Office of the Historian

222. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0

Vientiane, November 7, 1961, 8 p.m.

680. Department Eyes Only for Secretary. Ref: Deptel 429 and Confe 823.1

I have communicated Department’s and Amb. Harriman’s concern, which I agree, to Phoumi (Embtel 676)2 and to King (Embtel 678)3 with, I believe, some results, following similar assault by Australians and British. I have also attempted lay foundation for future pressure by persuading Souvanna through Sen to present proposition impossible for Phoumi to refuse (Embtel 679).4

I am not too concerned at reports of hostile activities close to Vientiane since they are minor patrol actions, some probably in retaliation to Xieng Khouang shelling, and General Boyle has returned from visit to front with Colonel Kouprasith encouraged at improved military situation in Vientiane region (SitRep Nov. 6, ML–5376).5 Enemy movements generally in recent weeks basically continuation general war of movement and manuever for position being carried on by both sides. Xieng Khouang incident was unfortunate error by our side which Communists would naturally exploit and which RLG handled very badly. I would agree with Amb. Harriman that ChiComs would intervene at least in north of Laos if SEATO troops entered southern Laos. I do not think, however, enemy likely in immediate future engage in general resumption hostilities.

Tough line I was authorized by Deptels 2876 and 2957 to use with Phoumi does not really give me any more effective leverage with him than I had already been exercising, since it still does not put me in position to withdraw support from him if he remains recalcitrant. I do not [Page 503] see any way in which I could “convince Phoumi that he personally not indispensable to US” in absence of any other person we could support. I remain convinced, as I said in Embtel 507,8 that we cannot effectively tell Phoumi we will not support him until we have made final decision to support Souvanna and tell Phoumi so. This would involve abandoning our bargaining position with Souvanna. We are obviously not ready to do this yet.

I am not prepared to accept as fully accurate Phoui’s statement that Phoumi told King Amb. Harriman did not urge him to negotiate for coalition government, since Phoui’s relations with Phoumi, despite recent surface indications of reconciliation, still fundamentally hostile and Phoui would undoubtedly love to displace Phoumi as US chosen instrument if he could.

I have told Phoumi, as Amb. Harriman suggests, that we expect him to go to Plaine des Jarres under conditions I suggested (Embtel 651).9 British, Australians, Commission and I are making concerted effort to bring this about.

I propose see Phoumi after Sen returns from Plaine des Jarres, possibly tomorrow morning, and press him further. I have told King that RLG’s willingness go there on conditions I proposed will be considered test of its sincerity.

I see little to be gained in terms of influence on Phoumi by sending officer to see Souvanna at this juncture and continue to feel this action premature (Embtel 668).10

I am slightly encouraged by my Nov. 6 meeting with Phoumi and King’s agreement that Boun Oum at least ought to go to Plaine des Jarres.

I therefore recommend that we continue to endeavor work things out along lines I am now pursuing.11

Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–761. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva eyes only for Ambassador Harriman.↩
  2. In telegram 429 to Vientiane, November 6, the Department asked for Brown’s views on Confe 823, Document 221.↩
  3. Dated November 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–761)↩
  4. Dated November 7. (Ibid.)↩
  5. Dated November 7. (Ibid.)↩
  6. Not found.↩
  7. See footnote 2, Document 189.↩
  8. In telegram 295 to Vientiane, September 28, the Department suggested that the Embassy make an effort to convince Phoumi that he was “not indispensable” to the United States and would lose “by not cooperating and will gain if he does play ball with us.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2561)↩
  9. See footnote 3, Document 189.↩
  10. See footnote 7, Document 216. Dated↩
  11. November 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–461)↩
  12. The Department stated in telegram 440 to Vientiane, November 9, that it agreed that Brown should continue to work along the lines he was pursuing for the present. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–761)↩