Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, January 22, 1962, 8:37 p.m.

639. Bangkok’s 1056.¹ Believe we should not be diverted by unfortunate events reported Bangkok’s 1047 to Dept.² Suggest we let Phoumi know his performance with Sarit unbelievable and shocking exhibition duplicity in light signed unpublished communiqu[. We note Boun Oum and Phoumi appear very sensitive to their public isolation and responsibility for any Geneva breakdown or suspension of US aid. Suggest you exploit this feeling both with King and Boun Oum/Phoumi, again pointing out that no one, least of all US, would be deceived by any claim that their supporters would not accept any decision made by them to give up Defense and Interior particularly if public were to know that Boun Oum signed communique which explicitly states that if RLG did not receive Defense and Interior they would choose two from three other posts they consider essential.

In this connection your efforts would be greatly strengthened if Souvanna responds favorably to Amb. Gavin’s approach in Paris (Deptel 3961 to Paris).³ Further measures elicit more constructive attitude from Sarit also in preparation.

We must still face definite possibility Phoumi will not yield on Defense and Interior and we therefore will need exert further pressures. We have been searching for means bringing Phoumi into line without substantially depleting right-wing strength. Appreciate your comments on following ideas for political actions which might have effect of isolating Boun Oum/Phoumi.

We do not believe that majority non-Communist Lao leaders would support Phoumi in destroying chances peaceful settlement if it were made unmistakably clear to them that:

1. Bulk of world opinion now counting on early formation government of national union as result Geneva meeting;

2. U.S. definitely no longer supporting Boun Oum/Phoumi as individuals because of their refusal accept peaceful solution;

3. This does not mean any diminution U.S. support to Laos or of other non-Communist elements who genuinely strive for peaceful settlement.

Following are lines of action we might adopt:

A. Make it widely known that we could no longer work with Boun Oum/Phoumi and could not support them as individuals. This would be apparent in our conduct of business in Vientiane. (Would appreciate your concrete suggestions on this score, e. g., direct payment of troops by U.S.)

B. Privately approach all responsible Lao officials including the King and selected military leaders; we would set forth reasons for U.S. decision re Boun Oum/Phoumi and our determination pursue Souvanna course. We were not supporting Boun Oum/Phoumi in their intransigence and we hoped that other Lao leaders would use their influence to bring about a coalition government under Souvanna. We would underscore the necessity of unity of all non-Communist forces for the future of the country and would remind them that Laos was forfeiting world support through Boun Oum/Phoumi actions.

C. Also reassure them that U.S. is deeply interested in Laos as a country and peaceful settlement would enable us resume our whole-hearted support.

Foregoing course action runs some risk of political instability, but it might create conditions whereby other Lao leaders might come together to force Boun Oum/Phoumi aside or accept Souvanna solution.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross and Queneau, cleared by Cleveland and Rice in substance, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Bangkok and Geneva Fecon.
1. In telegram 1056, January 22, Brown, who was in Bangkok, reported that he hoped to see Phoumi on January 23 (in Laos) and he had requested an audience with King Savang. Brown asked if there was anything the Department wanted him to say in these meetings in light of the discussion described in telegram 1047 from Bangkok. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 1047, January 21, Young reported a quadrilingual (Thai, Lao, French, and English, often simultaneously) conversation he had with Sarit, Boun Oum, and Phoumi. Young described it as “not hopeful.” The principal theme of the meeting, fully endorsed by Sarit, was that if Souvanna became Prime Minister and controlled both the Defense and Interior Ministries, it would be a disaster for Lao anti-Communists and for Thailand. Notwithstanding Young’s efforts to dissuade them, Boun Oum, Phoumi, and Sarit agreed that the RLG could not concede either the Defense or Interior Ministries, despite the fact that Boun Oum had signed a communique at Geneva agreeing to do so. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–2162)
3. See footnote 3, Document 275.