Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

29. Memorandum From the President’s Military Aide (Clifton) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, March 10, 1961.

ATTENTION: Mr. Bundy

I had an opportunity to talk to General Boyle and Colonel Wood after the meeting yesterday.¹ The following points were developed:

a. The PDJ plan is essentially Phoumi’s plan, with very slight modifications by CINCPAC and the JCS. Phoumi and Boyle and Wood are all firmly convinced that this will succeed.

b. All the items they have requested for implementation are essential to a continuing program of military capabilities. They were especially grateful that you had called this meeting because they have had some trouble in getting these very few items that they need.

c. Boyle and Wood point out that we do not have to wait until all of this is ready and then make a large decision to launch. They gave me as their honest estimates that when the eight large aircraft are ready—and if they are given permission to use them—they will accomplish this mission with the facilities now at hand.

They estimate that the Pathet Lao will “bug out” at the first sign of heavy attack. Their battalions will disintegrate and they will fade into the woods. They point out that the only reason Royal troops folded at the crossroad was on account of some unobserved artillery fire which fell in the area and scared them to death.

d. They gave as their honest opinion that there would be no intensification of the fight by Souvanna or the Soviets because of the use of the air bombardment. They point out that the Air Attache from Saigon is running daily aerial reconnaissance over the PDJ from altitudes as low as 200 and 300 feet (that is where those air photos came from) and no one has made a pass at them. They believe that the Soviet interest in building up these supplies is “to keep the pot boiling” and to keep the Chinese Communists out of the fracas so that they won’t have so much influence in the future.

e. Obviously, Boyle and Wood are not diplomatic experts, but they feel strongly that Souvanna would be welcomed back by the Royal Lao Government troops and also by a great many members of the present Royal Government who feel that Laos should be unified politically.

f. Boyle and Wood say that the Phoumi army has good morale—as good as the Pathet Lao, but they have pointed out in cables over and over again the bare fact that everytime a battalion commander becomes aggressive, Phoumi relieves him of his command. He doesn’t want any one personality to develop as a military leader. The other reason is that he doesn’t want to be guilty of killing a lot of other Laotians.

This is the most significant part of the action on the military level: No Laotians want to shoot each other. They cannot look down a rifle barrel and shoot another Laotian. They can stand off with artillery pieces and blast hell out of each other because they don’t see the results. Furthermore, their artillery fire is largely ineffective because both groups are dug in and neither group is skilled enough to use high-angle fire to get into the bunkers.

g. Boyle and Wood have the strong feeling that before you have given a decision to go all the way, you could take the intermediate step—which they are convinced would also test Communist intentions—of letting them use the eight big aircraft.

C.V. Clifton

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 3/2/61–3/13/61. Secret. Clifton noted on this memorandum that the President saw it. McGeorge Bundy wrote on it “very interesting.”
1. See Documents 25 and 26.