Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

124. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 27, 1961, 2 p.m.

Confe 288. Prince Boun Oum, accompanied by General Phoumi, has just called on me.¹ In discussing situation in Zurich, Phoumi explained that Souvanna Phouma-Souphanouvong attitude from the beginning of talks was one of victor over vanquished. They assume position of political and military strength, in short, practically demanding capitulation. In general talks on government formation, they used rough ratio of two-thirds-one-third. Requested RLG abandon close association with non-Communist world. In fact, Phoumi interpreted attitude as one of abandoning neutrality.

In direct answer to my question as to whether Souvanna Phouma had offered him position in government of National Union, Phoumi said that Souvanna had only indicated that he would not accept any military people in his government, implying that if Phoumi would remove his uniform, he would be acceptable.

In only interjection by Boun Oum during entire conversation, he compared present situation to condition created by Souvanna Phouma Kong Le demands which caused the fall of Somsanith cabinet in August. At that time, although decision in forming of government was left to discretion of King, military threats and pressures were used to induce King to name Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister.

In the face of Souvanna Phouma’s proud and arrogant manner with feeling that political fortunes and military situation all on his side, the only thing Phoumi felt he could do in Zurich talks was to salvage what little he could and to buy time until matter could be referred to the King. The one concession he felt that they had succeeded in wresting from the opposition Princes was the matter of gaining at least temporarily recognition of constitution and prerogative of the King. They felt, however, that in the showdown talks yet to come either in Phnom Penh or Luang Prabang that the same tactics would be used in forcing the King to accept their will.

Phoumi then set forth his position very clearly. Additional reason to that given above why he could not take stronger position in Zurich was uncertainty regarding U.S. position. This was one of the main reasons he had come through Geneva in order to talk with me. In response to my question, Phoumi was completely unequivocal in saying that a negotiated peaceful solution under present circumstances was impossible without resulting in almost complete capitulation to Souvanna Phouma and the PL. If there was to be any true negotiation, the military equilibrium would have to be established which could only be done by strong support from SEATO or the U.S. In this connection, he said that he did not feel that foreign troops in Laos mandatory but at least U.S. would have to take a very firm posture which would clearly indicate to Viet-Minh and Pathet Lao that any attempt to take over Laos completely by military force would be met by force.²

I asked Phoumi directly whether he thought Souvanna Phouma had any freedom of action and whether he was capable of maintaining a neutral stance or leading non-Communist neutral state. Phoumi’s answer was that this impossible. Souvanna Phouma depends completely on Souphanouvong’s PL forces; that Souvanna’s reference to his own forces is a fiction; that if this were not true Souvanna Phouma political position would not continue to receive Souphanouvong’s support.

I told Prime Minister and Phoumi at this juncture that as had been indicated to them last night, I have been authorized to extend invitation General Phoumi to go to Washington in order that our leaders derive direct benefit his assessment Zurich talks and situation in Laos. I explained to Prince Boun Oum reasons why visit by Prime Minister at this time would not be advisable and requested his permission for General Phoumi to proceed to Washington in this informal manner. I also informed him that I would precede him by a short time to be in Washington during his visit.

Phoumi has two ideas. One is to go back see King first, then proceed Washington, arriving Sunday. Other is to proceed directly Washington, thence home. He will give us final answer in few hours.

In summation: Phoumi finds himself in position where he must make decision to face political military facts and capitulate as gracefully as possible, salvaging what he can through use of constitution and King and by cooperation with Souvanna retain some of RLG and other non-Communists in the eventual coalition government under Souvanna. The only other alternative, as he sees it, is for U.S. to make it possible militarily for him to take stronger position with the assurance that if he and the King decide not to accept a dictated solution, that they have our military backing if negotiations break down.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2761. Top Secret; Niact. Also sent to Vientiane as telegram 242 and repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
1. Apparently Harriman.
2. In telegram 2332 from Vientiane, June 28, Brown commented on the discussion with Phoumi. Brown stated that the Embassy could not agree with Phoumi’s assertion that a military equilibrium could be reestablished without the introduction of foreign troops, nor did it believe token foreign forces occupying a few key points along the Mekong have any appreciable effect. Therefore, Brown recommended if the United States decided to intervene in Laos, it should be prepared to fight “at least a Korean type or perhaps a larger war.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2861)