Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

135. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, July 12, 1961, 9 p.m.

Confe 365. From Harriman. In an informal meeting today which we agreed would be considered unofficial and personal I discussed with Pushkin conference procedure. Pushkin remained adamantly opposed to MacDonald compromise proposal¹ but offered in answer to my arguments following proposal: First, that Declaration on Neutrality and Protocol on Controls, taken together, should be considered a “single entity.” Second, they would be considered in order in which they appeared in both currently tabled drafts, i.e., neutrality first, on understanding that if there is disagreement on any provision after one day debate, this provision will be set aside and discussion will proceed to next provision. After discussion of neutrality on this basis, and without attempting further to resolve points of disagreement, conference would proceed with discussion of protocol on controls on same basis. Thereafter, we would then consider how the unresolved provisions of both declaration and protocol could be dealt with by the conference. Pushkin said he had not obtained approval this proposal other bloc countries. He hoped we would give the matter serious consideration and felt that this compromise proposal met all our objections. I told him I would study this proposal, consult my government and let him know. I request urgently the Department’s reaction. I recommend its acceptance in principle, and that I be authorized reach detailed agreement with him and with non-Communist delegations along these lines. There are a number of details which would have to be satisfactorily resolved. For example, the idea of a single day’s debate on provisions in dispute should probably be interpreted as applicable only after we have reached an acknowledged deadlock on a particular provision. It is patent that many provisions would require more than a single day to negotiate. Pushkin agrees, of course, that discussions on general subjects, such as equipment for ICC, access or cease-fire can be taken up in conference any day at the instance of the US or any other delegation.

I feel this compromise gives us the main points for which we were pressing and in some ways is better than the British alternate day proposal as all unresolved matters of both declaration and protocol would be held for consideration at one time.

Martin

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1261. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London, Paris, Vientiane, and Moscow.
1. The MacDonald compromise was described in Confe 353 from Geneva, July 8. With the concurrence of the U.S., French, Canadian, and British Delegations, MacDonald suggested to Puskin either simultaneous discussion of “neutrality” and “controls” on every other day or as the basis of separate committees of the whole. Puskin refused to accept any departure from the Soviet-Chinese procedure of discussing only neutrality. (Ibid., 751.J.00/7–861)