239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea0

222. Seoul’s 236 rptd info Tokyo 105.1

1.
Dept concurs your comments para 4 reftel and believes clarification by Ambassador Berger of our position on return to civilian govt in [Page 511] reasonably near future without pressing for specific date would be useful.2
2.
If Embassy thinks it would be helpful in order disabuse PriMin Song and SCNR Colonels of notion that US favors prolonged military rule, Dept prepared to consider, upon Secretary’s return, a letter from him to Song along line of Ambassador’s intended clarification,3 perhaps in reply Song’s letter thanking Secretary for his July 27 press statement.4
Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/8-461. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Manhard, cleared by Koren, and approved by McConaughy.
  2. In telegram 236 from Seoul, August 4, the Embassy reported that it had indications that the younger members of the SCNR, Prime Minister Song, and KCIA Director Kim Chong-pil were resisting the idea of relinquishing military rule during the next 2 years. The Embassy also received an indication that Pak Chung-hui would welcome a private statement that the United States hoped for a quick return to civilian government. (Ibid.)
  3. On August 12 the SCNR announced a program for eventual return of the government to civilian control under revised constitutional provisions. The government would begin drafting a new constitution and electoral law in October 1962, hold a referendum on the constitution in March 1963, and hold general elections for a president and a unicameral legislature in May 1963. Included in the program was an “Qualifications Examination Board” to approve candidates for elections. Berger advised the SCNR that the board was a poor idea as it would be open to manipulation. (Telegram 269 from Seoul, August 9; ibid., 795B.00/8-961)
  4. Berger met separately with Pak Chong-hui and Prime Minister Song over the weekend and used the opportunity to talk about restoration of civilian rule. Pak claimed there was no difference of opinion in the SCNR about the principle of restoration, just about timing. He promised to send Berger a plan for restoration. Song thought the restoration’s timing was a difficult matter. If it came too soon, it would only restore incompetent and corrupt politicans and encourage factionalism. In light of Pak’s promise of a plan, Berger thought that the Department should hold the Secretary’s letter in abeyance. (Telegram 250 from Seoul, August 7; ibid., 795B.00/8-761)
  5. See footnote 2, Document 237.