472. Paper Prepared in the Embassy in Thailand0
UNITED STATES PLAN FOR PROMOTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THAILAND
Summary
- (Note: This document constitutes a statement of unilateral US goals. It has not been discussed with the Thai Government. It does not represent what the Thai Government will necessarily agree with or, even more important, what the Thai Government will necessarily put into effect. Therefore, implementation of specific programs may fall short of US objectives and goals projected in this Plan. It will be reviewed accordingly.)
Thailand is a hub of United States security efforts in Southeast Asia. It provides indispensable facilities which cannot be established or made available elsewhere on the Asian mainland between Japan and India. Thailand is now subject to Communist subversion and threatened by insurgency. Thailand has many of the dynamic elements necessary for starting and sustaining national modernization and development.
The purpose of the United States Plan to Promote the Internal Security of Thailand is to marshal all of our efforts and resources—political, economic and military—in order to discourage, prevent and, if necessary, cope successfully with subversion and insurgency. Simultaneously, the United States Plan aims to stimulate the Royal Thai Government to make a maximum effort in proceeding with dynamic programs of development and defense calculated to strengthen the country as a free and growings nation in the shortest possible time. This dynamic planning means modernization of many institutions, training of large numbers of professionally skilled people, widespread social and economic changes, raising of real incomes, realignment of security forces, establishment of communications to permit rapid movement of products, people and ideas, and voluntary participation of the people in the villages and cities in an expanding representative process of decision and consent.
The focus of the Plan is on rural Thailand and its remote areas, since the village and the villager—particularly minority groups—are the [Page 985] immediate targets of Communist subversion by political alienation. The villagers also represent the basic elements for building a stronger Thailand. Fundamental to the Plan is the requirement that the Thai Government assume primary responsibility for developing dynamic administration, extensive public services, and versatile security in rural areas.
The Plan envisages an initial phase of two years for the completion of an inter-related triangular series of political, socio-economic, and security programs. Greatest emphasis is put on programs of short-term impact. Long-range programs, however, are included and must be pursued vigorously. Highest priority is assigned to the following immediate targets: (1) secure the national allegiance of the Thai and non-Thai peoples to their government; (2) improve the collection of intelligence and police patrols in border provinces; (3) improve the economic and social situation of the people in vulnerable areas; (4) develop the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Thai security forces.
The total demand on Free World resources envisaged by this Plan for the period 1963–1967 is estimated at approximately $800,000,000 of which about one-half would be for social and economic assistance. $150,000,000 of this $400,000,000 will have to come from US sources. The second $400,000,000 required to complete the establishment of an effective Thai security force, of a para-military as well as military nature, will have to come mainly from US sources.
As for Thai resources, this plan accepts the Thai Government’s ratio of expenditure of 75% to 25% between non-military and military-police programs. Within this proportion of an expanding government budget, the Plan projects an increasing Thai share of the costs for development and defense as government revenues increase at least 8% per year and the GNP grows at the rate of 4–5% per year. This Plan also points toward sharing the cost of development and defense of Thailand increasingly with United Nations agencies, other governments, and private foundations.
For the long run, the role of the United States envisaged by this Plan is to serve as a “transient catalyst” to enable the Thais to take over many programs and thereafter sustain themselves with their own cadres and institutions. If effectively conducted, this Plan will lessen and eventually eliminate much US aid to Thailand and reduce the size of US organizations substantially.
Since the Thais themselves must lead any effort to strengthen their capabilities and reach a self-sustaining, viable position, a modified version of this Plan will be presented to the Thai Government as a basis for joint US-Thai action. The Plan will remain subject to modification as circumstances change and experience points to more effective ways of achieving objectives. The Plan and its component programs will therefore [Page 986] be kept under constant review with particular attention by the US to opportunities for increasing Thai responsibilities, increasing the aid of other Free World sources, and reducing American resources and personnel involved.
[Here follow the 28-page Plan, divided into 5 sections, and an appendix. Section I is “Background,” section II is “Definitive Statement of Thailand’s Stability and Vulnerabilities,” Section III is “Policy and Objectives,” Section IV is “Course of Action,” and Section V is “Programs and Source Requirements.” A chart depicting Section V is the appendix.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 7925/12–2862. Secret; Priority. This plan, condensed and revised, was sent to the Department of State in airgram A-238 from Bangkok, December 28. The airgram explained that the plan incorporated contributions from major elements of the Mission in Thailand and provided a framework for a coordinated effort to assist Thailand in strengthening its internal security capabilities. The plan would be presented to Thailand in modified form as a basis for joint Thai-U.S. planning and action.↩