Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

425. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, September 27, 1962.

Laos

You are scheduled to meet tomorrow morning at 11:30 a.m. with Secretary Ball, Secretaries McNamara and Gilpatric, Governor Harriman, Messrs. William Bundy, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Hilsman. Generals Taylor and Lemnitzer will also be present.¹

The purpose of this meeting is to review with you our current intelligence and compliance to date with the Geneva Accords by the Communists, and proposed U.S. actions to be taken before and after October 7th (the date under the Accords when all foreign forces are to be withdrawn from Laos).

There are attached as Tab A a memorandum from Roger Hilsman,² and as Tab B the current SNIE,³ both on the short-run outlook in Laos. I have also attached for your information (Tab C) some recent cables which would be of interest to you if you have the time to peruse them:

Vientiane’s 469⁴ gives Ambassador Unger’s policy recommendations. He favors completing our withdrawal despite evidence that Viet Minh continue to maintain their presence in Laos.

Vientiane’s 480⁵ discloses that Souvanna Phouma is aware of and admits continued Viet Minh presence.

New York’s 902 and New York’s Secto 12⁶ report recent conversations with Quinim and Gromyko on the question of Viet Minh withdrawal. Gromyko’s attitude is not especially helpful, but is consistent with the previous Russian line.

Deptel 362⁷ sets forth the Department’s temporary approval of our withdrawal and asks Ambassador Unger to prepare to bring pressure on the Communists through the machinery of the Geneva Agreement.

Governor Harriman is very anxious that we continue to adhere strictly to the letter and spirit of the Geneva Accords despite conflicting evidence of Viet Minh compliance. He does not favor a special effort with the Soviets before October 7th, and he is not in favor of starting a propaganda campaign designed to build up world opinion against the Soviets and the Viet Minh at this time. He wants to fight this out initially at the diplomatic level and through the machinery of the Geneva Accords. Although he has not told me so, I suspect that part of his reasoning is based upon a concern that a public campaign at this time would have unfavorable political consequences here and complicate our diplomatic efforts. You may wish to express yourself on this point.

Although I have not seen their papers, the State Department should be ready by tomorrow morning to present you with their plans for the specific steps to be taken in implementation of the Geneva Accords. These will presumably include the gathering of evidence of the continued Viet Minh presence and its presentation to the ICC (and to the Co-Chairmen if necessary); the technique and timing of diplomatic pressures on the RLG and the ICC to commence investigations in Pathet Lao territory; high level approaches to the Soviets and related public information campaigns.

The Defense Department and the JCS may have suggestions to make on military movements which might be undertaken in support of diplomatic pressures. In this connection the question may arise whether the army battle group which is now stationed in Thailand should remain there beyond the date originally contemplated for its withdrawal. Secretary McNamara’s plan was to withdraw the battle group simultaneously with the introduction of a roughly equivalent number of logistic personnel. It might be wise to consider separating these two movements so that the battle group would remain as long as the situation in Laos seems to require their presence (subject of course to rotation). The introduction of logistic personnel in Thailand would then occur independently of withdrawal of the battle group, since Sarit expects them as soon as the weather conditions permit. It is not clear that Secretary McNamara agrees with this thought, and you may wish to ask his opinion.

Governor Harriman will report on the economic situation in Laos and the efforts we are making to get British and French cooperation. He will probably ask for authority to make another special grant for the month of September. Tab D is a cable summarizing the economic position in Vientiane.⁸

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 9/1/62–12/31/62. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.
1. See Document 426.
2. Document 424.
3. SNIE 58–6–62, “Short Run Outlook for the Laotian Coalition Government,” September 29. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 9/1/62–12/31/62)
4. Dated September 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2262)
5. Dated September 24. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2562)
6. Both dated September 25. (Ibid.)
7. Dated September 26. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–2262)
8. Tab D was Toaid 267 from Vientiane, September 22. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 9/1/62–12/31/62)