Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, June 2, 1961, 9:36 a.m.

1880. Embtel to Dept 3165, Paris Unn, The Hague 154, Kuala Lumpur Unn, Canberra Unn, Moscow 43, London 121, CINCPAC 432.¹ Department concurs Embassy estimate of potentialities Sukarno Moscow visit and desirability inform Sukarno we examining WNG problem urgently.

Accordingly, subject to concurrence by President, Ambassador should seek early appointment with Nasution or Djuanda, making it clear he is acting under instructions, for purpose making following points to be conveyed to Sukarno at earliest appropriate time:

1. President Kennedy extremely pleased by warmth of relationship established with Sukarno and gratified by frankness and friendly tone of recent discussion.

2. President fully appreciates desirability find peaceful solution to WNG problem and is giving personal attention to search for suitable formula. In this connection we appreciated frank presentation of Indonesian views by President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio. These views being given full consideration in our development new approach.

3. Basic to our approach is belief that calm atmosphere will be great help and it earnestly hoped that President Sukarno will be able lend his prestige and influence to maintaining tranquility.

Paris for Brubeck

If President approves, request you urgently instruct Embassy Djakarta (rptd info other addressees) proceed with approach as outlined above.

Bowles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 798.11/5–1561. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Lindquist and Bell on May 29; cleared by Wallner, Tyler, and McConaughy; and approved by Bowles. Also sent priority to Paris for Rusk and repeated to The Hague, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra, Moscow, London, CINCPAC, and USUN.

   In a May 19 memorandum to Rostow, Robert Johnson described a conversation he had with Lindquist who indicated he was clearing a telegram (which was sent as this telegram to Djakarta) “designed to give some sort of general reassurances to Sukarno prior to his arrival in Moscow.” Lindquist said he feared there might be some delay in the approval of a new U.S. position and therefore was clearing the telegram separately and expected to ask for White House clearance. Johnson encouraged Lindquist in his efforts. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 5/61)

1. Dated May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 798.11/5–1561) Johnson and Lindquist discussed telegram 3165 during the preparation of Tab A to Document 175. Johnson described the telegram in a May 24 memorandum to Rostow: “This message suggests that the U.S., before Sukarno reaches Moscow, make clear to him our intention to press forward with a proposal which contains within it the possibility of ‘recovery’ of West New Guinea by Indonesia. The Embassy suggested both an official statement and private assurances.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 5/61)