176. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
3213. For Secretary from Ambassador. During discussion West New Guinea problem with General Nasution today, I passed along our thinking expressed to Sukarno and Subandrio in Washington on desirability of Indonesians making secret contacts with Dutch in effort to work out bilateral solution to problem.
Nasution who had apparently been briefed on this aspect of talks, said he had already taken steps in this direction, that he had representatives in Netherlands at present time in contact with party leaders, including Catholic Party and that he was considerably encouraged by attitudes encountered.
He recognized difficulty in Dutch public position on self-determination with which he said Indos did not find it easy to take this too seriously after 350 years of occupation. [sic] Indos had real trouble with this too, because there continued to be strong regional centrifugal forces and if applied to West New Guinea, self-determination would only result in encouragement other dissidents. He was just winding up one rebellion, he didn’t want any more on his hands. Forging a nation out of such diversity as one found in Indonesia was not always an easy task.
Nasution suggested possibility of avoiding shoal of plebiscite by having Papuan council pass resolution expressing desire return to Indonesian fold. When I indicated some skepticism, he said he thought this might well be possible, particularly if Dutch and Indos actually got together.1
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–2461. Secret; Limit Distribution.↩
- Nasution also discussed with Jones on May 24 the capture of rebel officers who stated they were trained [text not declassified] by Americans, [text not declassified]. Nasution planned to keep the discovery secret for fear of serious repercussions in U.S.-Indonesian relations just at the time of improvement based on the Sukarno-Kennedy talks. Nasution suggested that the U.S. Government investigate and asked, if some agency were involved, would the United States stop further assistance to the rebellion. Generally, Nasution believed the settling of the rebellion was “way ahead of schedule,” and he planned to grant amnesty to rebels after all resistance had ended. (Telegram 3214 from Djakarta, May 24; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, 5/61–7/61)↩