Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

355. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball⁰

Washington, May 11, 1962, 7 p.m.

President: I am concerned Eisenhower may make a statement in the next 24–48 hours that we should intervene.¹ I don’t want anybody else to know this. McCone and I are the only ones who know this. He told me a month ago he might make a public statement under some conditions. If it is so, we will be in a tough position. I think I should see Dobrynin and I might indicate Eisenhower’s position and indicate this is going to make it impossible to go on for a long period, and that they should pull that in balance. The Eisenhower thing would intensify it greatly and he should get back there. Maybe I should get him in tomorrow.

Ball: I am meeting the Secretary at 9.

President: Talk it over. This matter is to be held carefully. We don’t want any other person to know—not even Chip or anybody else, but he should be aware this could come into the picture at any time.²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Laos. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ball’s office.
1. In a brief memorandum, prepared on May 11, Forrestal described a meeting between former President Eisenhower and CIA Director McCone in which he was also present. Forrestal reported that among the comments made by Eisenhower “in an off-the-cuff and most probably in an unconsidered manner” was that if the United States were sending troops into Laos, Eisenhower recommended following up “with whatever support was necessary to achieve the objectives of their mission, including—if necessary—the use of tactical nuclear weapons.” (Memorandum for the Record, May 10; ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/10/62–5/16/62)
2. Two memoranda of conversation between Hilsman and the President and one between Hilsman and McGeorge Bundy, all May 10, reiterate how concerned the President was not to have Eisenhower’s views on intervention in Laos known. In fact, Eisenhower is referred to in these memoranda as “X” and is not named. Kennedy stated: “domestically my problems are (1) we get into a war (2) that (he) [Souvanna?] gets overthrown, particularly if X says we ought to put troops in there.” Kennedy also told Hilsman that should the United States decide to intervene in Laos, having Eisenhower say it would make it easier. (Ibid., Hilsman Papers, Countries, Laos, 5/1/62–5/10/62)