Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State⁰

Phnom Penh, December 19, 1963, 7 p.m.

546. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 534.¹Sihanouk alone and in sense unaided has produced out of thin air in recent weeks present major crisis which, climaxed by his latest speech, has brought US-Cambodian relations to low ebb. Major forces working on him in this situation have been following:

1. His conviction Communists will win in Southeast Asia and Cambodian survival as national entity, which remains his overwhelming obsession, depends upon his making some kind of arrangement with ChiComs.

2. His mental state, [1 line of source text not declassified] compounded by rigid diet cure under supervision French doctor in October.

3. Pathological hatred of US as evidenced by constant campaign of abuse in public statements during past few weeks.

In light of foregoing, my analysis problems US faces in Cambodia is as follows:

1. Sihanouk does not desire good relations with US. Crisis involving abrupt termination US economic and military assistance and posing question whether diplomatic relations will continue, would not have existed unless he wanted it. He has deliberately and publicly distorted every gesture we have made during that period to intensify differences between us and to instill anti-American feelings in masses of Cambodian people. His placing of what he knows to be impossible conditions for visit Dean Acheson to Cambodia indicates he does not desire such visit, and he has used Nong Kimny’s report of conversation with Harriman concerning Khmer-American Highway (Deptel 339)² to create public impression US has belatedly recognized Cambodia’s right to completion certain aid projects, thus implying we violated aid agreements in terminating aid upon receipt November 20 note. Sihanouk is thus distorting and using against us as evidence of weakness or hypocrisy our friendly gestures.

2. Sihanouk is convinced ChiComs winning in Southeast Asia and unless he can receive adequate guarantees against being swallowed up by them, his best course is to join them. He evidently expects new GVN fail in its fight against Viet Cong, and he sees neutralized SVN only alternative to complete domination whole country by Hanoi, with swallowing-up of Cambodia next item on menu. His present course began immediately after Saigon coup d’etat and, while he has backed away from elimination French presence, he is still assiduously courting Peiping favor viewing ChiComs as only real protection against Hanoi in long run. Peiping may be somewhat embarrassed by Sihanouk’s recent actions and reluctant for both financial and political reasons become too deeply involved in Cambodia too soon. In fact Sihanouk may be forcing the pace, while ChiComs may prefer longer term approach which they probably believe would bring all of Southeast Asia into their grasp without risks and without need expend scarce resources in immediate future. This is not to imply, however, Peiping will leave Sihanouk in lurch.

3. Sihanouk either because of strong convictions of wisdom his policy or because of his pathological hatred for US, determined let neither practical considerations nor apprehensions of more moderate Cambodians stand in way of course he has charted. In November 19 Special National Congress he exhibited for first time technique appealing to masses over heads of moderate Cambodians. His subsequent speeches have continued this tactic, and he can be expected repeat his performance with embellishments in semi-annual National Congress scheduled December 29. He is proceeding with his leftist economic policies despite disruption already caused Cambodia’s economic life and even greater disruption which could take place in next months as full consequences those policies become felt. Despite country’s obvious need for rehabilitation Khmer-American Highway and inability keep this highway in optimum condition by its own efforts, he has snubbed our invitation to work out conditions under which we would complete work. By his fervent calls for neutralized SVN and his flirting with Hanoi (DRVN delegation currently in Phnom Penh putting finishing touches on airline agreement) he indicates he is willing risk closing of Mekong when and if new GVN finally loses patience with him.

Foregoing considerations lead me to conclude there is no real hope improvement US-Cambodian relations as long as Sihanouk is unquestioned arbiter this country’s destinies and policies. If Sihanouk does not ask US withdraw all personnel (this could happen at any moment) I believe our best strategy is to pull in our horns, maintain our presence here quietly through existence of reduced Embassy (thoughts on size and nature such Embassy will be subject septel in response Deptel 347),³and seek to ride out storm in hope more moderate elements in Cambodian scene, increasingly disturbed at Sihanouk’s reckless action in economic and political fields, may assert themselves either to remove him from power or circumscribe his freedom of action. We have substantial number of friends here aware past benefits to Cambodia of association with us and fearful of direction in which Sihanouk is leading this country.

I do not see how any further US overtures to Sihanouk could lead to any change his attitude or current policies. Our trump cards of Dean Acheson and Sen. Mansfield, acknowledged by Sihanouk to be Cambodia’s most understanding American friends, produced reaction reported Embtel 534. Time and possibility French through visit Messmer can continue preserve Western influence and position are our best bets for period immediately ahead. However, it is interesting note that Cambodians on all sides are quietly expressing to departing American officials hope and expectation Americans will be back in matter of months. This reaction on part of Cambodians courageous enough to express it shows we have something to build on here for future.

Sprouse

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB–US. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Passed to the White House, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency and repeated to CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 534, December 18, the Embassy reported on a speech Sihanouk made at Prey Nop casting aspersions on South Vietnam’s attempts to improve relations with Cambodia as an American-directed tactic and spurning U.S. efforts to settle differences. (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 3, Document 136.
3. See footnote 8, Document 138. In telegram 347, December 17, the Department also asked for the Embassy’s view of the size and pattern of future Embassy staffing in Cambodia