372. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0
1107. We trust rapid and significant U.S. military reaction recent attack Nam Tha has convinced Communists (including Soviets) that their side can not flagrantly violate Lao cease-fire with impunity. We hope this conviction will take effect in two particulars (a) stop Communists from undertaking any other attacks against points which annoy them (e.g., Saravane, Mahaxay) and (b) stop Communists from massive action exploit and physically invest northwest territory opened up by FAR rout.
Assuming foregoing results accomplished, it now becomes important for us signal to Communists, both by actions and messages, what our immediate purposes are. They should specifically understand circumstances which we would consider satisfying our interests in such measure that we would be willing withdraw additional military forces we have deployed into area. Our friends and allies should also have clear understanding these matters in order preclude crossed wires and internecine differences.
Fundamentally, our intention is to seek reestablishment of the territorial basis on which we have expected provisional coalition government be established. it should be clearly understood that this provisional government, in order satisfy our interests in area (and those of our most directly interested allies) needs to be underlain by geographic as well as political and ideological arrangements. This geographical element has been inherent in Lao internal political negotiations ever since Zurich communique of June 1961 which stipulated that “during period of transition, organs of administration established during hostilities will be left in place provisionally.” These rather sophistic words have always been understood as assurance that, during period provisional government, Communist forces would be confined to those areas Laos over which they exercised de facto control at time cease-fire was fixed. By their general conduct, Communists (specifically Soviets) have indicated their willingness accept this understanding and willingness use cease-fire delineations to demarcate essential territorial basis for coalition. Nam Tha attack and subsequent FAR rout have put this understanding in jeopardy.
[Page 780]To restore this understanding and reestablish general territorial pattern which has existed since incidence and reestablish general territorial pattern which has existed since incidence cease-fire, our immediate policy vis-a-vis RLG should encourage them by all available influence to recoup as much of northwest Laos territory as they can. Internationally such action on their part can be justified politically in all objective quarters. Militarily, we suspect they could retake and re-garrison entire salient up to and probably including Vien Phou Kha without meeting significant enemy opposition. We therefore strongly approve actions you and Chief MAAG have taken in this direction and particularly applaud White Star team which has moved up trail from Ban Houei Sai.
We think, however, it would minimize risks involved in this reinvesting operation if ICC were fully informed of its purpose and its scope. We believe you should therefore, on confidential basis, immediately brief Avtar Singh. We also wish your advice soonest whether and when this information can and should be shared with Polish Commissioner in order that Communists have no rpt no confusion re intentions. We further believe ICC can be helpful with respect particular problem Nam Tha itself.
Ideally, village Nam Tha should be reoccupied by FAR if there is to be restoration cease-fire line in that area. Initially, therefore, Singh should be asked seek out Souphanouvong and attempt obtain latter’ concurrence evacuate Nam Tha. While it is highly doubtful Communists would agree FAR reoccupying Nam Tha (especially since Phoumi used it as base from which he launched his attack on Muong Sai) it is remotely possible Communists might be willing evacuate their troops from town itself if ICC could guarantee it some status as “open city”. In any event, it is highly desirable engage Singh and ICC mechanism in continuing and consistent effort restore cease-fire in Nam Tha vicinity and provide sanction for restoration territorial status quo ante in remainder northwest Laos.
If these arrangements can be accomplished and if Laos remains militarily quiescent, we would consider that major threat to Thailand and to peace Southeast Asia which seemed inherent in Nam Tha action had largely receded. This consideration, off course, is contingent on assumption that Communists refrain from any obstruction continuing negotiations for coalition government and that they especially continue accept underlying political, territorial and military balance which would give this government its inertial neutrality.
We, of course, will continue exhibit our good faith in this respect by maintaining pressure on RLG to negotiate sincerely and to refrain from obstructive tactics. In this regard, we are vexed by renewed demonstration Phoumi irresponsibility in flying off to Taipei at this juncture. We [Page 781] therefore repeat and re-emphasize our earlier instructions that he must be brought under responsible control.
As additional thought this direction, is there any possibility Col. Siho’s units could be deployed for northwest reinvestment operation, being replaced in Vientiane perimeter by battalions brought back for re-equipment from Nam Tha fiasco?1 Could MAAG make such deployment an element of re-equipment bargaining?
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1662. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sullivan; cleared by Wallace G. Magathan of G/PM, William Bundy of DOD/ISA, Forrestal, and Emory Swank, Rusk’s Special Assistant; and approved by Harriman. Repeated priority to Bangkok, 2nd to Moscow, New Delhi, London, Paris, Geneva Fecon, and CINCPAC POLAD.↩
- In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, May 16, Forrestal characterized Colonel Siho as “the local gestapo chief” who had “succeeded in keeping virtually all of the political community in Vientiane in a state of real fear (not a difficult thing to do in Lao circles).” Forrestal noted that without some” downgrading of his [Siho’s] organization, any change of the political scenery without Phoumi’s consent would be almost impossible.” In a brief memorandum [text not declassified] also May 16, Forrestal suggested that an attempt to neutralize Colonel Siho’s police organization, if feasible, would be in keeping with the policy approved by the President. (Both Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/10/62–5/16/62)↩