Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

181. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Planning for Laos

In the last two days I have been in touch with Cottrell and Steeves with respect to the status of further contingency planning for Laos. In particular I have borne down upon the problem of action that we should take in the event that there is no open break in the cease-fire at the end of the rainy season but instead a gradual, perhaps somewhat speeded up, erosion of the non-Communist position on the ground. Specifically, I have directed attention to the proposal in the paper that the State Department submitted to the President¹ two weeks ago for cautious introduction of small Thai and Vietnamese para-military units into southern Laos. I have also inquired into the status of action to stiffen the FAL by the introduction of additional U.S. advisers.

John Steeves indicated that he was also concerned about planning in this area. However, it is his view that, as a result of Ambassador Harriman’s objections² to the original Task Force paper, nothing further will be done with respect to this problem because of the fear that planning of such action will give too much encouragement to Phoumi and may, therefore, make him more unwilling to accept a political settlement. I called to Steeves’ attention the memorandum which General Taylor sent to Cottrell yesterday on this question. (I don’t yet have a copy.³) Steeves indicated that he planned to talk with Alexis Johnson this afternoon about the problem.

I am informed that the memorandum suggests that an effort be made to determine the purpose, scope and organizational requirements for an operation involving the introduction of Thai and Vietnamese para-military units into Laos and also to relate any recommendations to the planning already going on between Phoumi, Sarit and Diem.”

On the matter of stiffening the FAL, Steeves indicated that we are gradually introducing additional American advisers into Laos but will not increase the number beyond the 164 already planned until we get some indication from Sarit that the Thais will make a matching contribution. Because of Ambassador Young’s failure to raise this question specifically with Sarit in his initial interview, we do not have Sarit’s answer to this question. Steeves said that yesterday he had initiated another telegram needling the Ambassador on this question.⁴

We are standing still in our planning with respect to the problem of strengthening the non-Communist position in southern Laos. It seems to me that the argument against planning for the introduction of small Thai and Vietnamese forces is less strong now than it was before we had approached Sarit and Diem on the expanded Plan 5. I should think that it would not be impossible to make clear to Phoumi that our objectives in doing this kind of planning is the very limited one of holding on rather than one of making any kind of major effort to recapture Communist-held areas.

Obviously we have to wait about getting a Presidential decision on the necessary actions until after Harriman has had his talks with Souvanna. But we’ve got to get the planning going with a view to getting something to the President next week. The Pushkin views as reported from Rome⁵ are very interesting and may herald a real change in the Soviet position. But they may be primarily designed to keep us immobilized. As I suggested over the phone, I think it would be useful for you to talk with Alexis Johnson. I think State may be rather doubtful as to how much interest there is in the White House in anything but the diplomatic exercise at this point.

In your session tomorrow with General Craig,⁶ I suggest that you may want to explore his reactions to the following possible actions relating to the area:

a. Improvement of roads and of communications in southern Laos.

b. Action to strengthen the FAL logistic organization by applying the encadrement principle to that organization. (When I suggested this possibility to Steeves he claimed that the general encadrement now going forward is designed, in part to improve our supervision of the FAL logistics organization.)

c. U.S. participation in patroling operations along the coast of South Viet Nam.

d. Strengthening of the border control arrangements of Thailand and South Viet Nam on either side of Laos.

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 9/61. Secret. The source text is undated, but from internal evidence it was probably written on September 14.
1. For a summary, see Document 171 and its attachment.
2. See Document 167.

3. Not found. Johnson describes it as follows in a footnote in the source text:

   “I am informed that the memorandum suggests that an effort be made to determine the purpose, scope and organizational requirements for an operation involving the introduction of Thai and Vietnamese para-military units into Laos and also to relate any recommendations to the planning already going on between Phoumi, Sarit and Diem.”

4. Johnson is apparently referring to a conversation, September 5, between Young and Sarit, as reported in telegram 352 from Bangkok, September 7. Young stated that he did not mention specific numbers for encadrement of the FAL to Sarit because he and JUSMAG were concerned about bolstering the combat capabilities and strength of the Thai Army. Young thought 500 Thai cadres were too many. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–761) In telegram 321 to Bangkok, September 8, the Department reminded Young that Thai officers and NCOs would gain combat experience in Laos and the encadrement would enhance the training of the Royal Thai Army. (Ibid.) In telegram 363 to Bangkok, September 16, the Department informed Young that Admiral Felt agreed with Washington’s view of encadrement. (Ibid., 751J.00/9–1361)
5. See Document 180.
6. See Document 183.