143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India0
301. Deptel 220.1
Share Harriman’s concern re Menon’s philosophy and attitude at Conference. Appreciate fact you have done much missionary work with [Page 310] Indians including Menon to bring them to shoulder their responsibilities abroad, but believe time may be propitious for you to broach subject again with Nehru. Purpose would be to give him direct US exposition of position in case Menon has given him distorted version and also to urge India toward more forthcoming position on ICC. Suggest you approach Nehru along following lines:
You should tell Nehru that we desire to review with him Lao situation which continues to give us considerable concern, particularly since recently we have received impression that views of Indians and of ourselves had become divergent. Nine weeks ago when conference opened at Geneva it was our impression we and GOI were in tune on objectives to be sought. We had agreed to reactivation of ICC and to Conference on condition that there be effective and verified cease-fire so that Conference could proceed with serenity and not under threat of force. Nehru had contributed significantly to tranquilization of situation by speeding return of ICC to Laos.
Despite this auspicious start Communist intentions have become more clear and more menacing. They have prevented cease-fire from being wholly effective and blocked all attempts to have it verified by ICC. It has become evident that Communists consider they, in this instance Pathet Lao, are in position of strength and they have given no evidence of any willingness to find acceptable compromise.
It is clear that Communists are in position to exert considerable pressures within and from without Laos. Lao Communists are also members of Vietnamese Lao Dong party and geography encourages infiltration from North Viet-Nam. There are large numbers of North Vietnamese military personnel now in Laos and yet this fact is denied by Communists at Geneva who show no intention of withdrawing such personnel or of preventing their covert presence in Laos in future. It has become evident that what Communists are seeking is international recognition of a Laos which would in fact have no means to remain independent or neutral.
We understand quite well however Indian view that Communism can best be countered in Asia by having countries take a neutral stance on the larger world issues and permitting people of these countries to handle their home-grown Communists. However, we fear that Laos, because of its weaknesses and exposed geographic position, is in a category apart from all others. Furthermore, we would like to point out that no neutralist Asian country today has any Communists in its government. Yet Indians are pressing in Laos for a coalition government which would include a strong Communist representation.
If Laos then is indeed to be independent and neutral, compromise must be found. Nature of compromise we have sought is one which would create conditions in which non-Communist elements in Laos [Page 311] would be able to stand up to Communist pressures. It is clear to us that if non-Communist Lao elements feel abandoned by Free World and are left alone in open confrontation with PL aided and abetted by covert North Vietnamese and other Communist subversive activities, these elements will have no choice but to buckle. It seems clear to us therefore that some device must be found to protect Laos against such Communist intervention and pressures. That is reason why in our view question of ICC’s authority and facilities assume great importance. Only some impartial witness such as this can offer chance to overwhelming Lao majority to remain non-Communist.
To summarize then, we have sought at Geneva first of all to insure that there be effective and verified cease-fire. Interwoven with this question has been problem which we consider chief subject of negotiation—question of ICC. We consider that declaration of neutrality is essential to define status of Laos but that it will remain meaningless unless it can be supported by some effective international mechanism. We have gone out of our way to find basis on which Conference could agree.
It has been therefore with great chagrin that recently we have seen our Indian colleagues take position which was in many ways consonant with that of Communist powers. Indian representatives have undercut Free World’s attempts and particularly those of Canada to give ICC means to do its job. They have declared publicly that neutrality declaration is chief business before this Conference. They have tabled draft protocol re ICC terms reference less satisfactory than even 1954 Geneva Agreement, whereas we had assumed that India desired to see ICC become more effective international instrument for safeguarding Lao neutrality. Their actions have encouraged Communist powers, discouraged other neutrals, who are considerably worried by this situation, and are helping create situation which may well produce collapse of Conference.
We want Nehru to understand clearly that US is seeking in good faith to find formula which will permit Laos to remain both neutral and independent but US is not prepared to sell out Laos for sake of achieving international agreement. We had hoped and we still hope that India would take more affirmative stand in support of neutralist country.
Possibly Nehru may observe that effectiveness of ICC will in last analysis be dependent upon degree of cooperation it gets from Lao Government and that therefore most important immediate issue is formation coalition government. If he does, you might point out that extent to which Souvanna Phouma and neutral elements associated with him will be prepared to resist Communist domination will be greatly influenced by their estimate of international support any future Lao Government could get in taking independent stand. Assurance that there would be on ground in Laos strong, effective ICC would be key factor in encouraging [Page 312] Souvanna elements to maintain truly neutral coalition government.
Appreciate Ambassador now away but unaware details his schedule. Above should be used if he can see Nehru prior 30th. Request advise possibilities.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–2361. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Usher, Cleveland, Lee E. Metcalf of SOA, Steeves, U. Alexis Johnson, and Carl F. Salans of L; and approved by McConaughy. Repeated to Vientiane and Geneva for Fecon.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 141.↩