[Attachment]
1
Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Hilsman)
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
(Harriman)
Washington,
August 28,
1962.
SUBJECT
- Communist Intentions in Laos
As requested, we have (1) examined recent reports coming out of Laos
in an effort to assess possible Communist intentions; and, (2)
attempted to explore the implications for United States policy of
these intentions.
The Facts
Events and reports which should be considered in estimating Communist
intentions include the following:
- 1.
- The Communists and the Pathet Lao continue to deny the
presence of Viet Minh forces in Laos.2
Although movements of Viet Minh personnel have been reported
to include some withdrawals, there is no concrete evidence
that Viet Minh combat forces have been evacuated from Laos
in significant numbers. Nhommarath, which Souphanouvong offered as the
only checkpoint in his area, is of little practical
significance.
- 2.
- Truck convoys continue to move between North Vietnam and
Pathet Lao areas. We do not know what they carry. The Soviet
airlift has not yet been stopped, although there is evidence
that at least its pattern may be changed.
- 3.
- Pathet Lao attacks continue against Meo “pockets.” Some
minor Pathet Lao attacks against Phoumi’s forces have also
taken place in Sayaboury Province, north of Luang Prabang,
and in the Saravane-Attopeu area.
- 4.
- The Pathet Lao has restricted the movement of neutralists
into its areas and, according to Phoumi, even Souvanna has not had
complete freedom of movement. The cabinet on August 23
decided in principle on the freedom of movement throughout
Laos by central government officials. Souphanouvong took the
position, however, that some areas may be “inaccessible
during the rainy season.”
- 5.
- In mid-July the Pathet Lao refused to allow a company of
Phoumi’s troops for the integrated battalion to enter Khang
Khay, although Phoumi
had permitted the Pathet Lao and Kong Le companies to go to Luang Prabang for
the integrated battalion there.
- 6.
- The cease-fire committee established by the Souvanna government on June
30 has not as yet reached agreement on provisions to govern
the cease-fire.
- 7.
- Reports indicate that Chinese Communist troops may have
been introduced into Phong Saly Province where the Chinese
Communists are building a road.
Our Judgments
These tactics are consistent with an intention to prevent the
formation of a true government of national union in effective
control of all Laos. On the other hand, given the traditional
pattern of Communist behavior, they are equally consistent with a
Communist intention to pursue their goals within the Geneva
framework as they conceive it.
We would not expect the Communists to cooperate fully in permitting
each side to penetrate the other’s territory. Neither Hanoi nor
Peiping can be expected to abandon Communist gains or to jeopardize
them by admitting effective anti-Communist authority into areas they
hold.
At the same time, however, the evidence so far available does not
indicate that the Communists and in particular Moscow are ready to
abandon the entire coalition principle. The pattern of past
Communist negotiations at Panmunjom, Warsaw, Berlin, and elsewhere
is to confront the West with prolonged intransigence and
obstructionism in the hope of eroding resistance and winning cheap
gains without provoking an unacceptable military response. When
convinced that such a response may be in the offing or that public
rupture of an agreement carries
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intolerable political costs, the Communists
usually compromise their position so as to avoid either
consequence.
If the Communists intend to pursue their objectives within the
context of the Geneva accords, a limiting factor in their behavior
is the importance of retaining Souvanna at the head of a government of national
union. They must therefore calculate the degree to which their
obstructionism threatens the willingness of Souvanna to continue to
cooperate.
The interests of Moscow in issues much broader—and in their view more
important—than Laos is also a limiting factor.
As to the attitude of the Chinese Communists, they may well be
consolidating their logistic lines into Phong Saly, but their
present area of suspected activity is so close to the Chinese border
as to give no indication of offensive designs. Peiping’s cautious
and defensive stand along the Taiwan Strait and the Indian border
makes it unlikely that the Chinese Communists will push the Pathet
Lao into resuming hostilities.
In sum, we believe it is still too soon to take the full measure of
Communist intentions. However, they probably plan to play the game
within the Geneva terms as conceived in broad, elastic Communist
dimensions. Accepting our challenge to shift from the military to
the political arena does not, of course, mean that the Communists
have abandoned their goal of obtaining control over all of Laos.
Rather they are more likely to devote their effort at each point of
political attack—from winning key ministries in the government to
the penetration of village administration. In this sense, an
agreement in Geneva is only the beginning of a long and very
difficult road, as we have long recognized.
Possible Course of Events
At the moment, then, it is impossible to say with certainty what
direction events will take.
- First, various pressures—including the deterrent effect of
United States troops in Thailand and pressure from the Bloc
itself—might conceivably lead the Communists to modify their
tactics in the direction of greater cooperation with an
increasingly effective central government.
- Second, if the Communists change to a less obstructionist and
more sophisticated course of action and if Souvanna is gullible and
Phoumi stupid the
Communists may succeed in taking over by purely political
means.
- Third, if the Communists insist on following an obstructionist
line, Souvanna may quit
in disgust and retire to Paris.
- Fourth, if the Communists insist on following an
obstructionist line and if Phoumi is equally firm, the result may be a de
facto partition of Laos under the umbrella of an essentially
powerless central government.
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Implications for United States
Policy
We take it that our strategic objective in Laos is to deny the
Communists use of the Mekong Valley and its north-south
communications routes. We take it also that given the geographic and
political handicaps in Laos, the most promising means immediately at
hand of attaining this objective is the establishment of an
effective government of national union. We take it, finally, that
our tactics are to support Souvanna without destroying the morale of Phoumi and the Vientiane group; to
split Souvanna from the
Pathet Lao; and thus to arrive at a position where we can strengthen
all the anti-Communist forces (both Souvanna and the Vientiane group) in their political
struggle with the Pathet Lao.
Conclusions
If the above analysis is correct, it would be premature to abandon
the present course of United States policy at this time.
It is by no means certain that the anti-Communist elements would lose
a political battle for control of a true government of national
union. As demonstrated by the interesting account of his month’s
captivity submitted by the First Secretary of the British Embassy in
Vientiane, the Pathet Lao at least in Southern Laos do not have
effective programs of political indoctrination and economic
betterment. If the neutralist and right-wing forces unite in civic,
economic and political action programs, they would appear to stand
an excellent chance in all of Laos except the Pathet Lao’s
long-established northern strongholds.
If the United States continues to press hard for the establishment of
an effective government of national union, even though there may be
doubts as to the likelihood of achieving it, we can strengthen
Souvanna’s hand vis-a-vis Souphanouvong and thus maximize whatever chances
exist for a true government of national union. In any case such a
policy serves the United States’ purpose of clearly fixing the blame
for a breakdown of the Geneva accords on the Communists, and greatly
strengthens the possibility that Souvanna would be willing to call the Pathet Lao to
answer for their obstructionism or that he will blame them if he
chooses to abandon his role as Premier.
Moreover the coalition effort provides a legitimacy for the Vientiane
group which permits its continued strengthening, thereby
safeguarding United States interests should the coalition effort
fail. The problem lies in tailoring our support of the Vientiane
group to the requirements of backing an effective government of
national union under Souvanna. To the degree that Souvanna, and to a
lesser extent Khamouane Boupha, gain confidence in our support of
the coalition as an effective authority over all of Laos, they may
become correspondingly hostile to Communist obstructionism.
Difficulties between the neutrals and the Pathet Lao in the field,
in fact, have been going on for
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some time. This disillusionment could have
wide and favorable political ramifications were a final, irrevocable
split between the Communists and the non-Communists to reopen the
conflict.
So far Communist intransigence and obstructionism have failed to
undermine the position of Phoumi and the Vientiane group or to discredit the
United States deterrent posture in Thailand. These remain the twin
bases for our policy of protecting the Mekong Valley and hence our
position in Southeast Asia.