262. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Laos
When I talked to you last night about Laos I had not yet read the latest cable traffic. It seems to me that the courses of action proposed by [Page 566] Brown in his 945 of January 5 (attached)1 are generally reasonable for dealing with the immediate situation. My only question about these proposals is whether we shouldn’t insist that Phoumi go to Geneva with Boun Oum as a condition to action by the Ambassador to deposit the January cash. Boum Oum is, of course, a figurehead and is unlikely to be given much discretion by Phoumi. Phoumi’s absence could make negotiations in Geneva even less likely to produce results. (There is a counter-argument that he ought to be left in Vientiane where Brown will be in a position to influence him.) If there is a three Princes meeting in Geneva wouldn’t it be desirable for either Mr. Harriman or Brown to be there to run our part of the show? Some authoritative U.S. spokesman would seem desirable and our present representation at the Geneva Conference is pretty low level.
Looking beyond the immediate effort to get the negotiations resumed, it should be noted that Brown does not expect the RLG to yield at Geneva on the issue of the interior and defense ministries. Thus, even if we get a meeting, we are likely soon to be forced, as Brown suggests, to resort to the sanction of cutting off military deliveries.
Sanctions are however unsatisfactory at best: (a) we cannot be certain whether they will produce any result; (b) on the other hand, they may stimulate Phoumi into military action; and (c) they will soon begin to have the effect of reducing the strength of the FAR in a dangerous way and thus eliminate the one source of non-Communist strength in Laos. This last named difficulty might possibly be surmounted in the short run if, as the Department has suggested in a recent telegram, we could get the Soviets to agree to hold back the PL while we are engaged in our manuevers to pressure or get rid of Phoumi.2
Since sanctions are such an unsatisfactory instrument we ought to consider all other possibilities; e.g.:
- a.
- Taking Phoumi up on his offer (made to Brown on Oct. 14 and Nov. 12)3 to resign if we thought someone else could do the job better. At one time Brown thought of this as his first possible action in the event of final intransigence on the part of Phoumi, but it has not been mentioned in recent telegrams.
- b.
- Agree to support Phoumi in asking for a division of the Secretary of State positions in the ministries of defense and interior between the RLG and the PL. Presumably the RLG should be given the Secretary of State position in the Defense Ministry. Both ministries under this arrangement would be headed by a Souvanna supporter as Souvanna has proposed. Brown considered such an arrangement preferable to the troika arrangement favored by Souvanna, but State rejected the proposal. [Page 567] State’s view seems to be that this would simply be a formula for confusion—for renewal of the struggle in a slightly different form. It may, however, be better than the alternatives, even though it is admittedly unattractive.
- c.
- Phoumi has based his objection to Souvanna’s proposal on the ground that he cannot be sure that Souvanna is truly neutral and has stated that he (Phoumi) would be prepared to give up the two ministries if, after six months, Souvanna had proved himself truly neutral. Although this may not be a serious argument in the sense that Phoumi’s primary concern is with his own position, would it be possible to give Phoumi somewhat greater assurance that retaining and reorganization of police and other internal security forces would preserve a significant element of RLG strength and would offer the prospect of a means of keeping the government truly neutral? What I have in mind, is agreement now by Souvanna to reasonably specific plans for reorganization of the armed forces and for the establishment of internal security forces. We have recently taken the view, I believe, that such agreement cannot be obtained until there is a new government.
- d.
- Souvanna has indicated that Phoumi will be a vice premier. Is there any way that he could offer to let Phoumi share some of his powers that would be reassuring to the latter?
Although the renewal of hostilities in Laos could create problems with political repercussions in the U.S., I do not think they can be compared very exactly with those created by the Congo situation. In the latter case the Katanga Government has much stronger support than Phoumi would ever get because of the involvement of economic interests and the availability of a strong propaganda organization.
Finally, at some stage, we may find ourselves again faced by the question of whether some form of partition of Laos on a de facto basis may not be the best solution. I have always felt that there was a good argument for such a solution although admittedly, at this point, we have gone so far down our present road it is not easy to see how we can sit still and see it happen.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/1/62–1/15/61. Secret.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 256.↩
- See Document 256.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 253.↩