Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

172. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 29, 1961, 11 a.m.–noon.

MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE ON AUGUST 29, 1961, TO DISCUSS SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Attendance: The President, The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Attorney General, The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The Director USIA, The Director of Central Intelligence, Ambassador Harriman, Alexis Johnson, John Steeves, Roswell Gilpatric, William Bundy, Kenneth Hansen, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Robert Johnson)

Secretary Rusk made a brief presentation of the four possible contingencies covered by the State Department’s Plan for Southeast Asia. As the next step in the negotiation phase Ambassador Harriman should attempt to see Souvanna, preferably in Paris. If Souvanna would not come to Paris, Ambassador Harriman might see him in Phnom Penh. The Secretary referred to the reports on the Souvanna-Falaise conversations which have been quite unsatisfactory.¹ All of the individuals that Souvanna proposed for the neutral element of the cabinet were actually identified with the Pathet Lao. Thus, his proposed cabinet would have a 12–4 composition rather than an 8–4–4 composition. Perhaps Souvanna can be brought to modify his position if he understands our view clearly and appreciates fully the possibility that fighting may resume in the absence of an agreement. Whether Souvanna will play, however, is problematical. Thus, Secretary Rusk concluded, we should continue diplomatic negotiations but should be prepared, if the world situation permits, to take military action.

The President asked whether there were eight potential cabinet candidates who were pro-Souvanna but not actively involved with the Pathet Lao. In response, Secretary Johnson stated that there were other individuals in Laos who were not pro-Souvanna but who might be included in a center group. The President then ran down the list of the eight individuals mentioned by Souvanna² and Mr. Steeves briefly characterized the background of each. In connection with this discussion, Secretary Rusk said that one possible arrangement that might work would be for Souvanna to retain the Defense portfolio while Phoumi was given responsibility for the economy. This would keep the more important governmental functions out of the hands of the Pathet Lao.

Secretary Johnson noted that if Souphanouvong were left out of the coalition government and retained a separate army he would be left in a very strong position and could negotiate as an equal with Souvanna Phouma.

The President asked whether it should be Ambassador Harriman rather than Falaize who should talk to Souvanna next. Secretary Rusk said that the French might be asked to arrange for such a meeting but that we should reestablish direct communication with Souvanna which we have lacked for some time. The President indicated that Souvanna should be told that we were anxious to get an agreement with respect to a coalition government nailed down, but that we did not think that his candidates were truly neutral. Secretary Steeves emphasized the importance of an agreement on reorganization of the armed forces; leaving the Pathet Lao army in being would unrack the non-Communist opposition.

Ambassador Harriman stated that there was not much chance of getting Souvanna Phouma to accept our views unless he had some direct indication of U.S. backing and support. He was under illusions with respect to the support that Khrushchev was giving him. If he does not feel that he has U.S. economic and political support, which he does not feel that he has at present, there was not much use trying to negotiate with him through Falaize. The questions of the composition of the government and the reorganization of the armed forces were of the greatest importance. Souvanna should be made as dependent upon the FAL as he was now upon the Kong Le forces. There were some indications of dissension within Kong Le’s forces. He concluded by stating that Phoumi did not want a political settlement in Laos.

Secretary Rusk agreed that negotiation by the French on our behalf was not satisfactory. The French would probably be willing to accept any kind of a Lao government in order to avoid military intervention. They would also attempt to play down the significance of American support, a point on which we had to convince Souvanna. The President asked whether we would have difficulty getting Phoumi to go along with a political settlement. In response, Secretary Johnson stated that Phoumi was obviously not anxious to agree to such a settlement. Ambassador Harriman suggested that it might be important at some point to make a demarche to Khrushchev and to refer to his agreement with the President at Vienna.

The President suggested that it was important that Ambassador Harriman have available to him the assistance of Ambassador Brown or someone else who was expert on the backgrounds of the different possible cabinet candidates. As he saw it, there were three things that needed to be discussed with Souvanna—the character of the eight neutral members of the cabinet, the question of whether Souphanouvong was to be in or out of the government, and the breakup of the Pathet Lao. Ambassador Harriman agreed that he needed the help of someone such as Ambassador Brown [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to identify the individuals proposed by Souvanna. He thought it was important that, in these negotiations, we distinguish between individuals who were anti-American but neutralist and those who were pro-Pathet Lao.

In the further discussions of the topics to be covered in Ambassador Harriman’s talks with Souvanna, Secretary Rusk referred to the need to assure Souvanna of our political and economic support if he really plays a neutralist game. Mr. Steeves pointed out that the four conditions specified in the Paris Agreements covered the essentials of what we would seek. The President agreed.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that it was difficult for Souvanna to talk frankly as long as talks were held in Xieng Khouang. Ambassador Harriman suggested that the situation of the Kong Le elements was important. If we could somehow bring together all of those who really wanted a neutral Laos and those who supported the King, we could be successful in achieving our objectives. In the subsequent discussion it was agreed that if Souvanna refused to come either to Paris or to Phnom Penh we would have to continue to deal with him indirectly through the French.

Ambassador Harriman suggested that if we fail in our efforts with Souvanna or if he lacks the capability to carry out the sort of actions we require, we should make a major effort to disaffect him and get him to quit. We would be in a better position if we were contesting directly with the Pathet Lao rather than supporting a supposed neutralist who was not really a neutralist. Everyone but the Thais and the Vietnamese favor Souvanna for Prime Minister. The President asked whether there was any possibility that Souvanna could be induced to count himself out. Secretary Rusk replied that there were some indications of such a possibility. The President, however, suggested that in Souvanna’s conversations with Falaize he did not sound as though he were ready to count himself out. The President went on to state that we had said from the beginning that we wanted to get out if we could.³ If we were not successful, however, we may have to consider military action. He asked General Lemnitzer to present the military plan.

General Lemnitzer discussed some of the aspects of an expanded Plan 5. In the course of his discussion he said that the decision on expansion of the Meo operation to 17,000 could be made at a later time. Following General Lemnitzer’s presentation, Secretary Johnson pointed out that if we went to an expanded SEATO Plan 5 we would seek an increase in the contribution of Asian troops. In particular, we would seek an increased contribution from Thailand and perhaps Australia. He also noted that in implementing Plan 5 we would move by stages. We would begin with an operation designed to achieve the original objective of Plan 5—the reestablishment of a cease-fire along the May 3 line. If this approach did not succeed, we would conduct a cleanup operation in the South and seek to achieve a divided Laos. It was important to undertake shortly the necessary exploratory talks. He doubted whether we should go ahead with any military action in Laos under SEATO Plan 5 unless we were also prepared to take the action necessary to clean up the South. He noted that if there were not a resumption of hostilities by the Communists we would take the lesser actions that General Lemnitzer had described. He suggested that we should immediately begin bilateral discussions and subsequently discussions in SEATO on both concepts.

Secretary McNamara suggested that, in discussing these alternative plans with our allies, we should make no commitment to undertake military action until we had reviewed the situation in Laos in the light of world problems at the time, especially the situation with respect to Berlin. We would not want to tie down substantial forces in Laos if these forces were required to deal with the Berlin situation.

General Lemnitzer pointed out that there had already been discussions between the South Vietnamese and Phoumi with respect to putting Vietnamese forces into Laos to block passage of North Vietnamese forces into South Viet Nam. This kind of planning was the sort of thing that we could, under the circumstances, normally expect.

Secretary Johnson stated that we had thoroughly examined all possible actions that we might take if there were no resumption of hostilities by the Communists. No such actions would give us assurance that we could clean up Communist pockets in Laos. We also had to play our cards in such a way as to avoid charges that we were violating the cease-fire. The State paper proposed that we take certain actions to show our determination [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] not so much to clean up areas held by the Communists as to prevent a deterioration in the position of the FAL. Secretary Rusk added that our objective was at least to create a state of confusion on the Communist side which would prevent their consolidation of their position.

General Lemnitzer noted that we hoped to have the Thai supply half (500) of the additional advisers for the FAL. We would add about 200 more Americans beyond the 300 additional Americans that we plan to introduce or that we were in the process of introducing.

Secretary Johnson suggested, with reference to Secretary McNamara’s remarks, that we would have to talk quite freely about our plans if we were going to get the agreement of our allies to these plans. Mr. Bundy asked what these conversations involved. Secretary Johnson indicated in response that they would cover pretty much the concept set forth in the State Plan. Without committing ourselves to every point, we would want to talk pretty completely about all aspects of that Plan. Secretary Rusk said that he felt that Secretary McNamara’s reservation was inherent in the international situation and that this reservation made it difficult to talk to our SEATO allies. He suggested that we should not at this time mention to our SEATO allies the contingency that concerned Secretary McNamara—the possibility that the Berlin situation would preclude military action in Laos.

The President suggested that we should make it clear that we were developing a plan, but were not agreeing now to implement it. General Taylor suggested that the discussions be played in a low key and that we make our approach in terms of bringing SEATO Plan 5 up to date. Secretary Johnson agreed that such an approach would be appropriate but that the negotiations involved would be rather delicate. In response to an inquiry, Secretary McNamara indicated that the actions that he was concerned about reserving our position on were those which were proposed in the event of overt Communist aggression. We were, for example, very short of air power in Western Europe. We couldn’t take on another operation involving carriers and Air Force fighters at a time when these were required in Europe. He pointed out that the Soviet Union might very well take advantage of the Laos situation to drain off our forces from Europe.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that if we should get 40,000 troops in Laos they would almost all have to be supplied by the United States.

General Lemnitzer pointed out that one objective of the proposed Plan was to start off with a feint. This would be initiated through declaring first Charter Yellow and then Charter Blue for SEATO forces, to be followed by the proposed exercise in Thailand. The objective would be to encourage the Communists to cool off their own efforts.

The Attorney General asked how many American troops would be involved, assuming Communist aggression. General Lemnitzer pointed out that the Plan called for starting off with approximately 13,000 American troops, of whom 4,000 would be ground combat troops in Laos and nearly 9,000 would be supporting forces based in Thailand. The Attorney General inquired as to what could be accomplished with forces of this size. General Lemnitzer noted that these forces were intended to accomplish the original Plan 5 objectives. They would not move out from the Mekong River sites but would simply hold them and release the FAL for action elsewhere in Laos. Secretary Rusk added that the political purpose would be to get the Communists back to the conference table.

The Attorney General asked what would happen if the Communists then continued with their aggression—what American troops would be required then? General Lemnitzer stated that it depended on how much of an effort the Communists made and whether they were willing to accept the original May 3 cease-fire line. Secretary Johnson pointed out that we would not start implementing expanded Plan 5 unless we had assurances of help from our Asian allies.

The Attorney General recalled that, at a meeting to discuss the Laos situation two or three months ago, it had been proposed that we take military action in Southern Laos.⁴ At that time it had been estimated that the Viet Minh could wipe out forces introduced into Southern Laos in two to three days. He wondered why we were being more optimistic now. General Lemnitzer said that there had been no change in view but that SEATO Plan 5 was a flexible plan and could be the basis for taking action going beyond its original concept. General Taylor said that it should be noted that the 30,000-odd troop estimate simply represented the initial cost of the operation, not the final bill.

The Attorney General suggested that, if the Communists were serious and could not be faked—as we must assume was the case—would the Communist reaction to an expanded Plan 5 mean that we would soon have to drop bombs on Hanoi? General Lemnitzer felt that we would not have to take such action very early in the game. He pointed out that it was difficult for North Viet Nam to supply any substantial body of forces in Laos. Nonetheless, he acknowledged, continuing Communist military action would necessitate the introduction of more U.S. and other forces. Secretary Johnson pointed out that Admiral Felt had estimated that a four-division force was the maximum that the North Vietnamese could support in Laos.

Secretary McNamara said that he was sure that if 13,000 American forces were tied down in Southeast Asia we would have to reserve a part of our remaining military power to deal with the Southeast Asia situation as it evolved. He thought the Soviet Union might very well find it advantageous to tie down substantial U.S. forces in Southeast Asia in the midst of a Berlin crisis. Accordingly, we had to give most careful consideration to any such move.

In response, General Taylor suggested that such a situation would force us to make another survey of our readiness condition. Secretary McNamara said it was inconceivable to him that we could ship six divisions to Europe and fight a war in Southeast Asia without total mobilization. General Taylor acknowledged that such a situation would require a greater effort than at present. Secretary Johnson pointed out that it was not intended that we would continue to pour troops into Laos if the Communists raised the ante. Rather we would draw back and attack North Viet Nam from the sea and from the periphery of Laos. Secretary McNamara acknowledged that this was the intent. But the problems associated with military action in Laos had been viewed as very serious problems two months ago, and that was before the Berlin crisis had fully developed, before we contemplated the introduction of six divisions into Europe and before we had become aware of the non-nuclear deficiencies of our forces. He felt that we should carry on our discussions with our SEATO allies in a way that avoided any commitments to military action. Secretary Rusk suggested that if we became involved in fighting in Southeast Asia and in Berlin, it was most likely that trouble would also begin to develop around the periphery of the Soviet Bloc—in Korea and elsewhere. It was, therefore, important to try to obtain a peaceful solution in Laos. If such a peaceful solution were not achieved, risks involved in military action began to mount very fast.

The President agreed that Ambassador Harriman had to do his best to get an agreement. We didn’t want to be put in a position where we were only one man away from agreement with Souvanna on a cabinet. We didn’t want to take on a war in Laos in a situation where we lacked French and British support and where public interest in the U.S. had greatly declined. Secretary Rusk said that he had not thought we would go in for a military build-up in Laos as we have done in Korea—rather, we would fall back and hit the Communists from the sea and from elsewhere outside Laos. The President indicated his agreement.

In response to the President’s request, Secretary Rusk began to sum up the points on which the President’s approval was now required. In doing so, he relied in part upon his memorandum of August 29 for the President. The first point was that, through Ambassador Harriman, the U.S. should establish direct contact with Souvanna immediately. We should be prepared to discuss specific names and particular portfolios with him. We should indicate our willingness to provide economic and political support to him while indicating that we cannot go along with actions which will lead to a covert turnover of the government to the Communists. If we cannot establish direct contact with Souvanna, we should make the same points through the French.

Second, we should go ahead with the stiffening of the FAL, adding Thai and U.S. advisers, conducting rotational training in Thailand and discussing with our SEATO allies the establishment of a SEATO River Patrol. We should also begin preparations for the arming of an additional 2000 Meo.

Third, we should talk bilaterally and in the SEATO Council about the revision of Plan 5 along the lines outlined in the paper. We should not, however, seek agreement now to a large military exercise in October. We need to give further thought to this proposal. Mr. Steeves interjected to say that these discussions of SEATO Plan 5 should be on the basis that we were making no commitments but wished to dust off the Plan and to obtain their support for changes that might be required. In the discussion of this statement, the President said that we should not commit ourselves to SEATO Plan 5 without regard to whatever else may happen in the world. Secretary Rusk agreed that the discussion should be on a planning basis.

The President wondered whether Souvanna Phouma may not believe that, if fighting is resumed, he may be able to win control of Laos without Phoumi. Ambassador Harriman said that Souvanna had indicated that he did not expect to be Prime Minister if the Pathet Lao took over the entire country. Mr. Dulles asked if we should not try to get Souvanna out of enemy territory. If he would move away from Xieng Khouang, this would be the best evidence he could give of his neutrality. Mr. Steeves pointed out that Souvanna considered Xieng Khouang his home territory. Ambassador Harriman added that he needed to stay there because of his problems in getting Communist support for the Kong Le forces.

Mr. Bundy asked whether we wanted to go ahead with the proposal for support of 2000 additional Meos, who would add to our problems if we got a peaceful settlement, in view of the possibility that we might be able to achieve such a settlement on the basis of the Paris Agreements. Secretary Johnson agreed that this was a good question but that State felt that on balance we should go ahead. Mr. Dulles pointed out that if we did become involved in fighting, we would need the help of the Meo. The President asked what would happen to the Meo in the event there was a peaceful settlement. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Dulles pointed out that if the new Lao government were unfriendly, there would be trouble. In this connection, Ambassador Harriman noted that the first cease-fire violations by the Communists were likely to take the form of an effort to get rid of the Meo. Therefore, the stronger the Meo are and the better able they are to harass the Communists, the better off we shall be. The President agreed that we should go ahead with the equipping of 2000 additional Meo.

In response to a question from Mr. Bundy, the President also agreed that we should go ahead with action to increase the number of U.S. advisers to the FAL to a total addition of 500 and that we should seek to obtain 500 additional Thai advisers.

There was some discussion of the proposal for photo reconnaissance [7 lines of source text not declassified]. In response to a question from the President, General Lemnitzer indicated that this reconnaissance would be performed at altitudes of 5000 feet and that it would be a continuous operation with twice-a-week flights over areas of reported enemy activity. The President approved the reconnaissance proposal. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/29/61–8/31/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert Johnson. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
1. The report of the 2-hour meeting between Falaize and Souvanna in Xieng Khouang is in telegram 340 from Vientiane and Brown’s analysis is in telegram 348 from Vientiane, both August 28. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2861)
2. Souvanna’s list included Quinim Pholsena, Pheng Phongsavong, Khamsouk Keola, Sisoumang, Khamsing, General Heuan, and Khampham Boupa. While there were only seven names, Souvanna himself would hold a ministry in the cabinet as well as being Prime Minister.
3. McGeorge Bundy prepared a short record of this meeting which he described as minutes. Bundy wrote that “The President, in approving this pattern of negotiations, made clear that we would like nothing better than ‘to get out of Laos, if we can.’ We have no objective there other than to reach an acceptable settlement which does not hand the country over to the Communists.” (Minutes of discussion on Southeast Asia, August 29, by Bundy; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 9/1/61–9/20/61)
4. Robert Kennedy is apparently referring to one of a number of meetings that took place in late April 1961, perhaps the one described in Document 67.