Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

314. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, October 9, 1963, noon.

450. Reference Department telegram 288 repeated Tokyo 873 CINCPAC unnumbered.¹

1. With presidential election campaign entering final week, two of three main opposition candidates have dropped out and Yun Po-son has emerged as only serious challenge to Pak. Opponents of regime are falling in behind him adding to his vote-getting power. This, plus forcefulness of Yun’s campaign and large turnouts at his meetings are beginning to worry junta. Opposition efforts so far confined mainly to urban centers, campaign in rural areas getting underway as speakers fan out in crucial final week.

2. Despite substantial hostility to junta, especially in urban areas, and rising interest created by opposition oratory, we still do not characterize situation as “opposition boom.” Facing single major opposition candidate, Pak now running harder than before and still enjoys advantages of money, organization, use of govt administrative apparatus, an assured bumper crop and a solid core of popular support.

3. So far govt side has responded with restraint to hard-hitting opposition campaign. Amidst back-room threats of widescale arrests, martial law and election postponement, plus murmurings of assassination possibilities, junta keeping to original election strategy which aims to assure Pak victory in a quiet campaign with minimum of public disturbance. However, signs of growing opposition strength during remaining week could lead junta to change strategy. Concern about outcome of election or civil disturbance could provoke junta to take various actions which would arouse adverse opinion domestically and internationally. Junta’s actions so far to harass and hamstring opposition and its abundant funds, far in excess of legal limits, have stretched credibility in fairness of elections. However, despite its handicaps opposition has managed recently to mount a vigorous campaign with Yun Po-son hitting on two main themes that aim to discredit Pak: his Communist past and the allegation that he is unable to command the support and confidence of the US.

4. We agree with Dept’s view expressed para 3 reftel and to need formulate contingencies and possible lines of action open to US. We tend, however, to formulate such contingencies differently than set forth para 4 reftel.

A. On basis present indications we do not believe junta will postpone or cancel presidential election. In discussions with key leaders we have made clear adverse Korean and foreign reaction that would occur and have found no readiness to take such drastic step.

B. We do not believe junta will arrest Yun Po-son before presidential election. Consequences such action have also been discussed with govt leaders and to date such hard line has been rejected.

5. In our view should contingencies arise in connection with elections they more likely take following form:

A. Opposition boom develops and threatens Pak victory. Junta will react by severe repression opposition campaigning and then stuff ballot boxes or falsify count.

B. If by some freak junta’s plans go awry and opposition wins presidential election, govt would charge election irregularities and seek invalidate result in courts.

C. In addition to, or in place of, legal maneuvering in (B) above, junta would simply declare unwillingness accept unfavorable result and try to continue military govt by decree backed by force of arms.

6. We do not believe junta prepared accept defeat even though mindful of consequences of resort to extreme measures (paras 2 and 6 A reftel). They know blatantly rigged election or use of force to maintain power as military govt could set off public reaction but this would not deter them. We have repeatedly made clear to leaders importance we attach to proper conduct of elections and acceptance of election results, but there are those in ROKG who believe we have to support Korea whatever they may do.

7. Re para 6 reftel, Pak, Kim Chong-p’il and hard core of junta are not interested in compromise with opposition. The opposition on other hand is completely at odds with junta. While publicly promising abstain from political retaliation, if opposition comes to power, we can expect they will not hesitate to purge revolutionaries.

8. If presidential election takes place and Pak can make his victory stick without upheaval, there will still remain the uncertainties in connection with Assembly elections and establishment of govt power within a constitutional frame-work. Opposition will attack Pak victory as rigged and seek arouse public feeling. If serious disturbances occur, junta may be tempted hold off Assembly elections and continue authoritarian rule by an “elected” president. If Assembly elections are held country will go through another bitter campaign, in which govt’s chances are not so good and tendency to resort to unfair practices will be even greater. For example junta has threatened arrest and try (after October 15 elections) opposition politicians for “illegal” actions in presidential campaign. This maneuver, if carried out, would inhibit electioneering in Assembly campaign while also removing from field prominent opposition activists.

9. Our problem is constantly to weigh acceptability and consequences govt’s actions. We may at some time be faced with a clearcut issue, e.g., postponement of elections, martial law, or widescale arrests, and our actions in such cases can be more easily planned. In these circumstances the reactions of Korean people would be discernible and could be taken into account in deciding what actions we should take. We might however be faced with a series of less dramatic actions, no one of which is sharp or drastic enough to create a crisis within Korea or a collision with US, but which cumulatively would produce restiveness in important segments of the population and a generally unhealthy political environment. In such a situation the nature and timing of any decision the US might take would be more difficult to arrive at because it would have no clearcut focal point.

10. We have tended to rely greatly on private advice and carefully weighed public statements to encourage responsible political behavior in hope of building a more or less stable government structure in the wake of revolution. We have also counted on the rise of political forces within the Korean context which could take care of problems without overly active US intervention. While we must continue to rely on advice and official comments in dealing with or seeking to prevent contingencies of the sort laid out in the preceding discussion, such expressions may not be sufficient. We accept the lines of action proposed by Dept in paras 4, 5, and 6 of reftel and in fact have been following those courses as appropriate. However, in certain contingencies, we believe that more fundamental decisions may need to be taken.

11. The lines of action proposed by Dept in reftel are in nature of US reactions to a set of possible extreme measures by junta which we would find undesirable, which would confirm that US unable to deal with junta except on latter’s own terms, and which probably would be unacceptable to a substantial proportion if not a majority of the Korean public. We would therefore be setting the US in opposition to the junta, and in effect instituting a course of action which could have either of two basic objectives:

A. To force a change in junta policy to one which would be acceptable to us and suitable to local situation;

B. To begin process of withdrawing support from junta with purpose of replacing it with an acceptable govt.

Either of these objectives would call forth actions and counteractions involving the full range of complex relations and strategic interests which face US in Korea.

12. Alternative A above is not as harsh or difficult as alternative B, but if faced with intransigence on the part of the junta and a rising tide of public hostility to junta inside Korea it might inevitably lead to alternative B. We would need, therefore, to consider carefully the ultimate objectives we would have in mind and weigh the consequences, risks and alternatives. In dealing with various contingencies it is difficult to decide at what stage it is prudent as well as possible to move from the mild to the more drastic courses. No complete answer can be given in advance of events and the way in which situation develops.

13. We would welcome Dept’s comments on foregoing soonest. We also urge that in event contingencies of sort feared arise, there be close consultation and coordination prior to development our position or any public statement. While fully aware of possible need for quick US reaction, we believe such reaction should not be automatic but should develop in light of actual events and be based upon deliberate and recognized objectives.

Berger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 14 S KOR. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. In telegram 288 to Seoul, October 4, the Department of State suggested that the “hard slugging campaign of the opposition” and the withdrawal of presidential candidate Ho Chang in favor of Yun Po-sun appeared to be bordering on an “opposition boom.” While not predicting victory for the opposition in the October 15 presidential elections, the Department could not rule it out provided balloting and counting were relatively honest. Still, the hard-core elements in the military government were capable of harsh and anti-democratic countermeasures. The Department suggested contingency countermeasures for possible actions by the hardliners. (Ibid.)