10. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of Defense McNamara0

I–18062/61

SUBJECT

  • White House Meeting on Laos, January 23, 1961

Mr. McGeorge Bundy will prepare and circulate minutes of the meeting.1 The following is merely a preliminary memorandum.

The attached report of the State-Defense-CIA Task Force on Laos was discussed.

After a briefing on the military situation by General Lemnitzer, Secretary Rusk presented the main element of the Task Force2 paper.

The principal discussion turned on the recommendations. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that the recommended actions to improve the military situation (a) to (i) inclusive would be helpful, but would not be expected to reverse the unfavorable longer term prospects. He pointed up the issue of the military desirability of interdicting the Soviet Air Lift through the additional measures in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) versus the State Department’s concern that these measures would greatly impair the prospects of the political negotiations which they propose to initiate. The Secretary of State said that he would not reject (a), (b) and (c) but would want to talk with the U.S.S.R. before undertaking. Furthermore, he would want to have a strategic appreciation with the British and French of the more general problem of the security of Southeast Asia before talking with the U.S.S.R. He felt we may have let our allies off too lightly by permitting them to isolate the Laotian problem. He also thought we should increase our support to Thailand and Vietnam, and seek the creation of a composite SEATO force. In other words, he wishes to smoke out the real attitude of our allies.

The President expressed concern at the weakness of the local situation in Laos coupled with the weakness of allied support for our position. [Page 27] He proposed that, if the British and French aren’t going to do anything about the security of Southeast Asia, we tell them we aren’t going to do it alone. They have as much or more to lose in the area than we have. General Lemnitzer stressed the vital importance of Laos to the security of the entire area and to our relations with our Southeast Asian allies.3

There then followed a more detailed discussion of some of the specific courses of action. It was my impression, confirmed by a call to McGeorge Bundy, that we were authorized, but not directed, to proceed with all the military measures (a) through (i) as may continue to appear to be wise after further detailed exploration. Proposal (c) was, however, subject to clarification by the State and Defense Departments as to the legal status of the PEO personnel engaged in this operation and clearance with the French in the field.

On (i) Mr. Rusk pointed out the great disparity between the risks we may run into in Southeast Asia and the amounts of money involved in these matters. He hoped the President would authorize State to work out more flexible arrangements for handling these matters. The President agreed.

Secretary Rusk summarized the phasing of the steps to be taken in the following manner. First there should be consultation with our principal allies in an attempt to develop a common strategic appreciation. In the meantime, the ICC maneuver entrained by the British should be permitted to run its course. In the meantime, also, preparations should be made for attempting the neutral commission approach which might perhaps be adopted to meet a move in the United Nations with respect to the Laotian question. Concurrently, we should be exploring measures for joint SEATO action and possibly a SEATO commission.

Paul H. Nitze4

[Page 28]

[Attachment]

5

Report Prepared by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Laos

ANALYSIS

I. Current Adverse Factors

Efforts to achieve U.S. objectives in Laos are handicapped by the following factors:

(1)
An adverse current military situation which is deteriorating progressively and which could result in the loss of Paksane and other areas. Time appears to be against us if we do not increase our support of RLG forces.
(2)
An apparent determination on the part of the bloc countries to take maximum advantage of their present opportunity in Laos by introducing the necessary military measures and committing the necessary resources. They may see victory in sight.
(3)
An internal situation in Laos which makes the general populace and even large segments of the army apathetic toward the course of events there. The only real determination appears to reside in the Pathet Lao.
(4)
Uncertainty of SEATO members as to SEATO and U.S. intentions regarding Laos, caused by failure of SEATO up to this point to take action in a crisis which appears to have called for action. This is particularly acute in the case of Thailand, which would be immediately threatened by the loss of Laos.
(5)
Unwillingness on the part of the British and the Australians, and even more on the part of the French and New Zealanders, to support effective SEATO action.
(6)
Unwillingness of the French to use their position in Laos and their military personnel in wholehearted support of the RLG. Indeed, there is evidence of obstruction, at least on the part of certain French personnel, to the defense of Laos. Our own ally is working against us.
(7)
Unwillingness on the part of many important free world countries, particularly South Asian countries, to accept and deal with the present Lao government, thus diminishing its general aura of legitimacy.
(8)
A generally adverse world reaction to recent United States actions in Laos and criticism in important circles even in the United States. There is no important power which would contribute significant forces to a joint military intervention in Laos with the U.S., few who would openly support our intervention. Of those who would, only Thailand is in a position to provide significant number of troops quickly. There would be widespread opposition in the U.S. to committing U.S. troops to support of the RLG.
(9)
The geography of Laos, particularly its isolation and lack of access to the sea, its mountainous-jungle terrain, absence of railroads, inadequate roads and airstrips. Laos would be a most undesirable place in which to commit U.S. forces to ground action.

Measures calculated to achieve U.S. objectives in Laos must reckon with all foregoing concurrently.

II. Military vs. Political Approach

Basic to any effective U.S. strategy in Laos is the necessity for proceeding simultaneously both on the political and military fronts. This is self-evident since it is unlikely, on the one hand, that there could ever be a decisive military victory for our side within the present military and political context, and since, on the other hand, the success of any attempts on our part for a political settlement is directly affected by the military situation. As long as the PL and bloc forces maintain their present advantage through control of the Plaine des Jarres and continued success elsewhere, it would be illogical for them to agree to a weakening of their position without a suitable quid pro quo. If they succeed militarily, there is no necessity for them to negotiate.

Indeed, there appears to be no reason, from their standpoint, why the bloc countries should not capitalize on the opportunities afforded them by their present situation in Laos to create a puppet state in at least the northern part of the country, which they could use as a further springboard against Thailand and Southern Viet-Nam.

III. Possibilities of a Political Solution

Following are the principal considerations which it is believed are likely to affect favorably the willingness of the bloc to negotiate a political settlement:

(1)
Evidence of determination on the part of the United States not to permit a Communist takeover of Laos. This can be evidenced by the type and level of military support being given currently to the RLG, and by convincing proof that increased support will be given in the future. It can also be evidenced by the deployment of U.S. naval, air and ground units which would indicate the possibility, if not the threat, of direct U.S. intervention.
(2)
Support of world public opinion, particularly that of the South Asian neutral countries, of a particularly proposed political solution for Laos to the point that it would have gathered such momentum that it would be difficult for the bloc countries to turn it down.
(3)
It is also possible that the Soviet Union may have uncertainties as to the degree to which, and how, Communist China might exploit the capture of Laos by Communist forces. The Soviet Union may feel that this might lead China to an unpredictable and reckless course of action which would endanger world peace and upset the balance of power between them. The Soviet Union may be in a position now to influence China with respect to their joint policies in Laos because of the dependence [Page 30] of the Pathet Lao forces on Soviet supplies and airlift. China may in the future be able to achieve greater independence of action.
(4)
The change in Administration in the United States, which brings a new President into office with whom Russia has indicated expectations of dealing with on a more cooperative basis than the past Administration. Bloc willingness to cooperate in a Laotian settlement might be highlighted as a proof of good intentions upon which the incoming Administration could assess the possibility of its being able to work with the Soviets. The Soviet Union might be unwilling to prejudice this possibility so early in the new Administration. There is risk, on the other hand, in the new Administration’s committing its prestige and the future of its ability to work with the Soviet Union to the Laos issue, where the bloc countries have at the moment such a favorable situation to exploit.

There is also an advantage to the United States through the fact of the new Administration, in that there will appear to many critics of our past policies a potentiality for a new approach. The new Administration will have an initial momentum which might be an advantage in its relationship with other countries as well as the Soviet Union. Most countries should be inclined to give the new Administration every benefit of the doubt in its attempt to devise new lines of action to cope with the Laos situation.

IV. SEATO

One complicating factor on the present scene is the ambiguous position of SEATO. Since SEATO was created to act in circumstances such as that now existing in Laos and has not acted, it casts doubt not only on its own integrity but on the reliability of the United States as its originator. The obvious reluctance of the British and French and others to take SEATO action with respect to Laos creates general doubt as to the validity of our case in Laos. SEATO becomes a means whereby restraint is imposed on us by our allies against action which we might be willing and able to take unilaterally and which might be generally acceptable.

In view of the great emphasis which the U.S. has placed in the past on its worldwide treaty system, and the probable effect on other existing treaties, such as the Central Treaty Organization and even NATO, we cannot ignore, by-pass or seek to disband SEATO. If we conclude that it is best, in the light of all circumstances, for SEATO not to act directly on Laos, we must in the immediate future take action to clarify its position toward the Laotian crisis by requesting, approving, or at least acquiescing in whatever unilateral United States action is decided on. If SEATO is not to play an important role in the future, it should be progressively de-emphasized and United States unilateral action substituted for it, i.e., by a bilateral treaty with Thailand and whatever U.S. military dispositions are called for by the circumstances.

[Page 31]

A basic problem facing the United States arising out of bloc military success in Laos, failure of SEATO to take effective action, and what has appeared to be a retrogressive series of possible United States actions, is how to inject a basic strengthening effect into the free world position in Southeast Asia. This is necessary both to assure the continued support of Thailand, which must play a role in many of the immediate additional military actions called for in Laos, and to show U.S. determination to prevent Southeast Asia from being captured by the Communists. One way of doing this would be to land United States contingency forces in Thailand, on Thai request, in such a way as to give a clear indication that this did not indicate any expectation or acceptance of the loss of Laos. A careful statement should be made by the U.S. Government explaining its action as related to its long range objectives in Laos and Southeast Asia.

V. Additional Military Measures in Laos

All additional military measures which might be taken now in Laos to counteract the adverse military situation, within the present level of escalation, should be pursued vigorously. The only important additional actions requiring high escalation which might be considered are

(a)
Introduction of Thai and/or other non-U.S. SEATO troops.
(b)
Introduction of United States fighters and/or bombers over Laos.
(c)
Introduction of United States ground forces in Laos.

It is not believed that there is any important advantage to the bloc at the moment in the degree of their escalation. We both engage in military supply. We have introduced fighter aircraft to the RLG, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. They have introduced transports to the PL. They have introduced DRV personnel. We have introduced a few [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personnel. The principal advantage they hold is a quantitative one, i.e., their DRV personnel are much larger in numbers and more effective. Their DRV personnel are with advanced troops, ours are not. The military effect of our fighters has been negligible. In other words, we have not taken advantage of the escalation we have injected.

In considering the possible introduction of additional measures which could be considered a further escalation, it is not, of course, necessary to assume that each would be met by the bloc. It is, however, necessary to analyze whether the introduction of that particular measure by us would, if met, give the bloc an inherent advantage.

In considering the possible introduction of Thai troop units [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] consideration must be given to the fact that the DRV has a very large troop force available in North Viet-Nam, in the order of 13 divisions, which is greatly in excess of the number of available Thais, this being in the order of 3 divisions.

[Page 32]

In considering the possible introduction of U.S. fighter aircraft, consideration must be given to their relative ineffectiveness in interdicting supply on the ground. Russian or Chinese fighter aircraft could probably interdict our air transport as readily as we can theirs. It must be remembered, too, that the RLG controls the large cities, road junctions, and supply centers which provide much better targets for bombing and strafing than are afforded by the Pathet Lao forces operating in mountainous and jungle terrain. Although an air war between U.S. and bloc forces over Laos might not lead to further escalation, the next stage of escalation in Laos itself, i.e., the introduction of U.S. troops, would be highly disadvantageous to us in view of the inaccessibility to Laos, difficulty of supply, greater familiarity with terrain and guerilla type of warfare on the part of the Pathet Lao and the DRV. The fact that a jungle guerilla type war is the most difficult type for organized units, combined with a generally adverse world and U.S. public opinion, would make this a most difficult step to take, consequently we do not have it available as a threat if a lower order escalation fails.

VI. Ultimate Political Objectives in Laos

In supporting any plan for Laos it must be made clear to all that the United States is willing to accept in Laos any truly neutral government, i.e., a government not aligned to either power bloc, if it is committed to protecting itself against subversion. This may make it necessary to go back to the conditions existing at the time of the Vientiane Agreements, including at least tacit acquiescence to Pathet Lao control of Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces.

The promise of free elections in Laos supervised by neutral observers, as part of a general plan, would be one of the best ways of proving to the world the sincerity of our intentions in Laos. We should in this eventuality be prepared for the election of a certain number of Pathet Lao representatives. Certainly, however, if there were a preparatory period during which the Laotian Government gives evidence to its people that it has something to offer them along civil lines, there would be no real danger of losing control to “real”, i.e., Communist dominated, Pathet Lao.

Although it is a question which need not necessarily be faced at the present time, we might even consider the inclusion of “Laotian” Pathet Lao in unimportant positions in the government if this should prove to be a necessary condition. The Soviets are unlikely to agree to any situation in Laos which would permit the coming to power of a true pro-Western government. If we are to achieve our objective of creating Laos as an independent buffer state we must be willing to abandon this as a possibility, providing we have assurances that Laos will not fall under Communist domination.

[Page 33]

VII. Diplomatic Action vis-à-vis the Soviet Government

The key point in our diplomatic action will be the approach to the Soviet Union in response to the two oral statements which have been made, one in Washington and one in Moscow, to the United States Government by the Soviet Government on Laos.6 It would be highly desirable and conceivably essential that we should have more assets both military and political in regard to Laos than we have now before any approach was made to the Soviet Government. These would comprise (a) a stabilization of the military situation within Laos, particularly in the vital areas around Vientiane, (b) a SEATO basis for possible Thai-U.S. action and (c) on the political side a much wider acceptance among our allies and friends of the legitimacy of the present Lao Government.

To approach the Soviets under present circumstances would in all probability invite a sharp Soviet rebuff or at best becoming involved in a conference along the lines suggested by Prince Sihanouk and supported by the Soviet Government. It would therefore appear desirable before approaching the Soviet Government to put into effect military measures set forth in other parts of this document and endeavor to obtain SEATO permissive authorization for U.S.-Thai action. On the diplomatic side a further effort should be made with our allies and friends utilizing the prestige of the new Administration and endeavor to line up solid support for the legitimacy of the present Laos Government.

On the other hand, most careful analysis should be made of the degree to which these measures will indeed provide us with greater assets, political and military. If our considered judgment is that they will not be successful, then we should probably approach the Soviets without further delay. In other words, we should seek to estimate whether with the actions now in contemplation we will in effect at a later date be in a stronger position than we are now as against the possibility that despite these measures our position will have worsened.

GENERAL LINES OF RECOMMENDED ACTION

(1)
First, all steps that can be taken to stiffen the Laotian military situation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] within the present level of escalation should be taken and on proper scale. First priority in personnel, equipment, and funds should be assigned. Previous preconceptions as to limits of action in relations between U.S. personnel and the French in Laos and the Thai Government should be reanalyzed and accommodated to this objective. Proof must be exhibited to the bloc countries of U.S. determination to back the RLG both now and in the [Page 34] indefinite future. It must be made clear that we do not intend to permit the bloc to take Laos.
(2)
An immediate effort should be made to influence world opinion favorably toward the RLG and its cause. We should go out to all friendly countries in the name of the new Administration strongly urging them to accept and deal with the present regime in Laos. We should give assurances as to our ultimate objectives in Laos and at least hint at our plan that would give prospects for a generally acceptable solution.
(3)
Concurrently, strong pressure should be put on France in the name of the new Administration to cooperate in Laos and in SEATO toward the objectives we seek and, after obtaining French cooperation, at the same time we should approach Britain, Australia and New Zealand along similar lines. As soon as the cooperation or at least acquiescence of the other SEATO members has been assured, we should take the necessary SEATO action required to make the SEATO position toward Laos clear and to clear the road for U.S. bilateral action. The SEATO Council should call on or at least authorize each member to take such steps under the SEATO flag, short of direct national military involvement in hostilities, which in its judgment is necessary to deal with the current threat to Laos.
(4)
Assuming the situation still justifies it, U.S. contingency forces should be landed in Thailand, on request of the Thais.
(5)
The U.S. is committed to the British and Canadians to support the British proposal for return of ICC to Laos should exploratory mission of Indian representatives prove successful. Since we are convinced that the Soviets will not accept the text of the proposed reply, or in the event they do accept that either the Indians or Laotians will reject it, an alternative line of political action must be sought.
(6)
While the foregoing is taking place, therefore, we should see that a plan is put forward by the King of Laos for the creation of a commission comprised of Cambodia, Burma and Malaya under the chairmanship of Prince Sihanouk, which will supervise the carrying out a plan of action that has promise of being acceptable to other allied and neutral nations, should satisfy any legitimate international concern of the bloc as to the future status of Laos, and gives evidence of achieving minimum U.S. objectives in Laos. This concept should be merged with the concept of the buffer zone proposed by the King of Cambodia to include Cambodia and Laos. This proposal should be put to our allies with request for their support in the most forceful possible way, making full use of the prestige and momentum of the new U.S. Administration.
[Page 35]

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Courses of Action to Improve Military Situation

Phase 1—Action to be taken immediately

It is recommended that the following military courses of action be approved and that the timing of their implementation be left to CINCPAC:

[paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

b. The training of additional FAL personnel and/or units in Thailand.

Action required:

(a)
Securing approval of Phoumi and Marshal Sarit
(b)
Guaranteeing all costs
(c)
Inform CINCPAC

c. Use of PEO personnel (expanded members, if necessary) as tactical advisers to FAL units, ostensibly as training advisers.

Action required:

(a)
Clearance with JCS
(b)
Secure approval of Boun Oum/Phoumi
(c)
Inform CINCPAC

d. Make use of “silver bullets” and bounty.

Action required:

Inform [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] CINCPAC.

e. Establish a small U.S. logistic support group in Thailand.

Action required:

Clear with JCS.

f. Augment U.S. airlift in SEA in support of RLG either with contract aircraft [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or USAF aircraft.

Action required:

(a)
Clear with JCS
(b)
Provide funds

g. Substantial augmentation of FAL airlift by contract (20 H–34s or 43s), improved observation (3 high altitude helicopters), employment non-Lao commercial pilots and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] technicians.

Action required:

(a)
Clear with JCS
(b)
Provide funds

h. Improve SEATO intelligence collection agency.

Action required:

(a)
Clear with JCS
(b)
Secure approval of SEATO Council representatives
(c)
Provide funds

i. Make available to CINCPAC and CHPEO (1) necessary funds to cover existing deficit from past operations, (2) funds required urgently for current operations (3) a “drawing account” of ten million dollars from which to meet special requirements.

Action required:

Approval of a supplementary appropriation to the extent necessary to cover that portion of the above which cannot be met from current funds.

Phase 2—Possible additional military actions

[paragraph (2–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

[paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified]

7c. Preparation for commitment of U.S. aircraft if ChiComs start fighter escort of airlift.

[paragraph (1–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

e. Removal of restriction on use of bombs and napalm by AT6’s.

[paragraph (1–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

RECOMMENDATIONS

B. Diplomatic Action Vis-à-vis the Soviet Government

Phase 1—No action to be taken immediately.

Phase 2—Possible future diplomatic action.

(a)
At such time as the following political and military objectives have been achieved in Laos (a) a stabilization of the military situation within Laos, particularly in the vital areas around Vientiane, [Page 37] (b) a SEATO basis for possible Thai-U.S. action and (c) on the political side a much wider acceptance among our allies and friends of the legitimacy of the present Lao Government, or it has been determined by appropriate authorities that these objectives are not likely to be attained, it is recommended that an approach be made to the Soviet Government pointing out that the continuance of active Soviet support for armed bands seeking to subvert and overthrow the armed forces of the legitimate Government of Laos cannot but render illusory the possibility of fruitful discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union on other international questions. This message would urge that Laos be made a test case of the ability of our two governments to work together toward peaceful objectives.
(b)
If, however, it is determined to utilize [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] combat aircraft to interdict effectively the Soviet airlift, a formal personal communication should be sent Khrushchev by President Kennedy announcing (a) our determination not to permit overthrow of Lao Government by armed bands sustained and supported from without, and (b) a coherent plan for a political settlement; in other words, offering Moscow the olive branch or the sword.
(c)

SEATO

Discuss bilaterally with SEATO members a SEATO program of action including the following elements:

(1)
Visit by SEATO Secretary General to Laos, who would report findings to SEATO with copy to UN.
(2)
Holding of a publicly announced SEATO Council meeting to examine the nature of Communist intervention in Laos.
(3)
Stationing, subject to Thai’s request, of U.S. military unit (probably a battle group and an air squadron) at Ehorat. This unit to fly SEATO flag, if members agree.

(d)

Proposal for Neutral Commission

Explore first with Laos and Cambodia and then with U.K., France and other SEATO members creation of a neutral commission on following lines:

The King of Laos would invite Cambodia, Burma and Malaya to constitute a neutral commission.

The terms of reference of the commission might include some or all of the following elements: recommend a cease fire, a regrouping of contending forces to positions allocated in the Geneva accord, an amnesty, a cessation of outside military supplies, a broadened Laotian Government and possibly free elections.

(e)

Direct Pressure on Our Allies for Solidarity

Messages to friendly countries emphasizing the importance the new Administration places on concerted action in face of growing general threat and specifically urging coordinated support of RLG.

[Page 38]

POLICY TOWARD LAOS

Problem

To arrive at a sufficiently precise determination of broad policy toward the Laotian situation to give (a) guidelines for planning and action and (b) to leave necessary room for flexibility and initiative to those having specific subordinate responsibilities.

Background Considerations

a.

Internal Political Situation

The King, the Boun Oum government, and the Phoumi forces appear to be the only Laotian leadership presently available to give cohesion to the forces resisting a pro-Communist take-over of Laos. A broadening of the political base of the government, however, appears desirable.

b.

Internal Military—Political Situation

Continued control of the Plaine des Jarres would give the Pathet Lao—Kong Le forces a dominant strategic situation, threatening simultaneously Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Pak Sana. From this dominant strategic position, the symbolic centers of authority in Laos could be isolated and overrun and the country could be cut in half by a thrust to the Mekong River. Such a development of the military threat could mature in a matter of days.

Ambassador Brown reports a psychological weariness on the part of the Boun Oum-Phoumi elements which could result, if there are further military reverses, in a spreading collapse of the Laotian will to resist.

c.

External Political Situation

The Soviet Union has recognized the Souvanna Phouma group as the legitimate government, has recognized a Pathet Lao group as constituting the legitimate provincial government in the Plaine des Jarres area, and is overtly supplying the Pathet Lao forces with an expanding airlift.

The French have supported Souvanna Phouma overtly, and Kong Le covertly, and have not recognized the Boun Oum government.

The British have separated themselves from our policy, are avoiding their SEATO commitments and are seeking the role of middleman between us and the Communists.

The other members of SEATO are prepared to give Laos varying measures of support.

d.

The External Military—Political Situation

Communist Assets

The North Vietnamese can continue and increase the type of support they are giving the Pathet Lao. In addition to support of the Pathet [Page 39] Lao with cadres and supplies they could draw upon their 13 divisions and 16 regiments for “volunteer” intervention forces.

The Chinese Communists could give massive support, either through so-called volunteers, or overtly.

The Soviet Union’s logistic lines are long, but her capabilities for varied forms of support obviously immense.

Western Assets

Thailand has assets which could be committed to Laos [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Thailand has three divisions, one regimental combat team, one ranger battalion, and 128 aircraft in tactical units (33 jets) from which forces could be drawn for [3 lines of source text not declassified].

South Viet-Nam possesses seven divisions, one airborne group, and 88 aircraft in tactical units. They have no jets and only 15 fighters and 30 transport aircraft. Their Air Force Chief, however, has indicated a willingness to use his AD–6 aircraft on ground attack missions.

The Philippines have only one division with a low level of combat readiness, and 68 aircraft in tactical units (37 jet fighters).

Pakistan has seven divisions and 120 aircraft in tactical units (73 jet fighters). SEATO Plan 5–608 calls for the commitment of one brigade group and one squadron of F86’s by Pakistan and she has announced her readiness to make such a commitment.

The United States can provide air support from carriers or from bases in Thailand. A battalion of Marines currently afloat could be introduced in 3–6 days. An airborne Army battalion group in Okinawa could be introduced in approximately the same time. This would leave the remainder of the Marine Division on Okinawa and the remainder of the Army Division in Hawaii as possible commitments from CINCPAC’s resources.

Factors Governing the Commitment of These Assets

It is possible that increased Western [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support would be met by increasing Vietminh and Communist Bloc support along present lines.

It is possible that overt commitment of Thai, South Vietnam and or Philippine and Pakistani forces would be met by overt support from the Vietnamese with backing from other members of the Communist Bloc.

[Page 40]

It is likely that the overt introduction of U.S. forces would bring in Communist Chinese volunteers with backing from other members of the Communist Bloc.

BROAD POLICY ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE

The present crisis in Laos can be viewed as being one of a number of focal points at which over-all U.S. policy is in confrontation with Soviet bloc policy. Many of the interrelated basic elements of that confrontation bear directly on the Laotian crisis and in turn will be affected by its outcome.

The basic objectives of U.S. policy include the maintenance and strengthening of our alliances, the maintenance of a firm position versus the Soviet leadership coupled with a willingness to negotiate, and the maintenance of control over the risk of nuclear war either with Communist China or the USSR.

In Laos itself our immediate aim is to enable the RLG to reestablish firm political control over the population and communication centers. We have no aim to include Laos in any military system but on the contrary would accept and support its neutralization.

It does not appear that this aim can be obtained without increased external aid and support of the RLG from without Laos.

The broad policy alternatives facing the U.S. involve the manner in which we decide to carry out our basic policies in support of our local aim in Laos.

[1 paragraph (6–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Another range of alternatives is to mobilize a far higher degree of political support from our allies for the RLG. This would require a very specific commitment of the new Administration’s initial potential with the French and the British.

A third range of alternatives involves those specific, but relatively minor actions, which can improve the prospects of the RLG of restoring political control in the essential areas, without raising risks of escalation or substantial changes in the present position of our major allies.

A concrete policy would be unlikely to fall clearly in any one of these ranges of alternatives but would combine elements of all three. Emphasis in one direction or the other will, however, be important to our over-all policy.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/3/61–1/31/61. Top Secret.
  2. Not found.
  3. The interagency task force was headed by Parsons and included as principal representatives Walter Rostow for the White House; Paul Nitze for Defense; Richard Bissell for CIA; and William J. Sheppard, Director of the Office of Far East Operations, for ICA. (Memorandum from Parsons to Herter, February 8; Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, Task Force on Laos, 1961, Jan.–Aug.) The Task Force met over the inaugural weekend (January 21–22) and prepared the attached papers.
  4. Parsons also prepared a summary record of this meeting. He wrote that Kennedy “remarked on the unsatisfactory military situation, the geographic propinquity of Laos to the Communist bloc and the unsatisfactory internal and international situation.” The President stated that he did not see how the United States could solve the problem alone and one or more of the factors he had mentioned would have to be improved. The President wondered specifically how the United States could save Laos. During the ensuing discussion, according to Parsons, Lemnitzer emphasized that he did not consider that “Laos was lost.” In response to a question from Kennedy, Rusk noted that the Soviet Union might not seek a complete victory in Laos for fear of extending Chinese influence. Rusk ended the meeting, according to Parsons, with the observation that perhaps the situation could be kept in a state of flux, as opposed to deterioration, with the Royal Lao Government exercising “a fair degree of control of the country.” (Summary record of meeting, January 23; ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/1–2361)
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  6. Top Secret. In Parsons’ summary record of the January 23 meeting with the President, Parsons noted that Rusk suggested that the President “might read parts of the ‘Analysis Paper.’” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2361)
  7. See footnote 5, Document 6.
  8. Recommend for immediate action by Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, it is believed that military advantage, which would lie in the possibility of shooting down Soviet airlift, does not outweigh political disadvantages. It should be recognized that if this action is taken, it will meet with grave misgivings on the part of our British, French and other allies and will risk serious adverse political repercussions on our position in many Asian countries. [Footnote in the source text.]
  9. Dated August 31, 1960, “Plan To Assist the Royal Laotian Government to Counter Communist Insurgency in Laos” is Appendix B1 to “Report of the Military Advisers 13th Conference,” November 1960. (Department of the Army, SEATO Subregistry (Microfilm) Files: Reel S–4–60)