Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

311. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Honolulu, March 21, 1962.

I–25327/62

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Laos at CINCPAC Headquarters, Wednesday, 21 March¹

PRESENT

• Secretary McNamara
• General Lemnitzer
• General Decker
• Admiral Felt
• General Collins
• Admiral Sides
• General O’Donnell
• General Harkins
• Mr. Sylvester
• Mr. Bundy

Plus a small number of members of the CINCPAC staff

1. The meeting opened with an intelligence briefing by Colonel Patterson (J–2, CINCPAC). He stated that:

a. There was no change in the balance of military forces as compared with the period prior to the cease-fire last May. In discussion, it was made clear that this related to the balance between the FAR and the Pathet Lao augmented by Viet Minh cadres and battalions. The FAR could still cope successfully with the Pathet Lao without the Viet Minh.

b. Specifically, the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh were now capable of taking over major cities and defense points in the north and central areas. These included Nam Tha, Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Pak Sane, and Thakhek. The period required to take Nam Tha and Thakhek was estimated at 14–30 days and to take Vientiane the period was estimated at 30 days. In response to Admiral Felt’s inquiries whether all these could be taken simultaneously, the answer was that there would probably be a delay in a few sectors depending upon the emphasis, but that the above time tables would not require major shifts to achieve. Admiral Felt queried whether harassing by the Meo had been taken into account and Colonel Patterson replied that it had.

c. With respect to equipment, the Communists have brought in 40 PT–76 amphibious light tanks, a full-track vehicle carrying a 76 mm. gun but thought to be quite thin-skinned. This vehicle would be very useful in the Plaine des Jarres and other areas of open country, but would be an easy target if used in the narrow defiles, for example, of Route 13. …² In addition, the Communists had just brought in a few pieces of 152 mm. artillery, as against the 105 mm. howitzer, the largest piece in the hands of the FAR.

d. The present FAR deployment was spread out, with at least five battalions up at Nam Tha. However, by means of airlift across Thailand, Phoumi could, if he desired, deploy his forces fairly rapidly to the south, using the Savannakhet and Pakse airfields.

2. Colonel Haffner (CINCPAC J–3 staff) commented on the basis of personal knowledge that the Route 7 supply line had to go over a very, very steep pass just at the Laos/North Viet Nam border, and was highly vulnerable to interdiction by air on the Laotian side.

3. Admiral Felt then made three points:

a. The rainy season (beginning roughly in mid-May) would favor defense.

b. The Meo (now estimated at 10,000) had been operating under wraps to date and might be capable of much greater action than they had undertaken.

c. Air operations could be extremely effective. Phoumi’s present force of T–6’s could not do much alone, but the introduction of US aircraft (presumably T–28’s and AD–6’s as in South Viet Nam) would be a major addition to FAR capabilities.

The discussion then moved to the question of policy alternatives. Secretary McNamara stated that there appeared to be three alternatives: (1) to go on supporting Phoumi as we were now doing, not putting pressure on him, and awaiting developments; (2) to put strong pressure on Phoumi through the use of military sanctions, including in the extreme the withdrawal of US military advisors; (3) to introduce US or SEATO forces under Plan 5 or some variant.

4. Admiral Felt expressed the view that in the event of a breakdown of negotiations (for example, if Souvanna went to Paris), the US should sit tight and maintain support as its first move. If the Communists renew the fighting then we should support the Phoumi government. Specifically, we should move a force commander and headquarters and communications, together with air strength, at least to Udorn in Thailand. (The force commander would be Major General Richardson, USA, if the action were under SEATO auspices, or would be Major General Cushman, USMC, if unilateral.) He believes that these elements should be moved rapidly, and that air strength was the crucial factor, to support the FAR and hit targets confined, at least initially, to Laos. As the action developed, the US should consider moving ground forces in to hold the river towns (i.e., under the Plan 5 concept) with the US retaining flexibility to select the appropriate river towns, and also to move forces into the Plateau de Bolovens in the south as action progressed. … As to the Communist reaction, he thought that the Viet Minh would not fight Americans. General O’Donnell, however, expressed the view that the Communists would react by moving light bombers down from China, and could “take out” Vientiane and also clobber the main points in the panhandle area; his conclusion was that we should go all out from the first, and not go in in bits. Admiral Felt said that a carrier task force should certainly be put in position and that we “must” react if aircraft were brought to bear from Chinese bases. He noted that the SEATO military advisors had agreed to bombing North Viet Nam if the Viet Minh came in openly, but conceded that this view might not be shared by their political leaders. Admiral Felt expressed the hope that SEATO nations would join in the action, particularly the Commonwealth Brigade, but made no prediction that this would in fact take place.

5. In explaining his view, Admiral Felt said that the alternative to such full support was to see the Communists take over north and central Laos rapidly, and that Phoumi could not hold even southern Laos without substantial help from us.

6. General Lemnitzer likewise thought that so long as the cease-fire continues we should sit tight and go on supporting the FAR. He was strongly opposed to pulling out the MAAG and US military advisors. We should seek to make the Communists initiate hostilities; if they did so, however, the best we could hope for was to hold a line running from the 17th parallel on the east diagonally northwest, holding Thakhek if at all possible. In the ensuing discussion, Colonel Haffner brought out that the Communists were threatening Thakhek very closely at present, and that the terrain lent itself to rapid military reaction by them designed to preclude any occupation by other forces. It was generally agreed that Thakhek was a critical point of concern.

7. In response to Mr. Bundy’s question concerning the military effect of a cessation of MAP deliveries (without withdrawing advisors or the MAAG), both General Lemnitzer and Admiral Felt thought this would have a very serious psychological effect; in concrete terms, the FAR probably had adequate supplies for a 30–60 day period, but beyond that the direct effects would likewise be very serious.

8. In discussion on the role of the Meo, it was brought out that they could help a great deal holding the Vientiane front, but that they would not extend into the areas that would be involved in a quick campaign against Thakhek.

9. Referring to the Kha situation, Colonel Haffner said that was going forward well, and that they now had 4 companies recruited who were exercising a major degree of control in the Bolovens area. The present strength of 700 could be built up to 1200 rapidly, and gradually expanded to a total strength of 9 companies and would be able to move into the area northeast of the Plateau de Bolovens toward the South Viet Nam border.

10. Secretary McNamara asked whether there was any possibility that the Thais would agree to send ground forces into southern Laos, provided that the US guaranteed Thailand and introduced its own forces into Thailand to reinforce the guarantee. Admiral Felt expressed the firm view that Sarit would not put any Thai ground forces in unless the US were “with them shoulder to shoulder”. General O’Donnell queried whether the Thais might not go in provided the US furnished air support, but the universal consensus of others present was that they would not do so even under this condition.

At this point, Secretary McNamara said that he had a clear picture and would now leave the room to call the President.³ As he was leaving (and I think while he was still in the room) both Admiral Felt and General Lemnitzer again reiterated their strong opposition to the withdrawal of MAAG advisors as a form of sanctions against Phoumi. On the political side, there were several comments during the course of the discussion to the effect that the prospects for a neutral coalition government were virtually non-existent.

WP Bundy

0. Source: Washington Federal Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Laos 1962, 000.1. Top Secret. Prepared by William Bundy on March 22.
1. Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer, accompanied by other Pentagon officials, visited Honolulu for the fourth Secretary of Defense’s Conference, March 21–22. For discussion at the Conference on Vietnam, See vol. II, p. 260.
2. All ellipses are in the source text.
3. No record of this telephone conversation has been found.