Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

473. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, January 10, 1963, 2 p.m.

1012. Saigon for Harkins. Reference: Department telegram 991.¹ I informed Thanat yesterday that we proposed reduce USAF Tactical Fighter Squadron to nucleus of 6 aircraft with corresponding personnel about Feb 1. Thanat said there would be no political objections on part his govt to this move and proposed that details be taken up in usual military channels.

As outgrowth brief discussion this matter Thanat expressed hope US continued to view SEA, specifically Laos and effects of situation there on Thailand and Vietnam, as critical area warranting closest attention. I assured him we did and cited retention nucleus of combat squadron in Thailand which could be rapidly reinforced and that program now going into high gear.

He referred to recent arrests of Communist subversive suspects in northeast noting that this is evidence of increased Communist infiltration into Thailand and from Laos. He recalled this was precisely what Thais foresaw at time of Geneva neutralization agreement. With some bitterness he claimed Thailand is bearing brunt of “experiment” West pursuing in Laos and asked what if anything we proposed to do about growing subversive/insurgent threat to Thailand. I cited many obvious evidences of US determination to help, including support for number of Thai programs designed to strengthen northeast against subversion: feeder roads, mobile development units, emphasis on increasing counter-insurgency capability of military and para-military forces with training and equipment, community development, etc. Thanat remained skeptical, likening this action to greater effort required to regain lost military position than to have retained it in first place. However, as usual he did not specify what he thought alternative to Laos settlement could have been.

Comment: Embassy assessment of current subversive developments Thailand in process.²Thanat is correct about fact of increasing Communist infiltration.

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.5411/1–1063, Secret. Repeated to Canberra, CINCPACPOLAD, London, Saigon, Vientiane, Wellington, Karachi, Manila, and Paris.
1. In telegram 991, January 3, the Department of State informed Young that while it was desirable to announce publicly the Special Logistics Action, Thailand (SLAT) program before announcing the reduction of the Tactical Fighter Squadron, it could not agree to making it an absolute precondition because of allied participation in SLAT. (Ibid., 792.5411/12–2962)
2. In telegram 1027 from Bangkok, January 14, Young reported a conversation with Prime Minister Sarit in which Young obtained Sarit’s evaluation of the situation in the northeast based on the Prime Minister’s recent trip there. Sarit stated that the situation was growing worse, his government was concerned, and quick action was required. Sarit specifically requested equipment and supplies for Thai Mobile Development Units. Young recommended quick response to this appeal. (Ibid., 795.5/1–1463)