Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

40. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, March 26, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
• Mr. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

In accordance with arrangements made from Key West, Ambassador Alphand met the President at the airport at Andrews Air Force Base on his arrival at 10:33 p.m. to deliver a reply to the President’s letter of March 25.¹ After the President had read the letter in² the car he said that he agreed that the three powers—the United States, the United Kingdom and France—should concert their approaches to the Soviet Union remarking that he thought the recent British approach to Moscow on Laos³ represented the agreed views of all three. Referring to his visit tomorrow with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko he said that, while he realized that there were differences of opinion among us as to what we should do in case we fail to bring the Russians around, he felt it important that no differences appear between us during the SEATO meeting in Bangkok. There we should all evidence a common resolve.

Ambassador Alphand replied that there was no doubt but that our resolve was the same. He said that there were some differences with respect to the order of the steps to be taken in seeking a solution to the Laos crisis. The United States wanted first a cease-fire, then a meeting of the ICC and then a conference with the 14. The French differed with respect to the order of these events (i.e., apparently would accept ICC before cease-fire). However, even in this respect the French had accepted the President’s position that there should not be a conference prior to a cessation of hostilities. The President commented that if the Soviets clearly indicated that an ICC meeting would bring about prompt arrangements for a cease-fire this might be acceptable. However, the President emphasized that he did not see how the Soviets could be persuaded to agree to a cease-fire without the presence of some threat. Ambassador Alphand replied that basically the French thought that there was no military solution that could be found in the Laos situation. There was simply no front that could be established—though he agreed to the President’s interjected observation that there was a river line. However, he continued, there was not even a Dien Bien Phu as a strong point, though God forbid that it should ever come to that! Another difference, Ambassador Alphand pointed out, was that the French were not willing to use SEATO.

The President said that even if there were a negative reply from the Russians it should be realized that a SEATO action would not necessarily be imminent. However, it was essential that we consult. Even more important, he was concerned that we should not show differences of opinion at the SEATO meeting with respect to possible future contingencies.

In reply to a question from Alphand the President said that if the Russian reply, perhaps from Gromyko tomorrow, were satisfactory the whole thing would be over. We should agree that, if the reply were not satisfactory, we would not permit Laos to be dominated or taken by the Communists through military means. However, he repeated he wanted to stress that there should be no obvious division among us and he personally hoped that no military action would become necessary. The difficulties would be aggravated if there were no definite Russian reply tomorrow, and the situation were just allowed to drag out.

Ambassador Alphand said he thought the French could simply be silent except as to basic purposes and the firmness of their resolve. In reply to a question from Alphand the President spoke to him briefly of his talks with General Trapnell and of the need to go ahead with the paramilitary measures. Ambassador Alphand commented that the fact that the De Gaulle letter reserves the French position with respect to SEATO and military action did not mean that they would not consider the possibilities under suitable circumstances. The President then asked what France would actually do if the situation collapses. Ambassador Alphand replied that he did not know. He asked in turn what the United States military thought about the possibilities. The President said they thought there were real possibilities of demonstrating strength. Perhaps the possibility of action on our part was a matter of concern to the other side. Maybe they do not want us to come in.

Ambassador Alphand repeated that the French note did not say they would not consider these matters. However, they now considered the Laos question as political and reserved their position as to SEATO and military action. He also pointed out the strong French backing for Souvanna voiced in the note. In reply to a question from the President the Ambassador said that the Pathet Lao was not a large force—there were about 9,000 of them—but they were fighting much better than the FAL even though they were unpaid. Consequently it was clear that the solution must be political. The President repeated that he did not see how negotiations could be successful unless there was some firm military posture on our side to which the Ambassador responded he realized it was a question of “the arrows and the olive branch”. The President stressed again that what we want now is that there should be no division at SEATO. Despite the French reserves there should be a firm and united front. All three powers should agree at SEATO that they should not accept a Communist conquest of Laos.

Ambassador Alphand then turned to the subject of the Macmillan talks and in reply to his question the President gave him a brief resume of the essential points as recorded elsewhere. He stressed that the British were in agreement at least that a bridgehead should be held in Laos if the situation deteriorated.

Ambassador Alphand said that he would immediately cable a full report to General De Gaulle regarding the conversation and the President’s observations including the President’s stress that we should “paper over the cracks” at Bangkok. The President said we would be in touch with the Ambassador further tomorrow afternoon after his conversation with Gromyko.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/7/61–4/10/61. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler.
1. The Department of State sent a telegram to Paris that contained a text of a message from Kennedy to French President Charles de Gaulle. Kennedy noted that the United States had been trying to do all in its power to find a peaceful solution, but if these efforts were unavailing, he was sure that De Gaulle would agree that “the West cannot allow Laos to go Communist.” Kennedy asked that France maintain a united front with the United States at the SEATO Council Meeting in Bangkok, March 26–29. Kennedy informed De Gaulle that he was taking advantage of Macmillan’s West Indies visit to meet with him at Key West on March 26 and that he was meeting Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on March 27. Kennedy asked for De Gaulle’s views at the earliest possible time. (Telegram 3950 to Paris, March 25; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2561)
2. The unofficial translation of this March 26 letter is in Tosec 27 to Bangkok, March 27. While de Gaulle agreed that Laos should not fall to the Communist camp, he stated, inter alia, that as for “using of SEATO as a possible cover for direct Western intervention in Laos, I must tell you that France, for its part, is not at present prepared to do it.” (Ibid., 751J.00/3–2761)
3. See Document 39.