Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

140. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia⁰

Washington, December 19, 1963, 1:07 p.m.

353. Ambassador Nong Kimny in company with Wongsanith called at his request on Gov. Harriman and Hilsman. On instructions and reading most of his text Ambassador Kimny stated that the RKG desired to inform the US Government of the reasons for which it had halted aid negotiations. The RKG felt that the US unilateral actions had made further negotiations pointless since there was nothing more to negotiate. He listed 16 specific actions taken by the Director of USAID to stop the economic aid program. (Details by pouch.)¹ He listed four specific actions taken by Chief MAAG to terminate military aid program. He particularly emphasized the cessation of POL deliveries and cancellation jute bag program saying that when oil does not flow “everything stops” and without jute bags the country would “choke to death on rice.” He stated these actions were not in conformity with Gov. Harriman’s earlier statements about terminating aid program in orderly manner.

Kimny then stated that Prince Sihanouk “accepted” suggested Acheson visit (Harriman had actually suggested Sihanouk might want to invite Acheson) but believes “we should set up conditions to give Acheson trip a chance to succeed.” He listed three “suggestions” which are identical in substance to the conditions listed in communiqué from Prince’s secretariat. If US could meet these conditions, Ambassador Kimny and Wongsanith would stay in Washington to complete negotiations and make arrangements for Acheson trip. In conclusion he emphasized particularly the importance of cessation Khmer Serei broadcasts saying that their continuation might “cause success of Acheson visit to suffer.”

In reply Harriman took up three points as follows:

1) US thought RKG note of Nov. 20 should be taken seriously as expressing wishes Prince Sihanouk and government. Harriman mentioned other public statements including some by Sihanouk which urged US AID personnel to get out faster.

2) Harriman reiterated that if RKG desires US to complete highway we would be glad to see if arrangements could be worked out to do so.

3) On conditions for Acheson visit Harriman quoted Amb. Yost’s specific instructions on manner in which word “barbaric” was used.² He then reviewed a few of the recent public press and radio statements emanating from Phnom Penh including some by Prince Sihanouk. He noted that RKG had issued a statement of denial and he expressed strong opinion that it would be in the interest of both countries not to reopen the subject since our side would have to reveal what was bothering us and this would be unpleasant. We had accepted RKG statement of denial. We could not review our Ambassadors’ statements without reviewing the whole record and this would aggravate rather than calm situation. Hilsman pointed out how unfortunate it was that possibility Acheson’s visit and these three conditions had been made the subject of a press statement before given to USG, a fact which visibly shook Kimny. In conclusion Harriman took following position:

1) Would postpone any further comment on questions involving aid until his statement analyzed.

2) Recommended that first two conditions for Acheson visit be forgotten.

3) Emphasized that both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had given personal assurances that US not responsible in any way for Khmer Serei broadcasts and he obviously considered RKG should accept these assurances.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) CAMB. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Hannah, cleared by Harriman, and approved by Hannah for Hilsman.
1. Not found.
2. See footnote 3, Document 133.