Office of the Historian

370. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, May 15, 1962, 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Meeting Called by Governor Harriman Concerning Laos

PARTICIPANTS

  • Department of Defense
    • Mr. Bundy
    • Col. McCrea
    • Mr. Heinz
  • JCS
    • Gen. Fontana
  • CIA
    • Mr. Fennimore
    • Mr. Cooper
  • White House
    • Mr. Forrestal
  • State
    • FE Governor Harriman
    • Director SEA—Mr. Koren
    • Laos Desk Officer—Mr. Cross
    • UN Adviser—Mr. Sullivan
    • INR—Mr. Hillsman
    • P—Mr. Greenfield
    • G—Col. Magathan
    • S/S–S—Mr. Kriebel

Purpose:

Governor Harriman said the meeting was called at the request of the highest authorities to consider military and political possibilities for the United States in Laos in Light of recent developments

Actions Requested:

1.
Governor Harriman asked that a small working group be established under the chairman of FE—Mr. Sullivan. The military services and CIA would be represented. The group is to make recommendations regarding certain political and military
2.
Governor Harriman asked the intelligence community for a balanced appraisal of the FAR in light of the events of Nam Tha. He is interested in Phoumi’s orders to the RLG forces, what his intentions were and what the capabilities of the RLG forces would likely be with new leadership and with a revised relationship with US military advisors.
3.
Governor Harriman said the President wants as many SEATO flags in Thailand as possible. These forces would have no commitment outside Thailand ant there would not be any time limit set as to their stay in Thailand. There would be no SEATO command.
4.
Governor Harriman asked Mr. Peters to cable our Ambassadors in Karachi and Manila that we would pay the bill for any forces sent to Pakistan and the Philippines.

Main Points of Discussion:

1.
Governor Harriman reviewed current US policy stating we still desire a cease fire and a return to political negotiations. He said we want a reorganization of the Laos Government with a reduction in power and influence of Phoumi. A consideration was whether US forces in Thailand would remain until a government of National Union was formed and we were sure the Viet Minh had left Laos.
2.

He thought the study group might consider the problems posed for the US if a Government of National Union were established or there were no real break in the cease fire nor progress or negotiations, or in the event that negotiations broke down and a cease fire were not reestablished. If either of the two latter possibilities develop he asked what division of the country might be arranged. Subsequent discussion indicated that a North-South division of the country would be most sensible militarily, but the Thai would regard this as unacceptable because of the threat it would bring to their border.

Governor Harriman also raised the question as to what would happen if US forces were introduced from Thailand into Laos for holding operations to restore the cease fire. He thought the possibilities were:

(a)
Early establishment of a cease fire negotiation.
(b)
A negotiated partition of the country.
(c)
Development of open hostilities with a consequent long stay in Laos for US forces.

3.
Mr. Hilsman suggested an intelligence community estimate of reaction of Viet-Nam and Chinese Communist forces should US forces in Thailand move into Laos with the announced purpose of enforcing the cease fire and remaining in territory basically under control of the RLG. He said his people thought the Chinese Communists and Viet Minh would match our moves but would not provoke open hostilities.
4.
Governor Harriman thought it essential to give the President a balanced account of the Nam Tha episode and of the effectiveness of the RLG forces.
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Laos 092, Jan.–Dec. 1962, Secret. Drafted by p. Wesley Kriebel of S/S. The meeting took place in Harriman’s office.↩