to set them on the path to self-sufficiency, or are we required to help them withdraw to military secure zones? Paradoxically, the Meo in the Province of Sam Neua are in better shape from a survival point of view than those in some of the areas around the Plaine des Jarres. Perhaps consideration should be given to the possibility of relocating as many Meo as possible into the Plaine des Jarres region to boost Kong Le. Considerably more study of this problem will have to be made by both Washington and the field.

ICC

The attitude of the Canadian and Indian members of the ICC is, to say the least, distressing. No one believes that the ICC is capable of evicting the Viet Minh from the Pathet Lao territory. Unfortunately, however, the non-Communist members do not believe that the ICC should take any action except on a unanimous basis, nor that the appeal machinery of the Geneva Accords should be used. Both Avtar Singh and General Bridle take the view that the Commission’s ability to function even in a limited way must be preserved at all costs, and that nothing must be done to disturb the delicate balance within the RLG. The result of this thinking is immobility. It has been argued to both of them that far from helping Souvanna Phouma, they have increased the strain on his Government by permitting arguments about the scope of investigations which should be decided by the ICC itself to take place within the RLG. It has also been put to them that the machinery of the Geneva Accords are designed to be used, not avoided; and that it would be most helpful to force the wheel through one turn as soon as possible in order to keep the Russians engaged. These arguments have not had any effect in Vientiane; and further efforts should be directed to New Delhi and Ottawa. It might be pointed out incidentally that General Bridle has on some occasions been less forceful than his Indian colleague. [1 line of source text not declassified]

USAID

Progress is being made in the commodity import program despite Pathet Lao objections and the AID Mission seems to be doing a good job on its immediate problems.

There is an area, however, where additional thinking needs to be done in Washington. The USAID Mission in Laos is relatively large. It has now almost 150 people and more are said to be arriving. The reason for this large number of personnel appears to be largely logistic. If the USAID Mission is to provide a significant U.S. presence in the country-side, an abnormally large support staff is needed. Placing Americans in isolated areas in Laos where they undertake various rural development projects requires, among other things, the services of a small air force for liaison, the warehousing and handling of assorted supplies and equipment, and all the administrative personnel required to back up such an effort. One wonders whether we have carefully examined what kind of AID presence is desirable at this time. If a complete job is to be done such as what we are attempting in South Vietnam, the personnel requirements will be rather large. If, on the other hand, we wish to keep our programs and projects to the minimum necessary to maintain a political presence, one has the impression that the USAID Mission need not be increased and might even be reduced.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that political maneuvering by the Pathet Lao and left-wing neutralist Cabinet members is on the increase. If the situation in Laos is to remain even in an uneasy balance, a constant counteroffensive will have to be waged by Ambassador Unger and his country team. This will require rapid and flexible support from Washington and Honolulu. The situation is so unusual and dynamic that it can only be understood by our people on the spot. We can be thankful that they are among the best.

Michael V. Forrestal²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/63. Secret. The handwritten date “1/15/63?” appears on the source text. Hilsman and Forrestal were in Laos January 9–14, 1963. They met with RLG officials and traveled to the Plaine des Jarres for discussions with Kong Le on January 11. An account of their trip and discussions with Kong Le is in airgram A–314, March 6, 1963; Department of State, Central Files, INT 7 Laos. Hilsman and Forrestal also traveled to South Vietnam and reported to the President; see vol. III, pp. 3 ff.
1. On January 2, McGeorge Bundy sent a message to Forrestal in Saigon asking him “to have a particular look while in Laos at the possibilities of supporting neutralist forces loyal to Souvanna.” Bundy continued that “at this distance it looks as if he or we may be missing an opportunity to build some strength in this area before it is absorbed or whittled away by the PL.” Bundy confessed he was ignorant on the tactical possibilities and wanted Forrestal to keep his enquiries on a low level. (Unnumbered telegram from Bundy to Forrestal, January 2; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/63–2/63)
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.