Office of the Historian

237. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0

Washington, November 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Strengthening a Souvanna Phouma Government in Laos

Monday afternoon I attended a working-level meeting to discuss the State paper on the “Souvanna Phouma Solution.”1 The following major points emerged from the discussion.

1.
There appears to be a difference of view between State on the one hand and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Defense on the other with respect to the extent, if any, to which we should continue to provide support to Phoumi. The State paper somewhat straddled this issue. While it clearly contemplated switching almost all of our support to Souvanna, it did suggest that it might be possible to help Phoumi “modestly in strengthening and consolidating his position in southern Laos while not giving him the means to challenge Souvanna or Souvanna’s government in Vientiane”. Some of those present—primarily State people—were of the view that it would be impossible to provide “modest” support to Phoumi without encouraging him unduly and risking the possibility that he might take actions that would seriously endanger our relations with Souvanna. On the other hand, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it would be possible to support Phoumi just as we might support other local politicians who have some power in various sections of Laos—for example, the Sananikones in Vientiane. I believe that the dominant State view will be reflected in the revision of the paper. In general, State believes that we will have to push Phoumi as far as we can in the negotiations leading to a Souvanna government, but that we will before long reach the point where we will have to “saw him off” and put all our chips on Souvanna.
2.
The section of the paper on support for political organization raised a number of questions without answering them. As a result of the discussion, the paper will, I believe, be revised to reflect the following definite conclusions:
a.
That we should work for a single party organization under Souvanna, rather than help somebody like Phoui create a political party in order to strengthen the bargaining position of the non-neutralist leaders in their political dealings with Souvanna.
b.
That in Laos the only practical type of non-Communist political organization is one based upon a coalition of elite elements who control, through village headmen and others, the votes in various sections of the country. I suggested that, if possible, we attempt to combine this type of organization with a more grassroots organization to compete with the PL where that is necessary.
c.
That, in accordance with a proposal I made on the basis of your suggestion, the recommendations would call for a careful, detailed study of how to organize to win the election.
3.
[7–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
4.
There was disagreement between FE and AID over our approach to future budget support. The argument was somewhat complicated, but, briefly, it ran as follows. FE favors a minimum of U.S. control over funds provided although, as I understood it, FE would be prepared to see some sort of budgetary review by the U.S. prior to decisions on aid levels. AID, on the other hand, wishes to have precise agreements on the specific uses to which U.S. funds will be put. AID’s views arise out of its concern for Congressional reaction to uncontrolled aid. State, on the other hand, believes that too much U.S. control could pose some very difficult problems that would have at least as severe political consequences in the U.S. Thus, for example, the Lao budget will support Pathet Lao forces during the transition period prior to full integration of the military forces; Souvanna may have other commitments to his Xieng Khouang allies; and he should have money to bribe PL forces away from the PL. AID believes that this problem can be solved, in part at least, by limiting U.S. support specifically to those activities which do not pose such political problems and thus releasing other Lao resources for such political purposes. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
5.
There had been a discussion at a meeting in the morning, which I did not attend, of the problem of supporting Lao police forces. One aspect of this problem was discussed at the meeting. It was suggested that, perhaps, the best approach to the training of the police might be to rely upon a third country from the area, such as Malaya or Indonesia, with the former much to be preferred over the latter.
6.
I raised the question of whether the proposed reduction in army salaries, which was expected to hasten the exodus of marginal and irregular troops, would have the effect of forcing out more members of the FAR than of the PL. I asked, more generally, whether the political consequences of the proposal had been carefully analyzed. I was assured that the effects would be about equal on both sides.
7.
As a result of my suggestion it was agreed that there should be added a recommendation that we search for a well qualified non-Communist economist to serve as a personal economic advisor to Souvanna. It was also agreed that the paper should include something on the ICC and how we can make it work more effectively.
8.
[9–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

At the end of the discussion there was some consideration of the question of the next steps in the work on this paper. State in introducing the paper had indicated that it had been prepared largely at White House (our) request. State also indicated that, following revision, the paper would be discussed in a higher-level interdepartmental group. I suggested that the question of where the paper should go following consideration in a higher-level interdepartmental group could be determined by the higher-level group itself. Specifically the question of whether this warranted Presidential consideration should be decided by such a group. I also urged that, consistent with our practice on task force reports, the paper be revised by State to take account of the recommendations of other agencies only to the extent that State was prepared to accept them.

It is obvious that the State Department considers that it is preparing this paper in response to White House request and indeed it was our pressure that initiated the whole exercise. I therefore think it important that we continue to show a very active interest in the project. State’s view tends to be that all of these proposed actions are moving forward and are being decided on a day-to-day basis in the drafting of telegrams. State therefore tends to discount the importance of the paper. I believe, however, and so stated in the meeting, that there is a real utility in achieving high-level interdepartmental understanding of the over-all approach that we plan to take to a Souvanna government.

It is obvious from this discussion that there are still some rather important unresolved issues. If these issues are resolved in the high-level meeting, I would recommend that the paper be sent by the Secretary of State to the President simply for his information. It implements a policy line that he has already laid down in general terms. If, on the other hand, there continue to be real differences of view, these should probably be submitted to the President for consideration, preferably in a meeting with his principal advisors.

Robert H. Johnson2
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T–028–69. Secret.↩
  2. See footnote 7, Document 220.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩