Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

309. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, March 20, 1962, 5:40 p.m.

Ball told Bundy that Alex Johnson was very apprehensive that this telegram¹ may involve a telegram from Averell saying “If you want my resignation, you may have it.” This is on the business with Phoumi. Bundy said that was what Rice had told him, but Bundy does not think Averell operates that way. Ball said he was committed very far down the line on this and Bundy asked how far. Ball said it was a kind of test of will on Averell and Phoumi.

(Johnson came on phone.)

Johnson said this was Sarit’s initiative. He said to come down and he would get Harriman and they would talk together. Johnson said now Phoumi has done a 180 degrees and says he is too busy; if Harriman wants to see him, he can come up there and see him.² This will mean that Phoumi has called him and Harriman is coming. Bundy asked how Phoumi read it and Johnson said the same way. Bundy asked “No matter what we may say about a Presidential message?” and Johnson said that doesn’t say anything which we have not said to him over and over. We have got to go down one road on this and Johnson thinks for Harriman to go see Phoumi—he would not recommend the President say this. Bundy asked his alternative and Johnson replied to cut off military supplies at this stage. This shows seriousness of intent—not immediate on the situation, but that we are in earnest with him. Johnson said we don’t yet have a slate from Souvanna that we can insist is satisfactory.

Bundy asked how much time do we have and Johnson said Harriman was arriving in Bangkok tonight to be there through tomorrow. Bundy asked how he does this—say to Sarit “I am going to do this?” Johnson said yes and he says “You have to support me in this.” Johnson said Sarit’s face was involved in this thing also and they just might succeed and we might not have to go through with this—but Johnson doubts it.

Bundy asked Johnson’s opinion on what Phoumi really thinks would happen if there was a renewal of the fighting. Johnson replied he thought Phoumi would think we will come into it.

Ball said his feeling was right now the problem is not to put ourselves in a position where we can be accused of selling this guy out and trying to force him into a government. It would be in effect selling out to the Commies. Bundy said this was what was bothering the President. If Harriman said “You keep your military supplies,” then Phoumi puts the word to us publicly. Johnson added that our Thai friends had reminded us of that.

Bundy said he thought the real trouble in this cable was not to Harriman’s mind. Johnson said Harriman also feels very very deeply about Phoumi. Johnson has not shared this same feeling. Bundy said their earlier message gave the impression he was not going to ask for this on this trip and Johnson said he would not unless the occasion arose.

Ball asked suppose he stay in Bangkok and send this when he was through, saying “This is it; you better come down here and talk?”

Bundy asked what would happen if the President sent a message to Phoumi and said he does not understand—Then he said no that would engage the President. Bundy said we might say to send this through the President [who] might say “if you are not able to keep your bargain to talk with my representative, it might be extremely difficult.” Johnson said you would have to go into the back history of it. It is not normal for our representative to talk except in the country itself. It involves a little explanation.

Bundy asked about the phone connection in Bangkok and Johnson said it was very poor. With luck he might get a decent connection, but he has never had one. Bundy said he would go back to the boss. Ball suggested he call him; then he would get Alex in. Ball said he thought he would be reluctant to buy this. The argument is that if Averell goes up there Phoumi would have won again and would be more insistent that he have things his own way. Bundy said he saw that but that he would try that on him.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Laos. No classification marking.
1. Not further identified.
2. In telegram 1307 from Vientiane, March 19, Brown reported that Phoumi had told Hasey that he could not go to Bangkok to see Harriman. It was no longer a personal matter, Phoumi asserted, the RLG Cabinet and the King were opposed to “clandestine missions” by Phoumi with representatives of another government. Phoumi suggested that Harriman come to Vientiane or send an emissary. Despite Hasey’s warnings that this would be a grave mistake and a serious affront, Phoumi was adamant. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1962)