Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

238. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Korea (Berger)⁰

Washington, August 1, 1961.

Dear Sam: One of the continuing problems which has concerned the President, Secretary McNamara, and me for some time is how to assure that the effectiveness and cost of our military assistance programs are consistent with the role to be played by U.S. forces and our major new efforts in other foreign programs, including economic aid. Our recent experience in presenting the President’s new aid legislation to the Congress¹ indicates that influential members of the legislative branch are similarly concerned.

We recognize the need to provide military assistance where necessary in our continuing security interests. In our view, however, many of our country programs reflect habits of thinking and methods of operation built up over the years which do not come fully to grips with the range of problems and opportunities which confront us. A realistic reassessment of these country programs in context of our political, economic, and military policies is imperative, bringing the whole spectrum of external and internal threats and capabilities into focus to determine the optimum thrust and balance of our overall effort.

The military review must be also related specifically to the current major reassessment of our economic aid activities requested in my Circular Airgram 1065 of June 23, 1961.² Our real military requirements must be evaluated before our economic judgments can become final, just as we must know probable economic resource capabilities and demands thereon before we decide on our military programs.

As a first major step in this process, Mr. McNamara and I have determined that a special priority should be given to a review of our programs in seven major aid-recipient countries—Korea, China, Vietnam, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Greece. An interagency Steering Group, chaired by State, with representatives from Defense, AID, and the Joint Staff, has been established to supervise this review separate from the FY 1962-67 military assistance planning now in progress (CW-608 of July 21, 1961).³

As you are aware from your participation in the Korean Task Force meetings our recently established policy assumes that, in both U.S. and Korean activities, priority should be given to the crucial internal problems and to the contributions which the Korean military establishment might make to economic development. Also as indicated in the Task Force Report,⁴ the JCS is reviewing ROK force levels and assessing their missions and strategic implications of alternative force structures. It is our hope that you will be in a position to provide a background combining all factors relevant to U.S. interests and decisions on longer term goals. In addition, this re-evaluation of military assistance would extend the review period to FY 1967, stressing the need to examine the policy alternatives both for the U.S. and those which may be feasible for Korea, and would seek to evaluate the risks and consequences of those alternatives and the military and economic aid measures related thereto, and to point up the optimum distribution of total resources in the U.S. and Korean interest.

For this review to be effective, your personal appraisal beyond the contributions of your associates, will be required and should be directed primarily at long-term aspects of our military assistance policies. While short-run considerations must be included in our planning, we are chief-ly interested in where you believe we should be by 1967.

To this end we are seeking the most informed answers to the types of questions, among others, presented for Korea in the first enclosure to this letter to assure ourselves that we are following the most promising course in relating military assistance to our overall objectives and other U.S. programs over the next few years. The answers may, of course, be provided separately or within the framework of a general response to the issues raised, whichever is considered to be most effective. I hope as well that the particular questions will not limit the scope of the response.

Perhaps the most important question is whether, despite the continuing risk of renewed local aggression, we should not somewhat reduce the size of the military aid insurance policy we are buying in South Korea in order to direct greater U.S. and indigenous resources to meet the crucial need for dynamic social and economic growth. Though to do so might involve taking greater calculated risks with respect to ROK military defenses, the continued presence of substantial U.S. forces plus the UN umbrella might suffice to reduce this risk to acceptable proportions. These are questions for your judgment.

Alternatives to the basic guidance used in preparation of the revised FY 62-67 plan, attached as enclosure 2 of this letter, have been formulated to provide a practical framework for judging the consequences of military program adjustments on costs and other factors in the context of other programs. Your views on these alternatives will also be solicited directly by CINCPAC through regular military assistance channels. A copy of your reply should go to him for consideration of the military consequences. These are clearly not the only possible alternatives, and we would welcome your views on any other you think desirable. All of this, of course, must be treated as an internal U.S. exercise.

I realize that this intensive review, coming on top of other requests for economic analyses and regular military assistance program reviews, will put a heavy burden on you and your associates since I would appreciate having your response by September 1 if possible. I also realize, however, the particular difficulties you are now facing and can well understand that you may feel a look into the next five years would not appear either practicable or worthwhile at this moment. If such should be the case, I would appreciate your view of an appropriate time to accomplish this task. I would hope on the other hand that this would not be too long delayed for we are faced with the need very soon to take a number of basic decisions on the nature and volume of military and economic aid to be programmed in FY 62 and that to be requested of the Congress in FY 63.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Dean⁵

Enclosure 1⁶

PROPOSED MAP QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KOREA

I. What alternative political developments may occur in Korea in the planning period with respect to such issues as unification, alliances, form of government?

A. How do these relate to U.S. national interest?

B. How do they relate to policy goals of the communist bloc?

C. What military and economic requirements are associated with such developments?

II. How can military assistance policies and programs contribute to overall U.S. aims in Korea?

A. What are the military, economic, political, and social threats to U.S. interests in Korea over the planning period; which of these are likely to be the most serious; against which should (a) U.S., and (b) Korean resources be focused?

B. What positive contributions can ROK forces make to the healthy development of Korea in the next few years and how can MAP programs encourage such contributions?

C. Can MAP policy have any influence with the SCNR on the issue of civilian participation in government?

D. What are the probable future military command relationships (UN, US, ROK) and how will these relationships affect military requirements and MAP policy?

III. What role for ROK forces will best serve U.S. interests?

A. Should this role be limited to meeting the threat from North Korea and maintaining internal security?

B. If larger forces are to be maintained what considerations should limit their size.

C. Does the “UN umbrella”—UN command structure, demilitarized zone, and U.S. forces in Korea and nearby—contribute a sufficient deterrent to communist attack even if the ROK forces were to be considerably reduced.

D. Should ROK forces be considered for deployment outside of the area?

IV. In the context of fundamental internal problems, what should be our approach to the threat of communist aggression against Korea from North Korea and Communist China?

A. How might the chances of successful aggression relate to the internal situation?

B. To what extent is Korea capable of developing forces to defeat such aggression?

C. What risks are involved in maintaining an imbalance in ROK forces (e.g., lack of air force strength) and do U.S. policy considerations justify a continuation of this imbalance. Will U.S. and UN forces continue to be required in support of the ROK to meet external aggression in any event?

D. What limits should be placed on the provision of modern and dual-capable weapons to ROK armed forces? What are the costs and risks in such a military emphasis?

E. What added local facilities and military capabilities would be required to permit the introduction of larger UN or U.S. forces in defense of Korea?

V. How should the U.S. approach areas of difference between the U.S. and ROK views on military requirements and priorities?

A. What are the prospects of current ROK thinking on defense policies changing over the next five years?

B. What are the consequences and risks involved if divergent US/ROK views on military policies developed, e.g., is the ROK likely to launch an attack against North Korea; rely on its own resources in the event of a withdrawal or reduction in military assistance at the expense of ROK economic and social development?

C. What risks are involved for the U.S. if we accept fully ROK views on military requirements and priorities?

D. What are the prospects for changing the primary emphasis of U.S. programs from military to economic and what U.S. measures would be required to do this.

VI. Faced with severe limitations of local human, material, financial and institutional resources, how should local and external resources be distributed across the spectrum of possible uses (military, economic, and social) to achieve the desired long-term results of national strength and independence?

Enclosure 2⁷

ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR KOREA

I. Alternatives:

The following proposals are alternatives to guidance used in preparation of the FY 62-67 MAP as per CW 608 of July 21, 1961 which includes, inter alia, retaining ground forces at the current level and providing equipment comparable in effectiveness to that possessed by forces of neighboring communist states. Further it should be assumed that there will be progressive reductions in supporting assistance throughout this period.

A. Alternative #1:

Provide only maintenance support for current ROK Armed Forces for period 62-67, thus deferring currently planned force improvements, including the provision of complex and sophisticated weapon systems; i.e., missile systems and F-104 aircraft.

B. Alternative #2:

Reduce the current 600,000 ROK Armed Force by 50,000 men annually during the planning period FY 62-67; thus limiting U.S. military assistance support of ROK armed forces to 350,000 men commencing FY 68. This reduction in force and loss in combat capability is to be effected without off-setting modernization.

II. Assessment of Alternatives:

For each alternative under I above, a summary of Country Team assessments should be provided covering as a minimum the following:

A. The estimated political, military, and economic consequences of each alternative.

B. A determination of the U.S. and country political, military, and economic measures which would be necessary if the alternatives were to be implemented.

C. A feasible time schedule for the implementation of the alternatives.

D. The order of magnitude costs of each alternative on the country and on military assistance, and supporting and other economic assist-ance programs for the period FY 62-67.

E. An estimate of the interrelationship of each alternative with currently proposed development assistance requirements (CG 1066 of 23 June 61 and replies thereto).

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5-MSP/8-161. Secret. Drafted by Martin M. Tank of the Office of the Deputy Coordinator for Foreign Assistance on July 25. Cleared by Peterson, George A. Morgan of S/P, Deputy Coordinator for Foreign Assistance John O. Bell, William Bundy, William A. Ellis of ICA, Jeffrey C. Kitchens of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Assistant Director of Bureau of the Budget Kenneth R. Hansen, Komer, and General Counsel for the newly created AID, Seymour J. Rubin.
1. Which became Public Law 87-195, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, approved September 4. (75 Stat 424)
2. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/6-2361)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 700.5-MSP/7-2161)
4. See the source note, Document 225.
5. Printed from a copy that indicates Secretary Rusk signed the original.
6. Secret.
7. Confidential.